Australia’s submarine ideas are slipping due to aging Collins-class warships and AUKUS risks, forcing difficult decisions on its future underground warfare skills.
This month, Naval News , reported , that the American government has designated the Collins class regular underwater sustainment program as a “product of concern”, following a Defense Australia , recommendation , to strengthen supervisory oversight of this important capability.
According to Naval News, this statement highlights the difficulties that these boats face in extending beyond their original design’s lifetime. The Albanese government is reportedly committed to investing AUD 4 to 5 billion ( US$ 2.56-3.2 billion ) over the next ten years to ensure that the Collins school is in place until its planned withdrawal in 2030.
The Australian Shipbuilding Company has a fresh AUD$ 2.2 billion sustainment agreement, which was signed in June 2024, according to the report. This agreement replaces the one under the previous coalition government that included an Hey 120 million efficiency dividend.
The Collins school has experienced significant problems, including unprecedented levels of erosion, which necessitated complete remediation measures, according to Naval News. It states that the title of “product of problem” aims to address these issues through better oversight and a upcoming summit in early 2025.
According to the report, this initiative is a part of a wider effort to ensure that no capability gaps exist until the transition to typically military, nuclear-powered submarines is finished.
Underscoring the weight of the issue, American Broadcasting Corporation News , reported , in November 2024 that the Royal Australian Navy is grappling with a major operational problem. According to the review, the navy now has just one of its six Collins-class ships that is fully operational.
This condition is brought on by immediate repairs and scheduled upgrades that the aging ship, which has experienced exceptional ship erosion, are required, according to ABC News. The report says two ships are stationed at Adelaide’s Osborne factory, where employee cuts are causing difficulties in their extensive repair, known as full-cycle landing.
Additionally, the report mentions three ships are at Western Australia’s Garden Island marine center, with at least one awaiting documentation to return to support.
Despite these difficulties, ABC News maintains that Defense Australia can match the government’s operational presence goals, even though certain submarines ‘ specific locations and accessibility are unknown for security reasons.
Australia may hope to re-establish its underwater warfare capabilities by purchasing nuclear attack submarines ( SSNs ) under the AUKUS framework, but that prospect has an uncertain future.
Asia Times , mentioned , this month that Australia’s nuclear submarine ambitions under the AUKUS security pact face significant challenges due to a weak US production base, uncertainties from a second Trump administration and reluctance to share nuclear technology.
A recent US Congressional Research Service ( CRS )  , report , suggests that US SSNs could perform Australian and US missions in the region in lieu of Canberra’s acquiring nuclear attack submarines ( SSNs ) under AUKUS. Similar arrangements already exist between the US and its NATO allies. The report provides alternative strategies for reinvesting funds used for SSNs into other military assets, including forward rotations of US and UK SSNs to Australia. The report warns that if Australia’s SSN plans reach a cost-accounting death spiral, it could reduce funding for other military capabilities, impacting deterrence against China.
Critics claim that Australia should leverage its distance from China to avoid projecting military power into China’s near-mainland and that the AUKUS SSN project lacks a clear strategic rationale.
US President-elect Donald Trump’s return to the White House raises concerns about the future of AUKUS, with potential demands for increased Australian contributions. Further, Australia’s reluctance to cooperate on nuclear power complicates its SSN ambitions.
Australia might have to reconsider acquiring SSNs from an alternative source given Australia’s looming underwater warfare capability gap and the uncertain future of AUKUS.
In an , article , for the Strategist this month, Peter Briggs argues that Australia should prepare to acquire at least 12 French Suffren-class SSNs, as the current AUKUS plan for eight SSNs faces increasing risks.
According to Briggs, the AUKUS plan, which includes three US-built and five British-built SSNs, is unlikely to meet deadlines due to production delays and design challenges. He claims that the Australian government, which will be elected next year, should choose the French design to ensure deliveries by 2038 by 2026.
He mentions that the Suffren class, already in service with the French Navy, offers a more feasible solution with its 5, 300-ton displacement, 70-day endurance, and 60-person crew. He claims that this ship’s design is best suited for anti-submarine warfare and can accommodate missiles and special forces.
Briggs says the AUKUS SSN plan’s mixed designs and oversized UK submarines, driven by reactor dimensions, are unsuitable for Australia’s needs and pose significant crew and cost challenges. He adds that the AUKUS plan is further complicated by US and UK submarine production issues, making the French Suffren class a more affordable and practical choice.
He claims that this change would allow Australia to continue to offer SSN training to its allies in the US and the UK and establish a joint construction program with France to meet its maritime security requirements.
However, acquiring 12 French-built Suffren-class SSNs would require a radical shift in Australia’s defense posture, away from the AUKUS arrangement and toward dependence on French defense infrastructure.
The Suffren class is a capable SSN, but the political and strategic risk associated with reneging on the AUKUS framework and the need to invest in nuclear infrastructure over the long term makes it so.
There are ongoing debates about whether the AUKUS framework was the best way to restore Australia’s underwater warfare capabilities in light of Australia’s aging Collins submarines and the uncertain future of its AUKUS SSN plans.
In a June 2024 , debate , published by the United States Studies Center, Richard Dunley argues that the plan is optimal given limited alternatives. He emphasizes the acquisition of Virginia-class SSNs from the US as a” stopgap” solution that accelerates Australia’s nuclear submarine capability. He also makes a point of mentioning the benefits of supporting a joint industrial base by co-developing the UK’s SSN.
Elizabeth Buchanan, in contrast, points out that the AUKUS SSN is too expensive and ambitious and advocates for a more practical approach that uses US and UK submarines using Australia’s “pit-stop power.” This arrangement, she argues, better aligns with Australia’s strategic and resource constraints.