Recent reports about China’s military missteps, from missiles that have been sunk to a sinking underwater, have fueled questions about its military’s eagerness and power.
Although these developments show actual issues facing China’s defense sector, it would be wrong to let US policymakers focus on a larger issue.
The United States has a significant chance to engage with China in ways that lessen threats and enhance relationships rather than reinforcing outdated stereotypes.  ,
China’s nuclear army continues to grow, and its corporate objectives remain transparent. The United States may continue to be focused on reducing nuclear threats and improving the US-China relationship rather than fixating on temporary issues or internal problems in China’s military and defense industry.
This requires developing stronger political-military ties and improving our knowledge of China’s changing radioactive strategy. Creative dialogue can help stop misinterpretations and errors in judgment and, crucially, avoid a US-China conflict that neither country would like.
The United States can maintain a steady corporate relationship and reduce the risks of nuclear miscalculation only through ongoing diplomatic and military commitment.  ,
True problems, real uncertainty ,
In its effort to modernize its defense, China faces distinctive internal challenges, including problems with DIB, labor shortages, and management issues. These hurdles make China’s military accumulation inconsistent and, at times, questionable.
But, ascribing very much importance to these deficiencies may be short-sighted. China has yet to declare a dedication to nuclear-related dialogue, while the US’s understanding of these options is still largely unimportant. It also has yet to make a statement regarding its commitment to developing its normal defense and nuclear capabilities.
The United States is unable to create a truly effective and beneficial exchange due to this knowledge gap.  , While it may be tempting to interpret developments such as corruption within the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) and inefficiencies in China’s DIB as evidence of a larger vulnerability in China’s grand strategy, this would be a dangerous miscalculation.  ,  ,
These views frequently show that China’s strategic interests and long-term objectives are not fully understood. Corruption, for example, while dangerous for domestic defense governance, does not essentially convert into an inability to manage or install atomic forces.
Similarly, inefficiencies in the DIB may slow aspects of China’s broader military modernization, but they do n’t undermine the strategic importance of China’s nuclear arsenal in the eyes of Chinese Communist Party leaders.
Interpreting these indications could cause US policymakers to interpret China’s real capabilities and motivations, thus stifling their attention from more crucial goals like risk reduction and transparency.  ,
The need for more strategic engagement cannot be ignored by China’s domestic difficulties.
China also seeks clarity regarding US threat perceptions and assurance that the United States is willing to engage in matters Beijing deems crucial to its national interests, only as Washington gladly awaits confirmation of Beijing’s intentions.
These incidents should validate the need for deeper communication and interaction rather than using China’s challenges as argumentative points to support a dynamic tale.  ,  ,
The United States must be aware that misinterpretations of China’s proper calculus can be dangerous. The goal should be to employ China on its long-term objectives, as well as the technical, philosophical, and social dimensions of its atomic considering.
This can be achieved through ongoing diplomatic and military-to-military speech, as well as by putting a mutual approach to relationship that emphasizes accountability and bilateral knowing at the forefront.  ,  ,
There is room for US officials to better understand the political, intellectual, and administrative factors that are influencing Chinese counterparts ‘ decisions regarding US nuclear policy in ways that seem overseas to Beijing.  ,
Building a more stable strategic connection requires demonstrating a commitment to meet China way on pressing issues.
The United States can develop greater respect and understanding between the two countries by concentrating on common pursuits, such as preventing nuclear misunderstanding and direct military conflict.
In a candid conversation, both sides have legitimate interests at heart, not by making unwanted punitive concessions.
Creative relationship over distraction ,
Great energy competition has become a more active goal that extremely influences policy decisions in Washington as a challenge rather than a chore to manage in US-China relations.
As such, some are willing to look for possible symptoms of benefits or disadvantage. Problem within the PLA rates, water-filled rockets or an undesirable submersible accident are all easy distractions. The US may resist the urge to take sweeping inferences from these improvements.  ,  ,  ,
Instead, US politicians should take advantage of these events as a chance to participate in proper speech. In the long-term, deeper political-military relationships are far more essential to US passions than reacting to every sign of feasible weakness or difficulties in China’s defense establishment.
The US-China conflict will linger, but by focusing on improving conversation, building confidence and addressing shared hobbies, it can be managed. Even better, with these initiatives, the United States can create the conditions for a more predictable coming for US-China relationships.  ,
Shawn Rostker is a research scientist at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.