MOSCOW– Relaxed observers perhaps expected Moscow to observe Donald Trump’s returning to the White House amid perceptions he was pro-Russia, or at least Russia-friendly, during his first expression.
These perceptions were reinforced by the Russiagate controversy and related claims in recent months that Moscow once more meddled in a US vote with Trump’s support, including through fake news websites and also funding the original liberal media band Tenet. However, those who anticipate that Trump did treat Russia with kid gloves will likely be disappointed.
When asked whether President Vladimir Putin would applaud Trump, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov immediately responded with the statement,” we are talking about an hostile land that is directly and indirectly involved in a battle against our condition.”
Peskov did leave the possibility of boosting ties if the Trump 2.0 administration had the political will to do so, but remember that before the November 5 election, Putin publicly supported Joe Biden and later Kamala Harris over Trump.
Because Putin, a consistent cautious pragmatist, preferred the proverbial devils in Biden and Harris over the unpredictableity of a second Trump term.
As for Putin’s reaction to Trump’s return, he congratulated him on his victory during his traditional Q&, A session at the Valdai Club’s annual meeting on Thursday ( November 7 ) evening.
I already stated that we would be collaborating with any head of state who the American people would trust. Indeed, this is going to be like this in practice”, Putin said. The leader continued,” The leader is ready to talk to Trump, improve bilateral relations, and put an end to the Ukrainian conflict.”
On that, former President Dmitry Medvedev, who’s now the deputy chairman of the Security Council, earlier tweeted that the goals of Russia’s special operation in Ukraine “remain unchanged and will be achieved”. He also made an implied suggestion in a Telegram post that Trump might halt Ukraine’s aid.
Sergey Lavrov, the head of Russian foreign policy, said on the eve of the US election that” the anti-Russian and russophobic orientation of US policy is based on internal political consensus which has a bipartisan nature. Ukraine is viewed as a crucial component of the hybrid war launched against Russia.
He later stated that Russia is open to dialogue, but he apparently does n’t anticipate any changes in the transition from Biden to Trump.
Therein lies the reason behind Russia’s tepid welcome of Trump’s return. In summary, many people here do n’t think Trump will force Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky to make the concessions that would most or all of Moscow’s earlier stated war objectives.
In essence, these demilitarize and denounce Ukraine ( both of which were never explicitly defined ), and restore the nation’s military neutrality as a result of the country’s removal of the constitution’s 2019 amendment, which makes NATO membership a strategic goal.
Putin told war correspondents in June 2023 that” If they ( the US) genuinely want to , end today’s conflict via negotiations, they only need to , make one decision, which is to , stop supplying weapons and , equipment. That’s it.
” Ukraine itself does not manufacture anything. Tomorrow, they will want to , hold talks that are not formal, but substantive, and , not to , confront us with ultimatums, but to , return to , what was agreed upon, say, in , Istanbul.”
This goes back to what Medvedev implied in a recent Telegram post about Russia’s hopes that Trump will stop, curtail, or at least use arms shipments to Ukraine to coerce Zelensky into making concessions that might lead to reciprocal ones from Russia for ending the conflict.
Trump might have a curveball, though, if he accepts the plan allegedly sent to him by advisors in June that would require more weapons deliveries to Ukraine if Russia does n’t quickly accept a peace deal.
The issue is that Putin has staked his reputation on delivering his previously stated objectives, including denazification and demilitarization ( which might have been done with impunity ), and gaining control over the entire administrative boundaries of its new formerly Ukrainian regions.
It’s already proven a challenge to do this in Donbass, so it’s unlikely that Russia can militarily achieve this with Kherson and Zaporizhia’s cross-Dnieper River areas.
The cession of Russian territory is not permitted by one of the constitutional amendments passed in 2020, which means that it cannot formally cede them without changing the law.
A constitutional court’s decision to cede those lands to Russia might open up a loophole, but either way would still have a negative impact on Putin. Those regions would also need to be changed since Russia already includes them on its official maps.
Russia could still agree to end the conflict along the Line of Contact ( wherever it may be at the time this occurs ), just like Ukraine could do the same.
For the reasons already stated, that is the most likely outcome, but Russia would need to portray it as a success before its own citizens at home and among its supporters abroad to deter them from becoming demoralized if the conflict does n’t reach its full territorial goals.
There’s also the issue of demilitarization and denazifiction to consider. Ukraine is still fully armed, and when the conflict is over, it wo n’t likely give its weapons to the West. Trump would n’t likely demand a return of arms because he believed it would weaken Ukraine and potentially encourage Russia to rekindle the conflict in the future.
Additionally, Ukraine wo n’t be able to pass legislation that Russia believes is in line with its condemnation objectives. Trump and his team do n’t appear to be concerned about the situation in any way.
Therefore, Russia can only reasonably anticipate that any potential peace agreement that Trump will broker will require that Ukraine formally abandon NATO.
Even that might not be the victory it appears to be because a number of security guarantee agreements signed throughout the year with the members of the security alliance represent Ukraine’s de facto membership, but without any implied Article 5-like requirement to send troops in its support.
According to popular belief, NATO members are already providing significant amounts of aid to Ukraine in accordance with Article 5, which does n’t require them to deploy troops but rather to provide whatever assistance deemed necessary to aid an ally under attack.
Thus, it would likely be a flimsy move to officially outlaw Ukraine from NATO at this point. Trump might ease the blow by establishing a demilitarized buffer zone in Ukraine along the LOC and its borders with Russia and helping to save face.
If this is extended far enough to stop Ukrainian artillery from attacking its cities and military installations, the Kremlin would likely view that as a fair compromise.
Russia’s global media machine could then start trumpeting the deal as a stunning success, despite failing to achieve its maximum objectives, while the West’s could do the same, even though the war failed to restore Ukraine’s 1991 borders.
In that event, a German- or Korean-like partition would become a fait accompli. No one of the conflict’s participants, whether they are directly involved in Russia and Ukraine or indirectly involved with a number of NATO members, would be entirely content with the outcome, despite their secretive knowledge that a maximum victory is impossible.
Contrary to their official statements, neither side wants the conflict that will arise if Trump implements the rumored plan he received over the summer to increase arms deliveries to Ukraine if Russia rejects a peace deal.
The best thing Russia can hope to achieve is a military breakthrough before Trump’s reelection, which will bring as much territory under its control as possible since Ukraine is unlikely to be forced to surrender the rest of its former regions in their entirety.
Russia’s dreadful acceptance of Trump’s return is attributed to the growing realization that its maximum war objectives probably wo n’t be met. Its media team is probably already working overtime to portray an imperfect compromise as a complete victory.