On October 20, past public Jokowi Subianto sworn in as Indonesia’s seventh leader. Twenty-five centuries ago he was a leper, and for good reason.
In 1998, special forces soldiers under his command abducted democracy activists in Jakarta, 13 of whom have never been seen once, and he was accused of human rights violations in Papua and East Timor. Those who did gain had been tortured.
The kids had been calling for the departure of President Suharto, Prabowo’s father-in-law, who eventually stepped down in May 1998 after widespread violence that some believe Prabowo helped expert. Therefore, backed by forces under his command, Prabowo tried to storm the presidential palace, gun in hand, to intimidate the new leader, BJ Habibie.
Jokowi was prohibited from visiting the United States for 20 years, but he never went on trial for the campaigners ‘ disappearances.
And his beloved defense career came to an end fast: he was fired from the military for “misinterpreting orders.” Disgraced, and seen as embodying the violence and repression of Suharto’s plan, Prabowo went into voluntary banishment in Jordan. He appeared to have no hope for the democratic Reformasi ( reformation ) system that had come out of the ashes of the oppressive New Order.
But Prabowo was far from finished. His recovery and extraordinary ascendance to the president may presently signal the end of Indonesia’s delicate, ambitious liberal democracy and a profit to the New Order design.
The conclusion of Reformasi?
Prabowo lacks passion for democracy, it is obvious enough. He has said, for instance, that it “very, quite relaxing” and “very, very noisy and expensive”.
Gerindra, the political party he founded and prospects, yet has, as its number one mission statement, a transfer to the Constitution” as stated on August 18, 1945″. This is the conservative original Constitution that Soeharto relyed on to act. It gave the president enormous power, who was not elected and had no word limits, but it did not guarantee individual freedom or a separation of powers.
Following Soeharto’s fall, the Constitution was changed to adopt a progressive, democratic design. Thus, a return to the original 1945 Constitution may in itself possible finish Indonesia’s hard-won, if troubled, democracy.
But Prabowo may not need to go this far to love the sweeping authority his former father-in-law exercised. Numerous New Order components are already in position. Much of the work of dismantling Indonesia’s liberal democracy has already been done by the outgoing president, Joko Widodo ( Jokowi ), whose son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, is now Prabowo’s vice president.
For instance, a key foundation of the New Order was “dual work”, a theory that allowed serving military members to get human content, allowing them to occupy the government. Following Suharto’s fall, this was ended.
However, new amendments to the civil support law that were passed in October last year re-authorize active members of the police and army to hold human positions. The proposed changes to the Indonesian National Army ( TNI ) Law currently being debated could expand this. When questioned about the military’s return to human life, the military forces chief welcomed the alterations, saying the troops would not be exercising a “dual work” but a “multi-function”.
Also, under Soeharto, restrictive laws tightly restricted media freedom. A contentious new criminal script that goes into effect in 2026 may presently restore the bans on criticizing the government that the Constitutional Court had formerly outlawed. Additionally, “broadcasting investigative journalism information” may be prohibited under a proposed fresh television law.
Under the New Order, legal community engagement was likewise cruelly restricted. There has been a constant increase in libel and threats against state critics over the past ten years under Jokowi. Additionally, a law passed in 2017 allows the state to break non-governmental businesses without the use of a court system. Now, three NGOs have been banned.
Some activists now openly admit their dread of being targeted and intimidated by state trolls or even intelligence organizations. Some fear Prabowo will use his connections to Sunni civil society organizations to , force or vilify another groups , he sees as reviewers.
Keeping the leaders content
Jokowi is also forming a sizable alliance in the DPR, the federal government, by in the footsteps of Soeharto and Jokowi. Only one group is remaining, with over 80 % of the members already voting for the other.
Jokowi will also increase his government, allowing him to honor areas to supporters and co-opt others, including members of civil society. This will further weaken the opposition.
This kind of government of elite “unity” makes politics opaque. Before measures are put to a vote, political fights occur in secret and are resolved through power plays and agreements. As it was under Soeharto, it would render the national legislature as little more than a rubber stamp.
