The threat of wonderful power conflict, thought by some to be a remnant of the 20th century, has been powerfully resurrected by the war in Ukraine.
A new, possibly more complex, theater for this opposition is emerging in Central Asia as the dust settles on the fast repercussions of this conflict.
Central Asia serves as a possible focus point where the interests of Russia, China, and the United States are extremely intertwined with frequently palpable tension, despite observers ‘ long-recognized the state’s geopolitical significance.
Crucially, unlike other contested places, two of these capabilities share broad borders with the location, adding a level of physical contact that intensifies the stakes.
Central Asia, comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, finds itself at a critical moment.
Generally a crossroads of dynasties, the state’s post-Soviet freedom has been marked by a delicate balancing act, navigating the effects of its strong companions.
However, the lack of a strong, indigenous method of social security leaves it vulnerable. The region’s dispersed political and economic landscape creates a political vacuum that big powers are extremely excited to complete, often dubbed the least included region on earth.
Despite appearing to be a weakness, this lack of a unified local identity ironically presents both a challenge and an opportunity to withstand the currents of intense power conflict.
The integration of interests is apparent. Central Asia continues to be a vital transit point, a buffer against perceived European intrusion, and a vital sphere of influence for Russia.
The conflict in Ukraine, while straining Moscow’s sources, has instantly highlighted the importance of its “near internationally” for financial sustenance and other trade routes.
Central Asia serves as the foundation of China’s continental connectivity, a source of essential resources, and a crucial component of its westward expansion, according to its Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI ).
Despite going through a period of fluctuating engagement, the United States still has interests in preventing the unchallenged dominance of either Russia or China in this strategically important region. It also maintains interests in fighting terrorism, supporting democratic governance, with a waning emphasis.
This integration of these great strength passions, however, is not essentially harmless. The potential for tension is evident. Russia, weakened by the Ukraine conflict, is afraid of China’s growing financial and possible social impact.
While recent language emphasizes collaboration, the long-term repercussions of China’s ascension in the region are a source of uneasiness in Moscow. On the other hand, the US is concerned that Russia and China might impose more oppressive policies and restrict the political place in Central Asia.
Network projects, security cooperation agreements and even social exchanges have become arenas for delicate, but important, power projection. Without a strong regional framework, these competing interests risk escalating into a modern-day” Great Game”, albeit with more actors and more complex dynamics.
Herein lies the potential saving grace: the C5 1 framework. The five Central Asian states and the United States are paired together in this diplomatic platform, which provides a unique opportunity for informal collective action while maintaining the flexibility that individual states need to interact with all external powers.
Unlike rigid security alliances that would inevitably alienate at least one major player, the C5 1 provides a venue for dialogue, coordination on issues of mutual concern ( such as border security, economic development, and environmental challenges ) and, crucially, a platform for the Central Asian states to articulate their collective interests.
The strength of the C5 1 lies in its informality. It enables countries in Central Asia to communicate with the US without being directly in the crosshairs of Russia or China. In addition, it gives the US a place to establish itself and exert influence in the area despite its explicit military responsibilities.
This adaptable structure can be used to increase one’s resilience against excessive pressure from one great power. The C5 1 can help to create a stronger sense of regional identity by promoting intra-regional cooperation on practical issues, making Central Asia less susceptible to serve as a launching pad for external rivalries.
However, the C5 1 is not a panacea. Its viability depends on the persistence of all parties and the ability of the Central Asian states to put forth a front that is unwavering. Its potential may be undermined by internal divisions and varying degrees of alignment with external powers.
Beyond primarily addressing economic and developmental concerns, the framework must evolve to include more nuanced discussions on security and strategic autonomy.
Central Asia is positioned as a region ripe for intensified great power competition in the post-Ukraine landscape. In the absence of effective regional integration and collective security measures, external actors are eager to make use of vulnerabilities.
Yet within this challenge lies an opportunity. With its inherent flexibility and inclusive nature, the C5 1 framework provides a promising platform for encouraging collective action and giving Central Asian states the ability to navigate this complex environment.
Central Asia’s future will depend largely on the viability and evolution of frameworks like the C5 1 in shaping a future in which cooperation, rather than competition, determines its course, or whether it becomes merely a center for great power rivalry or a region that successfully exploits its strategic location to its own advantage.
Understanding and constructive dialogue with this dynamic will be essential for policymakers in Washington, Beijing, and Moscow to ensure stability and prosperity, not just for Central Asia but for the wider Eurasian landmass.
The Maqsut Narikbayev Institute for Networking and Development ( MIND ) in Astana, Kazakhstan, is home to Miras Zhiyenbayev, the head of the foreign policy and international studies program.