Pacific Forum published this article at its original publication. It is republished with authority.
Japan and New Zealand announced in June 2024 that the two countries had come to terms on an data protection arrangement.  , While information on the specific characteristics of the contract are yet to be published, it might be safe to assume that this is a step toward further bilateral security assistance, given New Zealand ‘s , increasingly vigilant approach , to the emerging , regional security infrastructure.
However, it’s crucial to remember that sharing intelligence does n’t always translate to aligning security policies.
The , New Zealand Intelligence Community consists of three organizations:
- the Cabinet and Prime Minister’s Office’s National Assessment Bureau is responsible for assessing brains.
- the New Zealand Intelligence Security Services ( SIS ) for domestic security intelligence, and
- the Bureau of Signals Intelligence, part of the government connections and safety.
New Zealand has increased its activities in Asia, particularly since the UK joined the European Union, as pointed out by both , academics , and , experts. New Zealand has always maintained its place among the Five Eyes society, even though it retreated from the US and Australia’s 1951 ANZUS Treaty in the 1980s.
The states ‘ monthly summits and ministerial meetings are a key part of the Five Eyes framework’s institutional strengths, which coordinate their positions, set their goals, and share ideas. They also co-ordinate their positions, and share ideas.
Despite their differing viewpoints, the New Zealand government often deviates from the conversation of other member nations. A new and striking case had been 2021, when New Zealand , stepped back , from involvement in joint denunciation against China’s treatment of its Uighur Muslim minority by the US, Canada, the UK, and Australia.
This is especially at conflict with the fact that the Five Eyes group just recently declared , a more expanded relationship , with another member states to include the political sphere.
Therefore, a question: What enables cleverness sharing to help to plan alignment?
Intelligence-sharing systems and agreements usually develop shared viewpoints. Similar types of analysis on comparable details, which have resulted in comparable opinions in various countries, have contributed, and have gained more knowledge that one’s partners also have comparable conclusions.
Establishing such mechanisms second requires acknowledging shared safety concerns and fostering trust in the companion nation’s handling of sensitive information.
Although we can conclude that these agreements will benefit both parties, the existence of an intelligence-sharing system does not always mean that the participants ‘ regional security policies will be in line with one another.
Policymakers , with cleverness assessment inputs – no intelligence companies themselves – generally participate in policymaking. Therefore, policy will depend on how eloquently the intelligence agencies ‘ risk assessments affect policymakers ‘ attitudes.
Bisher, it seems as though New Zealand’s intelligence services and local politics have had little effect on the political landscape. In comparison to more effective institutions in another Five Eyes nations, the intelligence role is also constrained, and their influence is less developed.
However, within New Zealand culture there is also lingering suspicion of the region’s intelligence agencies originating from the , Kim Dotcom incident, in which the agencies supposedly conducted unlawful surveillance of the accused.
Similar to other Five Eyes nations, New Zealand’s intelligence companies have since made more effort to improve their public relations and communication skills. But, just in 2023 did New Zealand publish , a risk assessment report, with the following of its kind coming in first September 2024.
Although these more common engagements will have a greater impact on policy, their discussion is not entirely in line with that of other government agencies. For example, New Zealand’s intelligence agencies described the People’s Republic of China as generally framed as New Zealand’s and its traditional security partners ‘ corporate competitors. This seems to be a variation from New Zealand’s standard approach.
David Capie, a leading New Zealand professor,  , described , it as a shock to the earlier New Zealand institutions that have spent much of the past decade rejecting perfectly that frame. He also noted and appreciated the significance of the SIS’s recognition that, in addition to being proper competitors, it also comes from apparently friendly nations, particularly in light of Five Eyes ‘ suspicions of India.
The American government was first accused by the American state of organizing Hardeep Singh Nijjar’s death in June 2023. In October 2023, New Zealand joined another Five Eyes nations in condemning New Delhi for threatening to formally withdraw American officials ‘ protections and immunity unless Ottawa reduced the number of delegations it had in India.
The question is whether these intelligence agencies ‘ attitudes, which are more in tune with their traditional surveillance partners, will eventually result in actual and consistent plan alignment.
The risk assessment report states that it is not a federal policy record but rather an independent assessment by the SIS, which is one caveat to answering this question. This is unusual because the New Zealand government is responsible for the publication of the report. What should this be understood as? Any corporate report must be reviewed and approved by senior government officials and political decision-makers, according to the standard operating procedure for federal papers. The key players in the state are typically essential people, not all politicians and government officials, according to the argument. So, we ask what made the Sisters include such a disclaimer.
According to my understanding, there was no discussion among the New Zealand government before the release. On page 14, the report states that it does not want to securitize some ethnic communities, but other topics might warrant discussion. Another cause could be that New Zealand officials are generally , skeptical , of intelligence firms, which made it difficult to get the natural light from senior officials to challenge the record as the government’s official status.
The recent SIS security assessment’s analysis serves as one more instance of how the views of New Zealand intelligence agencies have been accepted in the wider domestic policy community. The New Zealand intelligence agencies have less influence on the current Luxon government’s foreign policy and its alignment with its Five Eyes counterparts because of a relatively underdeveloped intelligence community and a low level of confidence in the policy/political community.
There is still work to be done, despite Japan and New Zealand’s intelligence cooperation offering both opportunities: more information on North Korea and China in Japan’s and New Zealand’s cases.
In order to maintain democratic control over the government, it is crucial to establish an oversight mechanism in both the parliament and the government as intelligence agencies venture into uncharted territory regarding cooperation. The scope and authority of the intelligence agencies must be enshrined in law for them to function properly, or even be established, and after that, political authorities can carry out appropriate supervision.
Japan currently lacks proper intelligence agency governance and will benefit greatly from an established, organized, and official agency with oversight. In order to bridge the gap between the intelligence agencies, on the one hand, and the government and the public, New Zealand will gain more public trust by including former intelligence officials in its oversight committee.
Rei Koga ( rei. koga@kcl .ac. uk ), a PhD student in international political economy at the Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London, is a WSD-Handa research fellow at Pacific Forum.