Seoul stated that it would rethink providing martial assistance to Kyiv after Moscow and Pyongyang signed a de facto Mutual Defense Treaty in June 2024. This is important because South Korea has a longstanding policy that forbids the source and export of weapons to effective conflict areas.
Due to the deployment of Korean People’s Army (KPA ) soldiers on the frontlines of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War, the rethinking process of this policy may be accelerated. Predictably, Moscow is prepared to promote its ties with Pyongyang over Seoul, with such bias good to , endure , in the future.  ,  ,  ,  ,
From the perspective of the Republic of Korea ( ROK ), defense and military cooperation between a Russia that is desperate to win this war and a Kim Jong Un regime that is aware that it can press for a favorable deal to exchange the North’s weapons and men for military technologies ranging from missiles to submarines and even nuclear weapons greatly increases the potential for destabilization of an already fragile intra-Korean relationship and brinksmanship in the Korean peninsula.
In response, a previous article argued that the ROK should provide military assistance to Kyiv, citing justifications like i ) upholding the UN’s ( UN) norm regarding Ukraine’s right to legitimate self-defense, ii ) expressing strong opposition to Moscow regarding any proposed military technology aid to the DPRK, iii ) demonstrating the efficacy of South Korean “K-arms” in a context of rapidly expanding market share, and iv) setting the stage for
There should be political will and security concerns for the Yoon Suk Yeol leadership to grant approval for arms shipments to Kyiv when Moscow suddenly crosses Seoul’s dark line by providing weapon and/or nuclear technology to Pyongyang. To illustrate South Korea’s possible arms shipments to Ukraine during the ongoing conflict, this article provides a three-course cooking comparison.
Appetizer munitions
A small dish that is served before the principal sure to whet the appetite is called an appetizer. Similar to “appetizer” weapons, limited quantities of selected weapons could be used to assess suitability and effectiveness, whetting the Ukrainians ‘ interest in having it included in a upcoming “main course” sale or to give other nations the motivation to consider taking them on as an inspiration for future purchases.
Two such South Korean military “appetizers” are the AT-1K Raybolt anti-tank guided missile ( ATGM ) and the KP-SAM Chiron surface-to-air missile ( SAM ).
The Raybolt ATGM can either be operated by little, armored-carrier-mounted teams of soldiers or mounted on light strike or armoured vehicles, giving these units the ability to meet and outsmart the tank-mounted armaments’ stunning variety. Its infrared-imaging targeting method also increases affect accuracy and mortality, while being ideal for both day and evening operations.
Finally, its warhead is designed to be most effective and penetration-proof against contemporary tanks and armoured vehicles equipped with explosive reactive armor, allowing Ukrainian soldiers to use the asset to counteract Russian ground forces by destroying Russian tanks and personnel carriers.
A small first shipment of Raybolt ATGMs may help to replenish Russian stocks of West-supplied Javelin missiles and reduce any anti-tank missile shortage in the continuing land conflict.
The ability to compare the Raybolt’s functionality to the Javelin, the most important asset in its weapons course, would be crucial for forthcoming arms development projects, as well as being a fantastic sales advertisement if the asset produces significant wartime results for Ukraine’s regional defense, according to LIG Nex1 and Hanwha Vision, the companies that manufacture AT-1K missiles and launchers, both.
For the , Chiron , SAM, it, too, is infrared home, scalable with smaller army sections, systems-integrable onto several military vehicles, and appropriate in various operating environments. It has the ability to shoot down low-flying aircraft and helicopters while maintaining its comparatively effective underwater drone attack capability, which is essential for the continued land war.
KP-SAM’s allure is obvious given that it is only available in limited quantities for a Ukraine that is desperately in need of missile stocks to strengthen its short-range air defense. It could either be used to help strengthen Ukraine’s Integrated Air Defence System ( IADS ) by providing a missile umbrella to protect more Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure from Moscow’s suicide drones and cruise missiles, or be used to strengthen air defense protection for frontline troops to maintain their defensive formations.
Finally, the high combat performance of the KP-SAM in warfighting scenarios could open the door for potential buyers looking for a more affordable and deployable option than the Javelins given that countries like Romania have already chosen to purchase the Chiron. This would encourage more military assistance for Ukraine in its defense against Russia and exports of defense to the European Union.
Main course munitions
The main course constitutes the most substantial and essential component of any meal in Western cuisine. Correspondingly, metaphorically describing any armament type as a “main course” implies that such weapons are critical for the war’s conduct.
