Pacific Forum published this article at its original publication. It is republished with authority.
With the US presidential poll just around the corner, in South Korea there are  , concerns , about the potential gain to the White House of former President Donald Trump.
Trump previously mentioned the , withdrawal , of US troops from Korea, but he was not the only one: There have been past historical instances in which the ROK-US empire faced major changes depending on who might be US leader.
After the end of the Vietnam War, President Nixon , reduced , US forces in Korea to really above 40, 000. During the Iraq War, President George W. Bush made a second attempt at this problem.
But this look directly. North Korea continues to advance its nuclear weapon features and has amended its law, declaring a , shift , in its coverage regarding South Korea.
China , launched , an ICBM for the first time in 40 times and exchanged strong warnings with Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan. Russia, after dragging out the war in Ukraine for over two and a half centuries, is threatening , atomic weapons use and has restored its nearby Cold War , ties , with North Korea.
Not just South Korea, but also the US are in for a difficult time for the empire. In this environment, neither country may defend its protection alone. Through the release of the” Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Washington and its allies have shared situational awareness and are developing a robust defense network using the concept of” Integrated Deterrence” from the United States.
While issues and elections within the alliance are unavoidable, they may be conducted with a , objective aligned with the group’s goals.
I think the US government is fully aware of the challenges the empire is facing. However, shared risk perceptions do not immediately improve the ally, nor can the US wholeheartedly understand South Korea’s regional interest. Through discourse, where differences in danger understanding and national interests are adjusted, is managed to form an alliance.
The government of South Korea should n’t be just worried about the ambiguities in US policy. South Korea may create a clear course of action in order to advance its passions, not as one of two distinct countries but as a member of the alliance.
- South Korea should first create a list of its national interests as a focus within the empire.
- Second, it does manage to develop South Korea’s guidelines in US coverage on the Asian Peninsula.
- Third, special attention should be paid to upcoming situations that might alter the public’s opinions of important numbers following the US election.
- Secondly, there must be a complex approach to important topics and issues.
The new US administration should prioritize effectively separating the problems to be emphasized from those that should be minimized. This must be done with careful thought of the new government’s impulses, the change team’s tendencies, and the occasions that may affect their perceptions.
The alliance’s benefits should be at the forefront of consideration. For instance:
- It is a values-based ally.
- South Korea’s defense budget is a great 2.7 % , of GDP.
- The proper benefit of Camp Humphreys.
- South Korea has built a solid defense business base – manufacturing, low-grade fighter planes, artillery and rockets.
On the other hand, evidently complex and complicated ROK-US security discussion bodies or international consultation systems, as well as past commitments or policy directions, may burden the new administration. Those should be addressed slowly.
Important concerns
We remember the issues surrounding President Trump’s extraordinary policies, which materialized soon after his opening. His Northern Korea-related claims had been challenged yet before they materialized, with a series of North Korean missile tests that reshaped Trump’s view of the Asian Peninsula and led to a , near-war problems.
However, the situation also provided North Korea and the US with an unprecedented opportunity to negotiate.
The next US administration, whether it continues the legacy of Trump’s first term or, under Harris, follows Biden’s policy direction, will not represent an entirely new path for South Korea.
Although election promises are gradually becoming more specific, there is still uncertainty regarding which Korean Peninsula policies or defense issues will come up. In addition to South Korea’s pressing issues surrounding the 2024 election, the following chart contains key points:
None of these is insignificant, but a few issues stand out:
- The US will continue to exert influence in the Indo-Pacific region while shifting the costs and obligations to its allies. As a result, there will be more pressure on nations like South Korea, Japan, and Australia to contribute more financially and assume leadership positions. South Korea should  , pledge , strong efforts on regional issues while emphasizing its clear responsibility for the security of the Korean Peninsula. This does not mean ignoring regional issues, but rather actively managing Korea’s part in regional security, which is a pillar of Korean Peninsula.
- Ukraine War: The , stark difference , in stance between Republicans and Democrats regarding support for Ukraine will lead to significant changes depending on the election outcome. However, as European nations ‘ threat perceptions evolve and they accelerate their military buildup, efforts by NATO and the US to , strengthen military cooperation , and defense trade with their Indo-Pacific partners will likely increase. South Korea will take an active role in establishing connections between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic regions.
- North Korea’s nuclear problem: It is one of South Korea’s most pressing issues, but it also has a lot of uncertainty. In the short term, it is unlikely to be a top priority for the new US administration. However, the current international system, with its unstable balance of power and increasing fragmentation, gives North Korea significant maneuvering room and opportunities. Expected North Korean actions may include the , seventh nuclear test , to deploy tactical nuclear warheads ( Hwasan–31 ), a standard-angle ICBM test to demonstrate the capability to strike the US mainland and tests of , SLBMs , equipped with MIRVs to demonstrate the ability to penetrate US missile defense systems. These provocations must be anticipated in advance by South Korea and the US together.
- Extended deterrence: The US will continue to provide its nuclear umbrella to its allies in order to maintain the international non-proliferation regime in light of Russia’s nuclear threats against Ukraine along with North Korea’s developing nuclear capabilities and its potential for preemptive strikes. The US Congress ‘ bipartisan” Strategic Posture Commission ( SPC )” also made a point about how important it is to optimize military postures abroad. For its part, South Korea must institutionalize the accomplishments of the newly established Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG)   ) system to ensure that the United States ‘ extended deterrence and assurance commitment continues to be strong.
- Trilateral ROK-Japan-US cooperation and US military redeployments: There is a stark , difference , between the two presidential candidates regarding multilateralism. The institutionalization and growth of the trilateral cooperation established at Camp David must continue. If the US Department of Defense reviews the , Global Posture Review , and considers redeployments of US troops overseas, including in South Korea, careful consideration of related complex issues like the , transition of wartime operational control , will be necessary. South Korea will take active part in enhancing regional security structures.
- Defense and military technology cooperation: As global supply chains are restructured, South Korea’s role in defense and military technology cooperation will become increasingly important. The vulnerabilities in the US’s defense industry have been highlighted, and the concept of “friendshoring” with reliable allies in the Indo-Pacific region is being emphasized on a bipartisan basis. The ROK-US alliance, although currently limited by , US domestic laws , and focused on functional cooperation through , committees, provides an opportunity for South Korea to enhance its capabilities and expand the alliance’s overall strength.
No business as usual
Elections allow a new government to be inaugurated, which is a great blessing of democracy. Citizens reflect their will through elections and, in turn, formulate, implement and evaluate new policies.
While allied countries do not have voting rights, they still have expectations. South Korea works with the new US government to protect its national security from common external threats. ” We are living in a decisive decade”, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin emphasized in , the 2022 US National Defense Strategy. ” Business as usual at the department is not acceptable”.
The ROK-US alliance is indeed at a turning point. It can no longer deter threats and make appropriate responses by going on. I think that time will favor those who are united by shared values and mutual trust rather than those who are splintered by conflict and mistrust.
Dr. Hanbyeol Sohn ( han. b. [email protected] ) is a professor at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU) and , also serves concurrently , as , the , director of the Center for Nuclear/WMD Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs ( RINSA ).