US Sentinel missile’s nuclear deterrent in a hot spotlight – Asia Times

The Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ( ICBM ) program and other pressing concerns related to the country’s land-based nuclear arsenal were highlighted in a report released by the US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) this month.

The Sentinel, formally known as the LGM-35A, is intended to replace aging Minuteman III weapons. However, critics have voiced concerns about the high costs associated with the system’s development and deployment, which are expected to cost the US atomic force an estimated trillion.

The CRS record mentions a heated debate over the proper requirement of maintaining a land-based ICBM calf in America’s nuclear triangle, the three-pronged military pressure structure comprised of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and proper bombers. Some argue that novel current challenges properly have rendered stable, silo-based methods vulnerable to proactive attacks.

According to the CRS report, Sentinel system critics question whether for systems, especially in times of crisis, increase the risk of error or accidental launch by putting pressure on decision-makers to create fatally quick responses.

According to the CRS report, the innovative missile may offer significant improvements in reliability and security, as well as providing a reliable and reliable deterrent against changing global threats.

The Sentinel plan has emerged as a non-negotiable wall of the US’s nuclear development strategy despite rising costs and brutal budget battles.

Despite an 81 % cost overrun that caused a crucial Nunn-McCurdy breach, which occurs when a defense acquisition program exceeds predetermined thresholds, the US Department of Defense ( DOD ) confirmed the continuation of the Sentinel ICBM program in July 2024.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, under the direction of William LaPlante, came to the conclusion that there are no viable alternatives to the Sentinel because it is so essential for national protection.

The agency’s acquisition cost today stands at US$ 140.9 billion, mainly due to increases in the order and start parts. The DOD rescinded Milestone B acceptance in order to solve the cost issues and mandated a restructuring to keep nuclear deterrent capabilities in check.

Nevertheless, the Sentinel plan may remain at the cost of other US Air Force tasks. For instance, according to Asia Times, the US Air Force is under significant budget constraints while funding important projects like the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA ) drones, Next-Generation Air Dominance ( NGAD), and Next-Generation Aerial Refueling System ( NGAS ) tanker.

Due to these financial challenges, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall highlighted the need for” creativity” in force structure. Modernization efforts are hampered by commitments to nuclear deterrent updates and the growing risk from China despite these programs ‘ connected functional and affordability concerns.

The Sentinel ICBM is being criticized as a potential cause for escalating risks in addition to the escalating debates on value and importance.

The controversy over the usefulness of the US land-based nuclear army was covered in Asia Times in April 2024. The existence of a land-based nuclear arsenal, according to proponents, would serve as a “missile towel” to withstand enemy attacks and offer a quick first-strike capacity.

Critics, however, show their vulnerabilities, such as the ability to live a large-scale nuclear strike unless launched quickly and backup given the capabilities of bombers and atomic ballistic missile submarines.

Further, Stephen Cimbala mentions that it is crucial to keep the nuclear triad’s credibility afloat by supporting the replacement of the tired Minuteman III missiles with the new Sentinel ICBM in the 2023 book” Politics Between Nations.”

Cimbala claims that ICBMs improve US strategic force resilience and complicate adversarial planning.

However, Cimbala says critics point out that ICBMs are first-strike vulnerable, and their fixed silos might escalate pressures toward a launch-on-warning posture.

He mentions that opponents advocate for a dyad of sea-based missiles and bombers to lower costs and prevent unintended escalation risks and propose downsizing or eliminating the ICBM leg.

Cimbala suggests moving to mobile or deep-underground basing for survivability, incorporating antimissile defenses, or even putting conventional warheads on ICBMs for flexibility in order to keep the US ICBM force relevant.

He points out that while modernization advocates believe these improvements are stabilizing, critics believe they are accelerating the development of new threats like cyber and space warfare, and that they raise the question of whether the ICBM force’s strategic value justifies its risks and financial costs.

The legacy of Cold War-era ICBMs is alimentating a contemporary arms race, which is being shaped by shifting alliances and emerging threats as global powers increase their nuclear arsenal.

ICBMs, which embodied mutually assured destruction ( MAD), were a key component of the US and Soviet Union’s nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Each superpower’s ability to target its cities and infrastructure thousands of kilometers away reduced the time it took to respond.

Due to the possibility of disastrous retaliation, this situation created a balance of terror. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ( SALT) in the 1970s aimed to limit ICBM arsenals.

Despite these efforts, ICBMs remained a perilous component of Cold War strategy up until 1991, when they served as a deterrent to nuclear conflict.

However, according to Asia Times, the US, Russia, and China’s most recent ICBM tests reflect each nation’s efforts to modernize and strengthen their nuclear arsenals in the midst of rising international tensions.

With China emerging as a significant player alongside the US and Russia, the transition has been made from a bipolar to a triadic nuclear power structure.

Advancements in missile technology, the abandonment of arms control agreements, and each country’s strategic motivations to maintain or achieve nuclear deterrence are the highlights of this new arms race.

With competitive alliances and growing arsenals redefining the world’s nuclear weapons dynamics, there is also the potential for a new era of multi-front nuclear deterrence.