A central issue looms heavily over the conflict in Myanmar as heavy monsoon rains transition to the year-end cold time: is day on the side of federal-democratic forces fighting the military coup government of the State Administration Council ( SAC)? Or, rephrased, does the extraordinary military momentum achieved by those causes over the last year been maintained in the year to arrive?
There are no clear answers to the question in either development now given the interplay of numerous domestic and external factors, some of which are” known unknowns” and others are “unknown unknowns.” But two overarching realities that before long will eventually – and possibly quickly – effect the war are already in full view.
The first is that coordinated activities by well-organized cultural makes organized as regiments and brigades with clear lines of command were carried out in the borderlands of Shan, Kachin, and Rakhine states, where the annual 1027 campaign started on October 27, 2023.
They were even able to absorb a amount of casualties not publicly revealed but which in particular engagements, notably the month-long struggle for Lashio town in Shan state and cruelly protracted sieges around army strongpoints in Rakhine state, certainly cost thousands of lives.
A much less skilled or well-organized group of ethnically majority Bamar Peoples Defense Forces ( PDFs ) will fight the war in the upcoming year primarily in the central country of Myanmar.
Indeed, this shift has already begun with PDF forces moving within rocket range of Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city, while in neighboring Sagaing region PDFs loyal to the shadow National Unity Government ( NUG) and supported by the long-running ethnic forces of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA ) overran the strategically important town of Pinlebu on October 8.
Window of opportunity
The second stark fact now shaping the issue is that the SAC government is gearing up to fight for its success. The regime has undoubtedly been shaken to the core by the unprecedented blows to manpower, materiel, and morale of the past year.
But notwithstanding gung-ho opposition commentary predicting retreat without end and possible regime collapse, there is little evidence to suggest that the discipline and cohesion that has underpinned the military for seven decades has evaporated in a single year.
Despite this, advancements on the battlefield are already being made faster as a regrouping process that will likely only increase in the coming year is being made.
Against the backdrop of ramped-up diplomatic, material and advisory support from Russia and China, the military continues to push ahead with a conscription drive that is now in its sixth iteration. It was started in April, and it has reportedly dragged over 20 000 new recruits into the army’s already stale ranks.
How effectively this desperately needed infusion of manpower translates into battlefield capability remains to be tested. And that test will be challenging to measure given that newly trained draftees are being deployed to strengthen battalions already deployed in the field rather than forming new units that might fail and fail at the first opportunity.
But as Joseph Stalin famously noted of technically inferior Soviet tank power thrown against the German panzers of World War II, “quantity has a quality of its own”. History demonstrated that the conceited Soviet dictator was right.
At the tactical level, the army’s new directorate for unmanned aerial warfare is boosting the impact of the SAC’s largely unchallenged airpower. The directorate already receives Chinese material support thanks to an initiative launched earlier this year to expedite the introduction of drones to front-line battalions.
Russian expertise derived from the war in Ukraine is also almost certainly playing into a drone war in which opposition forces no longer dominate Myanmar’s battlespaces.
Despite the fact that these and other improvements to the SAC’s sagging capabilities are likely to gain popularity over the upcoming year, it is still safe to say that none has yet attained a critical mass that alone or in combination could give a decisive advantage over an enthralled resistance.
In the national heartland, often demoralized regime garrisons remain bunkered in mainly defensive mode. And where in the borderlands, the army plans significant counteroffensives in the upcoming weeks, a lack of manpower, mechanized mobility, and combined-arms experience all prevent dramatic, if not even significant, rebounds.  ,
A more likely scenario is that army advances stifle grinding attrition battles that further reduce both manpower and morale. That scenario is already frustrating regime counterthrusts around the approaches to Mandalay, in Nawnghkio township on the Shan plateau to the east of the city and in Madaya on the Ayeyarwady River to the north.
China’s ambitious plan to end the conflict in the north by closing its borders on munitions, medicine, and fuel shipments that had previously reached the opposition tripartite Brotherhood Alliance and KIA in Kachin state is still in its early stages.
Even assuming a 2, 200-kilometer border can be effectively and indefinitely sealed – an improbable scenario – the impact of the embargo on front-line opposition forces will be mitigated over the coming months by the vast quantities of munitions captured from the Myanmar Army during Operation 1027.
In addition, it’s still to be seen whether Chinese threats and scolding can effectively stifle the lively commercial instincts of the United Wa State Army ( UWSA ), the well-stocked and ostensibly neutral faction that has long profited from its role as a back-room quartermaster for ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar.
Against this backdrop, the current balance of forces leaves open a clear window of opportunity for the opposition to exploit the momentum gained in the year of Operation 1027 and press home its advantage before a still-stumbling enemy has the opportunity to regain its balance.
It’s difficult to predict how long that window will remain open. But it is almost certainly safe to predict that Myanmar’s loose federal-democratic alliance, severely challenged by a lack of external material and diplomatic support, does not have another three or four years to put in place the prerequisites for a military victory. It has one or at most two, which is more likely.
Regular forces
The opposition in the Myanmar heartland, the center of conflict in 2025, will need to use locally based PDFs as foundations to establish regular units, without which concentrations of Myanmar Army forces cannot be defeated.  ,
A resistance to the idea of regular forces organized into battalions and brigades and exercising command-and-control at both district and regional levels would suggest that the war must continue if it is to not stall.
Raised spontaneously for local defense and hit-and-run attacks, PDFs are neither structured nor commanded for the coordinated mobile operations now indispensable in a conflict that the successes of 1027 and a shrinking window of opportunity have propelled into a broadly offensive phase.