This assumes Prabowo is capable of handling Indonesia’s powerful political leaders, particularly the rivalry between Megawati Soekarnoputri and Jokowi. Together, they now control the two biggest parties in the legislature ( PDI-P and Golkar, respectively ).
In the February elections, Jokowi, a still incredibly popular man, backed his ex-liar Prabowo because he believed that this would help him maintain his influence after he left office. Prabowo will, however, be reluctanced for very long to give someone real power. One of his biggest obstacles to rule is likely to be his relationship with Jokowi.
Having to deal with a obstructive court
The Constitutional Court, which has the authority to impose laws, is one of the few remaining obstacles to Prabowo acquiring the kind of dictatorial powers Soeharto had. Prabowo will not want a non-compliant and obstructive ( that is, independent ) Constitutional Court. Politicians are already openly discussing the need to “assess its performance.”
The court could simply withdraw from the court, as it has done in the past, if the legislature passes laws that weaken the court.
But the court was established by the amendments to the original 1945 Constitution. This implies that a return to the 1945 Constitution could be used to replace it if the government is unable to pass laws that would weaken, stack, or intimidate independent judges.
Before doing this, Prabowo would need to feel confident that his rule is secure and that he has the backing of the elites, but it is undoubtedly possible. Returning to the original Constitution would simply require a two-thirds vote in the MPR, Indonesia’s highest representative assembly.
Bold promises on the economy
In exchange for high economic growth and development that freed millions of people from poverty, Soeharto’s system was based on a Faustian agreement that allowed him to rule corruptly and oppressively.
Prabowo is likely to adopt the same approach. He campaigned on an annual GDP growth target of 8 %, a rate reached under Suharto, but never by subsequent governments. Jokowi put a lot of emphasis on development, especially in infrastructure, but he never saw much growth above 5 % annually.
Many people are optimistic about the state of the economy under the new president. Prabowo’s father was a prominent economist and finance minister. Prabowo has also , asked , Jokowi’s highly regarded finance minister, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, to stay in her role.
However, Prabowo comes to office with some enormously expensive commitments that would make Sri Mulyani’s job extremely difficult. These include his free school lunches program (upwards of US$ 30 billion ), which Sri Mulyani has publicly questioned, and Jokowi’s signature new capital city, Nusantara, currently under construction. ( The initial phase alone will cost at least US$ 35 billion ).
Moreover, Prabowo’s main priority will be to keep the elites happy and maintain his enormous coalition. His supporters and allies will demand access to concessions and lucrative appointments for their cronies to make up the large sums spent on the February elections, including his brother, tycoon Hashim Djojohadikusumo, who has funded his political career. Rational economic policy-making will therefore be highly constrained.
Indonesia’s high growth rate has always been attained through foreign investment, but Prabowo’s protectionist rhetoric has not stopped there. In reality, Indonesia will continue to be open for business. That will likely make the 8 % GDP annual growth target impossible.
More active foreign relations
Prabowo, who was educated overseas and speaks English fluently, feels comfortable on the global stage. Given its enormous size and new status as a middle-income nation, he will want a more prominent place in international affairs for his nation.
As Jokowi’s defense minister, he was active internationally, even attempting to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. And to his great surprise, countries like the US, which had previously denied him entry, have congratulated him on his victory.
Prabowo’s main foreign affairs challenge will be the same as his predecessor’s: managing the difficult relationship with China.
Indonesians harbor a strong sense of suspicion for China, which is fueled by a potent combination of deeply ingrained racist beliefs, a fear of communism, and an underlying hegemonic concern. The elite rely heavily on Chinese trade and investment, and Indonesia is one of the largest recipients of Belt and Road investments.
Like Jokowi, Prabowo will have to manage this difficult balance.
Indonesian civil society leaders are already referring to the new administration as” New Order Volume II” or “neo-New Order,” and it is obvious why. All the evidence suggests that the process begun under Jokowi will continue under Prabowo, moving much more toward a liberal democracy reform movement that was attempted 25 years ago.
There is nothing in Prabowo’s past or his campaign promises to suggest otherwise. The only thing that remains to be seen is probably how quickly it occurs and how far he will travel.
Tim Lindsey is the director of The University of Melbourne’s Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam, and Society, Malcolm Smith professor of Asian law.
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