Ironically, as Ukraine attempts to address its issues of ammunition shortages that have resulted in it losing ground on numerous fronts in the primarily land-based war so far, anyone could provide ammunition for the country at this time.
The visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to a Pennsylvania-based munitions factory in September 2024 is evidence of the importance placed on restocking the country’s ammunition stockpiles. Such “main courses” could include ammunition for rifles and machine guns, grenades, mortar bombs and artillery shells for howitzers, amongst others.
With global ammunition supply chains under significant strain owing to the Covid-19 pandemic and the eruption of multiple conflict flashpoints, Ukraine’s survival and territorial defense is, perhaps, contingent upon the expeditious and sustained provision of ammunition.
Given the small, yet steady shift in the direction of favorable political winds in the ROK’s parliament regarding the arming of Ukraine, South Korea’s developed military-industrial complex is capable of quick shipment rolls and remarkable speed in weapon deliveries, similar to the carbohydrates of a main meal.
With the US receiving 550, 000 155mm artillery shells over the past year, which allowed Washington to free up corresponding munitions for Kyiv, the ROK has already demonstrated its capacity to produce and supply munitions. Additionally, South Korea could also supply 105mm shells compatible with North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NATO ) STANAG-compliant military assets, many of which are currently used by Ukraine.
Since the ROK has a stockpile of about 3.4 million 105mm shells and is relegating its 105mm artillery to reserve service as it , transitions to 155mm artillery assets, it is well-placed to provide ammunition to assist in Ukraine’s defense of Russia.
Missiles for dessert
Given that both ammunition and SAM missiles can be classified as having a limited offensive range, making exporting political authorization more appealing to the ROK is important to note. However, if the current war is to be concluded on Kyiv’s terms, more politically contentious “dessert” weapons might be required to be presented onto the meal table.
While Ukraine could continue to resist Russia into 2025 and even 2026 using the above-mentioned “main course” and “appetizer” arms, the cumulative suffering inflicted upon the former is unconscionable. Hence, it would be morally preferable to expedite the end of this war in Ukraine’s favor. One of the means to this end is the supply of “dessert” weapons like the Hyunmoo series of ballistic missiles, specifically the Hyunmoo-1A and Hyunmoo-2A.
Both Hyunmoo versions are guided land-attack missiles with ranges of 180km and 300km, while carrying powerful 500kg and 1000kg warheads respectively. Furthermore, both are older variants of the series with the 1A already retired and the 2A having a 20-year service record.
Hence, South Korea’s military readiness should not be impacted if 1A stocks were exported to Ukraine. The development of the Hyunmoo-4 and 5 variants can accelerate the timeline for the stand-down of the 2A versions, opening up potential room for export to Ukraine.
Being given the Hyunmoo 1A and 2A would significantly increase the momentum of this war in Kyiv’s favor, given the unfortunate reality that Ukraine only has long-range attack drones with small warheads and insufficient stocks of Neptune cruise missiles.
Old though the 1A and 2A versions might be, their extensive ranges and heavy warheads would enable devastating strikes on Russian munition/fuel depots, troop/vehicle garrisons, command and control facilities, and other infrastructure critical to the Russian invasion, previously considered relatively safe by Moscow due to the lack of Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities.
Should Seoul provide these crucial “desserts” to Kyiv, such complaints ring hollow because it is widely known that Pyongyang and Tehran are already providing ballistic missiles for Russia’s unjust war. The export of these assets could transform Ukraine’s strategy so far, bringing the three-course meal to an end in itself.  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,
In closing, despite the incorrect attribution of the phrase” The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing” to Irish statesman Edmund Burke, it still has a significant place in Ukraine’s ongoing defense against Russia’s illegal invasion, a flagrant violation of the overarching principle of state sovereignty in international law.
With its unique and unmatched defense production capabilities, the ROK is well-positioned to act as a force for good in international affairs and take action by providing a three-course meal military aid package to Kyiv, with significant reputational and economic gains resulting from such a move, in spite of President Yoon’s commitment to make the ROK one of the world’s top four arms suppliers by 2027.
Nah Liang Tuang ( PhD ), a research fellow at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, is a member of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies ( RSIS), an affiliate of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies ( IDSS).
Thomas Lim is a senior analyst for RSIS’s Military Studies Program. The authors ‘ own points and arguments in this article do not represent any of IDSS or RSIS’s positions.