The recent victory of the opposition in Pinlebu demonstrated the urgency of organizing regular forces in full force. If reports from the field are accurate, the town’s capture was undertaken by manpower from around 50 different PDFs pulled into the battle from over ten townships stretching across Sagaing region. It was the start of a 53-day campaign that had just begun in mid-August.
While a tribute to revolutionary solidarity, this” all pile in” approach to offensive operations is not a serious template for fighting a war against both a ticking clock and an army dug in across scores of towns and cities. Pinlebu’s capture was also supported by KIA regular units, which are active in northern Sagaing but whose advice and support cannot be found further south.
Similar problems with less positive outcomes have also been apparent in Mandalay region, where PDFs launched the” Myingyan District Special Operation” ( MDSO ) in mid-August. Local groups overran positions in several adjacent townships during a well-planned, albeit brief campaign before retreating in the face of regime airpower and ground forces ‘ rapid focus.
More recently, on October 21, the town of Ngan Myar Gyi, captured on August 19 as part of the MDSO, was retaken by a concerted regime operation involving ground forces, air strikes and naval bombardment from the Ayeyarwady River.
Without the direct support of major ethnic actors, PDFs lack the organizational resilience and logistical resources to withstand, let alone defeat, Myanmar Army forces.
Over the coming year, failure to draw on the best of PDF manpower and equipment and prioritize the formation of new regular battalions configured for mobile offensive operations beyond local boundaries and command structures likely risks strategic defeat over the long term.
Piecemeal reversals on the battlefield, popular exhaustion, and soon enough, the lure of SAC-sponsored “militia” status for business-minded PDFs will only be made worse by external factors. The acclaim, grudging or enthusiastic, with which an Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) -led international community will greet the travesty of SAC-staged “elections” in 2025 is only the most obvious.
building blocks for a battalion
In the dry season months ahead, it is unlikely that even newly constituted regular forces would be capable of overrunning and holding urban centers of any importance. Any assault on a major city the size of Mandalay could prove disastrous if rebel attempts to storm towns would arguably be foolish.
If properly equipped and deployed, however, regular units could prove crucially effective in maintaining the momentum of 1027 with high-profile and ideally well-coordinated attacks on the vital arteries of a severely overstretched regime.
The interdiction of crucial transportation and communication channels that gradually confine the military to urban-controlled islands would ideally be strengthened by airbase raids, ammunition production plants, and fuel convoys.  ,
One of the more impressive aspects of the war is how not many people have the ability to launch serious attacks on airbases, which is directly related to the lack of local PDF capacity and strategic direction.
Virtually by default, the lead actor in addressing the challenge of forming regular forces will be the NUG, the only entity with broad enough legitimacy and some degree of authority in the Bamar heartland.
The Ministry of Defense ( MoD ) of the NUG has already provided financial and logistical support to some but not all PDFs in much of central Myanmar and has nominally renamed them “battalions” in response to persistent sniping from its critics.
In addition, several other armed Bamar actors could pivotally play a key role in creating a new force structure. One is the Bamar People’s Liberation Army ( BPLA ), a group originally based in eastern Karen state where it was trained by cadres of the ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army.
As part of the 1027 campaign, the BPLA has gained combat experience in northern Shan state over the past few years. Its leader, Maung Saung Kha, has recently repeated his intention of redeploying a claimed force of 1, 200 troops back into the Myanmar heartland.
Another potent player has emerged as the Mandalay PDF ( MDY-PDF). Since abandoning dreams of urban guerrilla warfare in Mandalay city, the group has trained and grown under the tutelage of the powerful Ta’ang National Liberation Army ( TNLA ) in hill-country on the borders of Mandalay region and Shan state.
The MDY-PDF, which currently has at least 3, 000 trained regulars, operates alongside the TNLA and under its command-and-control, while acknowledging the authority of the NUG.
Since July this year, it has pushed south along the east bank of the Ayeyarwady River to threaten Mandalay city and potentially extend its influence into the army-dominated flatlands south of the city where MDSO took place.
Other smaller, less frequent organizations include the People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ), which is operated by the TNLA, and the All-Burma Students Democratic Front ( ABSDF), a long-standing group of several hundred troops with significant combat experience who have participated in significant battles in the Indaw and Tigyaing regions of northeast Sagaing.
Who’s command-and-control?
However, the main resistance dissent in 2025 will be less dependent on manpower than on command-and-control, and by extension, on personality and political issues that may yet shape the tragic outcome of a failed revolution.  ,
The main inquiries can be easily answered: Does the MoD of the NUG have the authority, vision, and organizational acumen to take on a central role in the development of strategic operations in the country’s heartland?
Could an open-door” coalition of the willing” form a joint headquarters under NUG auspices bringing together chiefs-of-staff from key commands, Bamar and ethnic?
Will powerful ethnic armies be willing to enlist in direct command-and-control or have operational control over the ethnic Bamar PDFs that could serve as the foundation for the heartland’s elite forces?
Would the BPLA or ABSDF be willing to recognize the command authority of either the NUG or a joint HQ or, alternatively, insist on operational autonomy?
What is not in dispute is that Myanmar’s federal-democratic opposition will soon need to field regular forces for coordinated operations against the SAC in the majority Bamar heartland, where the military is most militarily firmly rooted, using building blocks that are already largely in place.
Political failure to unite around that military objective will likely lead to spreading confusion, strategic incoherence and ultimately a defeat that leaves a blood-soaked military dictatorship in place.  ,
Anthony Davis is a Bangkok-based analyst with Janes security and defense publications.