The US has installed a Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) in Guam, signaling heightened readiness against potential threats from China as the US integrates cutting-edge missile interceptors to fortify its Pacific stronghold.
Last month, The War Zone reported that the US Navy had installed a Mk 41 VLS for Guam’s Aegis Ashore air defense system, marking a significant upgrade to the island’s defenses. The War Zone report mentions the installation is part of broader efforts to enhance Guam’s airspace security against mainly Chinese threats.
The report notes that the Aegis Ashore system, which includes the Aegis Combat System and AN/SPY-1 radar, is designed to intercept ballistic missiles during their midcourse flight using SM-3 interceptors.
It says the modular Mk 41 launcher can accommodate other interceptors like the SM-6 and the forthcoming Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), enhancing its capability to counter hypersonic threats.
However, The War Zone suggests that the installation faces challenges due to Guam’s limited open space and mountainous terrain. The Mk 41 launcher is a crucial component of the planned Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (EIAMD) system, which aims to provide a comprehensive 360-degree defense of the island against a broad spectrum of aerial threats.
Asia Times reported in April 2024 that the US is set to enhance Guam’s missile defenses by deploying Northrop Grumman’s Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) following a successful test at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.
The IBCS, which integrates disparate sensors and weapons systems into a cohesive network, will bolster Guam’s defenses against ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons and drone threats.
The upgrade is part of a broader strategy to address vulnerabilities in the US air and missile defense kill chains, particularly against Chinese and North Korean threats.
The EIAMD missile defense system, featuring Aegis Ashore, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Typhon and Patriot systems, will form the future core of Guam’s defense.
However, in May 2023, Asia Times mentioned that integrating multiple systems may present challenges, as unlinked systems and fixed sensor-to-shooter combinations could fail against advanced missile attacks.
China and North Korea’s “Guam killer” missiles, such as the former’s DF-26 and the latter’s Hwasong 14 and 15, pose significant next-generation threats, with China potentially deploying hypersonic weapons from its naval and air forces.
Alongside kinetic missile attacks, Asia Times mentioned in October 2024 that China could potentially take advantage of vulnerabilities in the US kill chains by launching coordinated attacks from various domains, including space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum, to overcome US missile defenses.
Asia Times reported in June 2022 that the US has initiated significant construction on Tinian, a strategic island in the Western Pacific, to serve as a backup facility for its naval and air operations on Guam.
This effort, part of a broader US$20 billion initiative to enhance the US military presence in the Pacific, includes the Tinian Divert Airfield project, which features a new aircraft taxiway and parking apron and is set to be completed in October 2025.
The project aims to provide strategic, operational and exercise capabilities for US forces to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Tinian’s infrastructure will accommodate 12 tanker aircraft and support personnel, with regular military exercises planned.
Aside from Tinian, Asia Times reported in May 2021 that Palau has invited the US to build strategic ports, bases and airfields on its Pacific islands in response to China’s perceived economic bullying.
Palau’s President Surangel Whipps has recently accused China of destabilizing Palau’s economy by “weaponizing” lucrative Chinese tourism after Palau refused to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
This geopolitical tension has led Palau to seek closer military ties with the US, highlighting the high-stakes rivalry between Beijing and Washington in the Pacific.
Palau, with a population of 18,000, is strategically located in the “Second Island Chain,” which is crucial for US military interests in the region. The US has a historical defense agreement with Palau, and recent military activities have included training exercises and visits by high-ranking US defense officials.
These developments underscore the islands’ historical and ongoing strategic importance dating back to World War II. The US military strategy in the Pacific, which relies heavily on Guam, faces challenges due to the far-flung region’s limited, isolated facilities that are increasingly within the range of Chinese and North Korean missiles.
They also align with the US Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) strategy, which aims to enhance survivability and operational flexibility in increasingly contested environments.
ACE seeks to counter adversary threats to traditional airbases by increasing resilience and generating combat power from dispersed, flexible locations, complicating enemy targeting efforts.
The air strategy promotes a shift from large, centralized airbases to smaller, dispersed locations, enabling rapid movement and maneuvering of forces.
ACE leverages decentralized execution, tailored force packages, pre-positioned equipment, scalable logistics and robust communication networks for joint all-domain operations and partner-nation cooperation.
The focus is on expeditionary skills, infrastructure innovations and agile logistics to maintain combat operations. These elements ensure the US Air Force can generate airpower from multiple, unpredictable locations, complicating adversary planning and reducing vulnerability to attack.
However, James Leftwich and other writers mention in a May 2023 RAND report that the US military’s focus on efficiency has led to a highly centralized supply chain, which could make it vulnerable during high-end conflicts.
Leftwich and others emphasize that centralized decision-making outside warfighting commands leads to delays in resource allocation. They highlight the risk this poses to combat support operations, as the logistics network may struggle to quickly adapt to rapidly changing demands during a contested fight, which in turn could threaten overall mission effectiveness.
In an April 2021 Air & Space Operations Review article, Zachary Moer and other writers note that many US dispersed bases under the ACE concept lack the essential infrastructure of traditional airbases. Moer and others say this includes hardened shelters, advanced air defense systems and sophisticated maintenance facilities.
They point out that scattered military bases are susceptible to attacks without adequate protection, particularly from opponents such as China, who could exploit diplomatic, economic or physical tactics to target them. They note this could potentially undermine air operations due to a lack of proper defenses and logistical support.
In addition, Matthew Donovan mentions in a January 2022 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that US adversaries have studied its force deployment and invested heavily in pervasive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and all-domain long-range offensive capabilities that put its global footprint at risk.
While dispersal complicates targeting, Donovan argues that adversaries could still leverage pervasive surveillance technologies to detect and strike these smaller, less-fortified locations.