A new record that exposes the ticking time bomb inside both US and Chinese missiles suggests that aging jet energy may be slowly crippling the nation’s nuclear arsenals.
South China Morning Post (SCMP ) reported this month that Chinese rocket scientists have discovered that the solid fuel used in intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBMs) ages much more quickly than previously thought, potentially making hundreds of missiles unusable.
Major changes in the fuel columns that can happen within the next 30 years, making them unable to resist the loads during flight, were discovered in China’s National Key Laboratory of Solid Rocket Propulsion in Xian. This finding might explain the regular launch failures that some nuclear powers have experienced in recent years.
The older engineer Qin Pengju led the study, which revealed that while the aged propellant appeared stable during regular storage, it quickly became considerably more brittle when under high pressure. It mentions that the research focused on the solid fuel commonly used in ICBMs: ammonium perchlorate, aluminum powder and hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene ( HTPB) binder.
According to SCMP, the study’s results suggest that after just 27 years, the battery’s flexibility may be compromised, leading to potential fast fractures during launch. It notes that the topic has raised questions about the US’s declining nuclear deterrent capacity, which relies on Trident II weapons and Minuteman III weapons from the 1970s.
A Minuteman III ICBM check that went wrong in November 2023 may have heightened concerns about the US’s aging land-based nuclear army, perhaps as an example of the instability of aging ICBMs. According to an anomaly, the unarmed weapon was launched from Vandenberg Space Force Base.
While the Minuteman III as a whole is nonetheless considered a reliable arms structure, its subcomponents, such as the container, technology and weapon, are outdated and may have been neglected.
As delays and price shortfalls plague its next-generation LGM-35A Sentinel system, according to a report from Asia Times that the US is under increasing pressure to replace its aging Minuteman III ICBMs.
Budgeted first at US$ 95.8 billion, the Sentinel’s price has surged to an estimated$ 160 billion, forcing the Pentagon to support the raise under the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment. According to Covid-19 disruptions and prices, generation delays have postponed its implementation until 2029. As a result, the US Air Force has stretch Minuteman II I’s duration.
In addition to outdated delivery methods, Asia Times reported in January 2024 that the US’s proper barrier is severely hampered by the country’s aging of uranium mines in US nuclear arms. Despite plutonium’s 24, 000-year half-life, micro changes over time can impact the backup protection and violent yield of nuclear arms.
The US National Nuclear Security Administration ( NNSA ) has struggled to build new plutonium pits, with the goal of 80 pits per year unanticipated until 2030 or later. This gap is attributed to a post-Cold War tradition of apathy, a lack of skilled workers and limiting environmental rules.
Existing mines, designed for older arms, does not perform as required in newer techniques, raising concerns about the stability of the US nuclear arsenal.
Keeping the 1970s-era Minuteman III poses major problems. Lauren Caston and other authors claim that the aging equipment and components that require ongoing development are essential to keeping the aging Minuteman III in company in a February 2014 RAND statement.
Caston and others make the claim that while the Minuteman III Service Life Extension Program ( SLEP ) aims to replace crucial subsystems like guidance and propulsion with incremental modernization, the obsolescence of the original manufacturing processes and materials, which makes it necessary to rely on more expensive, contemporary alternatives.
Another major operational requirement is the monthly check firing charge, which accelerated after 2017, when the price increased from three to four tests per year, due to the depletion of missile inventory. Without boosting new production, they claim that America’s missile stockpile could fall below the required operational levels by 2030.
Parth Satam mentions in a July 2024 article for The Aviationist that it is much less expensive to extend the Minuteman II I’s life until 2050 because previous renovations cost only$ 7 billion for 450 missiles, as the US struggles to keep the Minuteman III in service while defending the Sentinel’s ballooning costs.
Satam points out that maintaining these outdated systems is technically challenging due to outdated documentation and a lack of skilled technicians. He contrasts that to the Sentinel program, despite its$ 140 billion price tag and cost overruns, promising a modern, cyber-defendable command and control system.
Satam says the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) projected lifetime for the Sentinel, set up to 2075, is arbitrary and inflates costs. He claims that a more flexible timeline could increase the viability of the Minuteman III extension. However, he cautions about the risks of not modernizing, citing the need to address emerging threats from nuclear-armed competitors like China and Russia.
However, he notes the Sentinel’s development could also strain budgets, potentially impacting other key defense programs such as the Next-Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD ) fighter and B-21 Raider stealth bomber.
In light of growing threats from nuclear rivals, reliability and deterrence are in doubt as a result of this situation. China and Russia have aggressively modernized their nuclear arsenals, further compounding the US’s strategic quandary as Russia exhibits nuclear brinkmanship in the Ukraine war and China ramps up fissile material production.
While liquid-fuel systems may avoid problems associated with solid fuel, they bring challenges such as difficult-to-store propellants, design complexity, which opens up more points of possible failure, and the need to be fueled before launch, unlike solid-fuel missiles.
To illustrate these problems, Sidharth Kaushal mentions in an October 2024 Royal United Services Institute ( RUSI) article that Russia’s efforts to replace the aging liquid-fuel R-36 Satan ICBM with the RS-28 Sarmat have faced significant challenges, highlighting issues within its missile production sector.
According to Kaushal, the recent catastrophic failure of the Sarmat test in September 2024 highlights these difficulties. He notes that the failure, likely due to propulsion issues, caused extensive damage to the Plesetsk Cosmodrome.
He points out that since its development in 2013 the Sarmat, which was meant to replace the Soviet-era R-36, has experienced numerous delays and technical issues. These setbacks are a result of the lighter structure and complexity of the new system’s propulsion system.
Additionally, he mentions that the collapse of Russia’s cooperation with Ukrainian contractors, who previously maintained the R-36, has exacerbated the situation. He claims that Russia’s reliance on its Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau for the Sarmat’s development has not completely resolved these issues.
Kaushal points out that the RS-28’s troubled history, including multiple failed tests and delays, raises concerns about the reliability of Russia’s silo-based ICBMs, which are crucial for its strategic deterrence. However, he says that despite these challenges, the Sarmat has been accepted into service, reflecting the urgency of replacing the R-36.