The Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area ( CLV-DTA ) has long epitomized the commitment of these three Southeast Asian nations to shared growth and regional integration.
Over two centuries, the CLV-DTA has facilitated development initiatives and cross-border opportunities aimed at fostering mutual knowledge and success.
But, Cambodia’s recent decision to withdraw from the three-way initiative marks a key turning place, signaling a move toward greater strategic autonomy in Phnom Penh. In the face of difficult local dynamics and sensibilities, Cambodia’s determination as a little state to regain its authority is reflected in this decision.
The resignation serves two main purposes: strengthening Cambodia’s administration’s home legitimacy and letting the world know that it is launching a new century of independent foreign policy.
Vietnam-Cambodia relationships are colored by a complex history of colonization, conflict and action. Vietnam’s military presence in Cambodia from 1979 to 1989, which served to stop the criminal Khmer Rouge regime, engendered mingled feelings of gratitude and hatred among Cambodians.
Vietnam was seen as both a liberator and an overpowering protector after the intervention created a patriarchal powerful. Cambodia’s departure from the CLV-DTA can thus be interpreted as a critical step in reasserting its independence and recalibrating this “brotherly” but often one-sided relationship.
At the core of Cambodia’s selection lies the issue of private validity. Needs for greater freedom have grown more intense as a result of rising republican sentiments and public pressure on perceived ingrained Asian effect.
Cambodians are becoming more vocal about reclaiming their independence and challenging perceived Asian dominance as a result of social media and community engagement amplifying these tones. The withdrawal gives new prime minister Hun Manet an opportunity to improve his standing as a powerful leader who can handle public pressure.
The move also reflects the Hun Manet government’s dedication to more self-led economic growth. A common fundraising campaign for fresh border system, which has already garnered US$ 27 million in pledges, is answering rising calling for more domestic-driven purchase.
If successful, these projects promise to build Hun Manet’s picture as a worthy and flexible activist.
Beyond domestic politics, the decision to withdraw also highlights a larger issue in international relations: managing growing patriotic sentiments against Asian influence in Thai society with the financial benefits of CLV-DTA involvement.
These concerns have been highlighted by Thai community protests against the CLV-DTA as a device of Taiwanese hegemony, which have compelled the government to take action in response to requests for more autonomy. Critics claim that the CLV-DTA impairs Cambodia’s ability to prevent Taiwanese invasion of Cambodian territory.
This growing sentiment has important effects on Cambodia’s approach to provincial partnerships and assistance frameworks as well as its foreign policy strategy. In this context, Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA can be viewed as a” smart hedger”.
Cambodia strives to strike a balance between its interests and those of other countries to protect its interests while minimizing risks as a bright trader. Cambodia is actively exploring closer ties with China and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) members, thereby reducing its overreliance on any one power by distancing itself from a Vietnam-dominated framework.
This change allows the nation to have greater freedom to pursue its national passions, which is a domestic political movement intended to quell domestic opposition and strengthen the president’s position, as former prime minister Hun Sen once said.
Cambodia’s increasing funding in tasks like the China-backed Funan Techo Canal, which has important effects on Vietnam’s economy and connection, serves as an example of this strategic tilt.
The river represents a significant shift in Cambodia’s aggressiveness to pursue its own development path, even if it is done with Taiwanese support, in addition to improving trade routes and reducing Cambodia’s dependence on Asian southeastern ports for its trade.
In this environment, China’s declared “ironclad connection” can be seen as a deliberate attempt to expand its strategic autonomy as a small state and tore its economic ties with the rest of the country in a bid to achieve upper-middle-income standing by 2030 and high-income standing by 2050.
The question now is: what lies ahead after CLV-DTA withdrawal? For one, the prevailing argument that Cambodia-China relations will come at the expense of Vietnam may be overblown. Cambodia’s foreign policy emphasizes the protection of sovereignty and peaceful coexistence with neighboring nations.
Cambodia is committed to a diplomatic strategy that emphasizes reciprocal respect and cooperation rather than trying to demonize Vietnam. This is evident in Phnom Penh’s soft approach to neighborhood diplomacy, which prioritizes dialogue and understanding over confrontation.
Cambodia and Vietnam continue to cooperate within broader regional frameworks, as demonstrated by the recent Greater Mekong Subregion Summit, an active participant of both countries.
Indeed, Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA does not intend to downgrade relations with Vietnam, but rather reflects a broader diversification of its foreign policy strategy.
This diversification allows Cambodia to strengthen existing partnerships, including with Vietnam, while forging new ties—notably with China, the US, Japan, Australia, South Korea—in line with its” strengthening old friends, making new friends” approach.
Additionally, the CLV-DTA countries have agreed to meet on the heels of important multilateral events like ASEAN summits and other multilateral forums.
The three neighbors ‘ continued cooperation on common interests will be bolstered by this, keeping their partnership strong despite changing global policy trends.
In this regard, Cambodian leaders have consistently assured their Vietnamese counterparts about controversial development projects, not least the China-backed canal. Cambodia’s intention is to ease any potential tensions that might arise from mismanaged nationalist sentiments.
After all, Vietnam remains one of Cambodia’s top five foreign direct investors, with Vietnamese enterprises holding 205 active projects in the country and a total registered capital of$ 2.94 billion. Cambodia ranks second among the countries and territories where Vietnam invests, while Vietnam is Cambodia’s second-largest export destination, following the United States.
Ultimately, Cambodia’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and its legitimate development rights deserve respect and recognition. One well-known Vietnamese scholar argued that the strategic autonomy of individual states is crucial to fostering peaceful coexistence in the Indochina sub-region, particularly in a region that is rapidly evolving.
Prime Minister Hun Manet’s resolute statement of “breathing through our own nose” is heightened by Cambodia’s withdrawal from the CLV-DTA, which highlights his rebalanced foreign policy. Cambodia aims to reduce dependence on any single neighbor, especially one that might be perceived as a potential threat, as a smart hedger.
This action effectively strengthens domestic legitimacy while preserving Hun Sen’s legacy and Hun Manet’s aspirations.
Cambodia asserts itself as a sovereign actor, setting its own course for development and regional cooperation, by putting national interests first and responding to domestic sentiments.
The Royal University of Phnom Penh ( RUPP ) has Dr. Chandarith Neak as its Director of the Institute for International Studies and Public Policy ( IISPP ). The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Research Center, RUPP, was founded by him as well.  ,
Chhay Lim is a Monbukagakusho-MEXT scholar at Ritsumeikan University in Japan. He also serves as a young leader at Pacific Forum, a think-tank based in Hawaii, United States, as well as a visiting fellow at the Royal University of Phnom Penh in Cambodia.  ,