The defence officials from Japan, Australia and the United States , just met in Darwin, Australia, aiming to strengthen trilateral defence cooperation. One highlight: They agreed that the Japan , Ground Self Defense Force’s ( GSDF)  , Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade , ( ARDB) ― akin to Japanese” Marines” ― would regularly deploy to Australia in larger numbers. They may do more sophisticated training alongside US and Australian forces there and elsewhere in the area.
Japan is different from what it was over a decade ago when the term “amphibious” was prohibited. The idea of Chinese troops stationed in the Asia-Pacific area was also controversial.
However, “amphibious” conjured up pictures of Japan’s 1930s and 1940s anger and the ensuing crisis for the Chinese people themselves.
Japan’s aquatic army started developing in soon 2011 after , Operation Tomodachi. A dozen Japanese and Americans who were wise enough to refuse to request authorization from USINDOPACOM or the Pentagon helped spur the conversation.  ,
In 2018, the Marine Rapid Deployment Brigade was fully activated.  ,
The JSDF’s transition toward a more consistent war is exemplified by the ARDB. That is both a matter of electronics and weaponry as well as a psychological move.
The amphibious project faced remarkably little political or public opposition perhaps at first. It now faces few altogether, more demonstrating how Japan has changed.
Hasegawa’s analysis
But, while the ARDB demonstrates development, it also reflects the deficiencies in Japan’s efforts to build up its threats.
How thus?
Training and activities, such as those planned for the ARDB in Australia, are meticulously planned months in advance. Any moment the Self-Defense Force sends troops elsewhere, the same is true.  ,
That does not equate to the Japanese Self-Defense Force having the ability to engage in combat.  ,
Instead, think a pianist who is extremely well-versed in one or two pieces but is unable to read music or play a musical on time.
A GSDF commander, Captain Kazuki Hasegawa, wrote an , article , in US Naval Institute Proceedings in November. He claims that the ARBD cannot be mobilized quickly enough to deal with a crisis in the real world or fight a battle. The JSDF Parachute Brigade, Japan’s another “rapid implementation product,” also has this trait.  ,
As for the ARDB, the major problems include transportation, transportation, and education.
Transport
Boats and air travel are not included in the ARBD, nor are they natural. Normally, transport had been provided by the overworked and too-small-by-half , Maritime , and , Air , Self Defense Forces.
As the content information, the ASDF only has 30 transport plane. Moreover, the MSDF has only three landing deliver tank transports, known as LST, that are most beneficial for aquatic operations. And even the present cannot be fully integrated with the ARBD for education, much less for the war effort.
Captain Hasegawa says frankly:  ,
These figures, in particular given Japan’s alleged invasion of its most distant islands, do not adequately address the intense transportation demands of aerial and amphibious contingency operations.
Logistics
According to reports, the ARDB lacks the necessary shipping, including having ready-made weapons and equipment. Additionally, there are no pre-staged weapons and equipment companies throughout Japan, including those that facilitate ARDB rollout in the southern islands. In brief, it is missing the ability to get into action.
Education and Readiness ,
Captain Hasegawa offers another terrible judgment:
It’s challenging to maintain or even improve readiness for the JSDF’s expected operations because of the present JSDF training system.
A device must exert a lot of effort in order to make for quick combat. Additionally, the ARDB training cycle does n’t guarantee that a regiment is ready on a quick-call basis ( a large battalion by US Marine Corps standards ).  ,
The US Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit ( MEU) training and rotation cycle is suggested by Captain Hasegawa. Just put, one unit is ready to fight and another is education to be the “ready to come” system. The second is recovering from being the “on-call” regiment on lively activities.
The Captain properly states that the “backbone” of Japan’s protection is coordination with , US forces.  ,
So, the ARDB should deploy quickly enough for the Marines. The rest of the JSDF should also have that in mind.
In closing Commander Hasegawa recommends that more numerous and complicated mutual coaching with US troops in Japan, especially the US Marine Corps, is needed to improve ARDB capabilities and , interoperability , with US forces.
This is sound advice.  ,
The Japanese can aim for a high level of integration with Americans ( and vice versa ) beyond just training together. That should include including ARBD into operational plans, joint command and control, and exercises so they can fight together rather than as separate “battlespaces” in parallel.
Done right, the ARDB and the Marines ( and US Navy ) can be a bite-sized proof of concept that might bleed over to the entire JSDF-US forces relationship.
Suggestions
A few ideas to bring this about:
- Integrate a Japanese amphibious ship and an ARDB regiment with the US Navy’s Amphibious Ready Group ( ARG ) at Sasebo, Japan and the Marine Corps ‘ 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit ( MEU) on Okinawa. These units provide the MEU’s amphibious shipping.
- Create a multinational Australia, Japan, US amphibious group. From Darwin in northern Australia, each country would supply ships and troops.  , Form Joint Task Force – , Nansei Shoto.
- Make defense of Japan’s southern islands a joint effort, with a headquarters on , Okinawa. There, Japanese and Americans could work side-by-side on a real-world problem– and conduct necessary planning, training, patrols and contingency operations.
Each of these options serves as a “forcing function” to enhance capabilities ( in the case of ARDB). They would force US and Japanese ( and any other forces ) to become linked ( physically and psychologically ) to the point they could conduct real-world short-notice operations of all sorts, including fighting.
A half-spoken supplementary suggestion: The Marines might also want to prepare the paperwork for Captain Hasegawa’s transition to the Marines’, and perhaps also consider making him a major. At least in this writer’s experience, the ruling class in most militaries does n’t like being told it’s got problems.
Captain Hasegawa has, nonetheless, done Japan and the US a service by calling a spade a spade.  ,
RELATED:
Former US diplomat and former US Marine officer Grant Newsham. He is the author of the book” When China Attacks: A Warning To America“.
JAPAN Forward was the first to publish this article. It is republished with permission.