Reports from increasing numbers offer speculative or pro-active ideas about what the incoming Trump administration will do internally and how its policy may be applied internationally.  , There have been a number of responses, some of them coming from management wannabes, on what President-elect Trump should do about Ukraine.
Trump made the promise during the battle that once in office he had put an end to the Ukrainian conflict. He made hints that he would do this by speaking with Presidents of Russia, Putin, and Ukraine, Zelensky.  , Beyond , that we have a thinking game.
The wannabes , are throwing around conflicting tips.  , Some want a ceasefire , offer.  , Another talk about a cordon sanitaire and having it enforced by the Europeans.  , Also others concede a needed to “award” Russia and let it hang onto captured country.  , And some say that piece of a bargain might be to prevent Ukrainian NATO membership for , a period of time, maybe 20 years.
No one seems to know what the Russians want, at least not in theory.  ,
Trump is a savvy , communicator.  , He will want to know what his player wants and he will try and find ways either to accommodate , or to utilize him.
Russia has been very clear about some of what it wants, but not everything.  ,  ,
What follows is my knowledge of Russia’s goals in Ukraine. I do n’t agree with them because explaining them does n’t mean that I do. Nor does it mean that all are of equal value to Russia’s officials.
Russia may rely on preserving the regions it had formerly annexed.  , Numerous solutions – a peace, a buffer area or some kind of regional freeze – does not meet Russia’s leaders. Russia may demand that these regions ‘ previous settlements be officially acknowledged and establish secure borders. This implies that any negotiations regarding the conquered provinces are primarily a matter of maps.  ,  ,
Not only will Ukraine but also its NATO allies need to come to a consensus regarding the conquered provinces. It is doubtful Russia may accept a deal firmly with Ukraine’s authorities, since governments may change.
There is some – but not much – space for maneuver , about place, such as for transit of people and goods, submission of electric power and oil and gas pipes.
Another related problem involves family reunification and numerous counterclaims and claims for destroyed property that need to be resolved.
Russia did also desire security of the Russian Orthodox Church, which is being attacked by Ukraine, along with safeguards for the Russian language and culture. Russia has vehemently stated that it fought in order to safeguard the Russians who reside in Ukraine. Putin may accept a deal that leaves Russian-speakers prone and exposed, churches that are occupied by the army, or those who are subject to different kinds of official discrimination, given the significance of the Orthodox Church in Russia and its impact on Putin and others.
Russia may prefer a more amiable Kyiv government on the political level.  , What started this disaster in the first place was turning a somewhat Russia-friendly Kyiv state into a Russia-enemy state, and replacing Russian trade and security ties with new EU and NATO plans.
It is doubtful that Russia may consent to Ukraine’s EU membership, and Moscow certainly does require that NATO get out of Ukraine.  , Russia will want Ukraine largely demilitarized, probably by limiting the number of heavy weapons such as vehicles, troops fighting machines, weaponry, drones ( which the Russians may need be removed altogether ), and heat defenses reduced or permitted only to protect certain areas.
Russia will be against any further sales of weaponry to Ukraine and it will request for all officials and all soldiers, including companies, to quit , the land.
Beyond Ukraine, Russia will ask for lifting all sanctions.  , In exchange Russia will facilitate Ukrainian trade and commerce.
There are also issues with long-range weapons in some NATO nations and in Russia that could be addressed in a negotiation, as well as issues about the future of the Black Sea.  , The big issue is lowering the nuclear threshold. It is unclear whether this can be addressed in connection with a negotiation with Ukraine.
Russia, of course, will demand a resumption of economic cooperation and overall normalization of relations.
Trump will have to consider the Russian “wants” . , It may be too much in one transaction, and Trump can expect serious resistance from the Zelensky government.  , Therefore, any successful deal would work better if it was accomplished in stages.  ,
The main goal for Europe is to lower the likelihood of Russian-made security threats that Europeans ( and Americans ) believe Russia poses for the continent. Europe fears that Russia, now with a big and experienced army, will launch attacks in the Baltic States, or against Poland or Romania.
There is no guarantee that Europe’s long-term effort to improve its defenses will ever be successful.  , As the collapse of the German coalition appears to demonstrate, some European countries lack resources to take care of their own defense, let alone fund Ukraine’s army and government.
Therefore, if there was a Russia-Europe modus vivendi with non-intervention guarantees, Europe would be in a better position.
US objectives for the war have been unilateral: Russia has to leave Ukraine.  , That wo n’t be Trump’s position because he will understand that it is a non-starter, especially when the Russians are winning the war.
Trump, however, is aware of how to sweeten deals and that the Russians are willing to pay some attention, so perhaps he can come up with ideas that could lead to the resolution of the conflict.
One US objective that should be part of American thinking, but has not been, is to significantly reduce America’s NATO commitment. NATO has been expanding for some time, and this expansion poses a risk of going to war with Russia. Trump may be more than willing to negotiate with the Russians about NATO in exchange for less harsh demands on Ukraine.
Former US deputy undersecretary of defense Stephen Bryen is a recognized authority on security strategy and technology. This article originally appeared on his Substack, Weapons and Strategy. It is republished with permission.