The Taiwanese government appears to be lending a hand in support of the head of Myanmar’s military dictatorship as the legitimate rope pulls with the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor for an arrest permit.
In August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar for his first meet with Myanmar‘s junta leader, Min Aung Hlaing, since the February 2021 military revolution plunged the country into civil war.
Finally, last month, Min Aung Hlaing reciprocated with his first visit to China as brain of the junta.
According to reports in recent weeks, the Chinese government and the military coup in Myanmar are setting up a joint safety company to defend Chinese tasks and personnel from the civil war. This growth is very concerning and does not have any positive effects for the concerned parties.
The action comes after the opposition’s run of notable military successes, including Operation 1027 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance over the past year. These rebel groups captured large swaths of country near the China-Myanmar border, at least initially with China’s implicit support.
After decades of hedging its bet, there is still much to learn about the implementation of these secret Chinese security guards in Myanmar. However, one thing is sure: China has decided to firmly support the coup.
China’s increasing usage of personal security companies
A wide range of governments are using private security companies and private military companies to show influence and power in other nations without the political complexities that come with deploying classic military forces.
Private security firms provide basic stability to a nation’s citizens or property. Personal military companies, on the other hand, offer more in-depth military service for institutions or other players. This might involve enhancing military training and combat or combat operations.
China has a lot of new models to observe, such as Russia’s Wagner Group and the American Blackwater company. It was a bit late to the game of international private operators.
The private safety sector expanded as a result of the parliamentary changes in China in 2009, with lots of private providers working to protect personal assets from Central Asia to Africa.
Foreign private security firms typically avoid conflict roles and concentrate on protecting infrastructure projects, employees, and investments related to the Belt and Road Initiative.
The fresh joint security company’s presumably will expand the scope and number of these operations, though there are now four Chinese private security firms in Myanmar.
What do they seek to protect? The Myanmar-China Economic Corridor, which connects Kunming in Yunnan province of China with Kyaukphyu in Rakhine condition on Myanmar’s northern coast, is China’s most important strategic job. It includes a proposed railway and two suggested oil and gas pipelines. China is even constructing a interface it.
In Shan state and the Mandalay place, these pipelines pass through a range of armed groups ‘ handled place. The strong Arakan Army, a part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, also controls the region around Kyaukphyu.
In contrast, opposition parties have already seize control of a Chinese-owned concrete shop in Mandalay and a metal processing plant in Sagaing Region.
What are the probable implications?
There is little to stop the PLA from influencing these organizations ‘ operations on the ground, despite the fact that private security companies are supposedly independent of China’s People Liberation Army ( PLA ).
Additionally, having Chinese private security companies in Myanmar increases the likelihood of Chinese immigrants being harmed and probably killed.
Authoritarian regimes that are facing common violent opposition can occasionally fall fast, as the new magnificent fall of the Assad regime in Syria demonstrates.
Russia and Iran are now learning that backing a brutal regime can strand military and economic assets when the situation unexpectedly turns. China ought to take these implications into account.
The involvement of Chinese security forces would be embarrassing for the junta because it would not be able to defend its chief ally’s economic and strategic interests even if it had one.
Additionally, it increases the junta’s dependence on China as much as it already is. China continues to be a significant military and economic partner to the junta despite Russia being the main supplier of weapons since the coup.
The Chinese security operations make it even more difficult for the opposition forces to exert control over significant economic and population centers.
And it might mean that China will now rescind its support for some of the ethnic armed groups that are fighting the junta, such as those who are the Communist Party of Burma and have ethnic Chinese roots. This could cause the opposition to shift more toward domestic small arms production.
The opposition may look to diversify its economic activity beyond smuggling or trading routes into China, which could ultimately lower China’s leverage over these individuals.
Lastly, the Chinese security forces may further entrench anti-China sentiment throughout the country. In October, for example, the Chinese consulate in Mandalay was damaged in a bombing attack.
What are the regional implications?
India will undoubtedly be concerned about these developments. In Rakhine state, which is directly across the road from India’s own massive investment projects in the country, will there be an increasing number of Chinese security forces stationed if the plans are implemented.
Bangladesh and Thailand, two of Myanmar’s other neighbors, are undoubtedly concerned about having Chinese forces on their doorstep and possibly holding meetings with Myanmar officials.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) will continue to demand a more inclusive political solution to the conflict, despite China’s newly gained support providing a lifeline for the junta.
They are unlikely to agree with the expansion of Chinese security forces in Myanmar.
Adam Simpson is senior lecturer of international studies, University of South Australia
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.