China and Russia are flaunting their respective underwater skills in the Pacific while territorial disputes roil the South China Sea, the South China Sea, and a potential Taiwan combat beckons.
This month, Naval News reported that a new image of China’s Type 09IIIB nuclear-powered attack submarine ( SSN) has surfaced on Chinese social media, revealing more details about the advanced vessel. Naval News says the pictures, taken , from a southern area, shows a refined style that improves on earlier variants.
The Type 09IIIB, produced at the Bohai shipyard in Huludao, features a vertical launch system (VLS ) and a pump-jet propulsor. The factory has the capacity to produce two to three SSNs yearly, making the submarine a part of China’s wider effort to modernize its navy.
Since 2022, the factory has launched three to six Model 09IIIBs, based on satellite imagery. In the forthcoming years, China’s Type 09IIIB submarine may be replaced by the next-generation Type 09V SSN, according to Naval News, underscoring China’s commitment to enhancing its underground war functions in the midst of rising regional conflicts.
At the same time, Naval News reported this month that Russia’s Admiralty Shipyards in Saint Petersburg launched the” Yakutsk”, the sixth and final Project 636.3 diesel-electric underwater for Russia’s Pacific Fleet. The vehicle, part of the Superior Kilo II course, is 90 % finish and will have factory trials before its first ocean voyage by year-end.
The Project 636.3 boats, known for their innovative methods and Kalibr-PL weapon features, are a current incarnation of the Soviet-era Project 877 Paltus. Naval News notes that the” Yakutsk” will meet the 19th Submarine Brigade, enhancing Russia’s naval power in the Far East.
The next shipment of six boats contracted in 2016 is now complete with this release. The Naval News report also makes a point about how significant these ships are to Russian naval activities, including their employ in Ukraine’s ongoing issue.
The continuous advancements of Chinese and Russian submarine technology are tactical moves to challenge US naval dominance in critical areas as well as displays of their particular naval modernization.
Edward Feltham mentions energy forecast and ocean power in a report for the Naval Association of Canada’s issue of an , October 2023 issue.
Feltham notes that the People’s Liberation Army Navy ( PLAN ) has built its strategy around advanced submarines, including SSNs, conventional diesel-electric submarines ( SSKs ), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines ( SSBNs ).
He claims that SSKs are used to control the waters around Taiwan, SSNs protect sea pathways and expand China’s reach into the Indian Ocean, and SSBNs provide second-strike nuclear capability, giving China flexibility when defending its territorial claims and projecting strength beyond its local waters.
As for Russia’s underwater strategy in the Pacific, Nicholas Compton mentions in his March 2021 doctoral thesis that Russia’s underwater fleet plays a key role in its Pacific strategy, mainly through proper posturing.
The Russian Navy has reportedly switched from the Soviet-era submarine fleet to more technologically advanced nuclear-powered submarines, such as the Borei SSBN and Yasen nuclear cruise missile submarine ( SSGN ) classes. In the Pacific, these boats perform a number of functions, including nuclear deterrent and energy forecast.
He claims that Russia intends to create a strong naval presence in the Pacific and Arctic parts by using modern ships to proclaim power over disputed areas and protect its interests, particularly in the resource-rich Arctic.
Moreover, he mentions Russia’s rely on hybrid war, which includes the potential use of submarines to destroy or touch undersea cables, demonstrating their versatility in conventional and unconventional operations.
China and Russia’s shared focus on the importance of superior standard and nuclear-powered submarines , for their marine strategies in the Pacific suggests a potential for participation in underwater design, strategy and tactics.
In October 2023, China and Russia announced their partnership to create the Type 096 SSBN, a next-generation vessel, to strengthen China’s strategic ties with the US and its Pacific allies. This collaboration makes use of Russian expertise to enhance China’s stealth and operational viability of its submarines.
Russia’s proficiency in hybrid warfare, which includes using submarines to disrupt undersea infrastructure, could benefit China as it extends its influence into the Indian Ocean and beyond. China would have a strategic advantage if it had the capability to conduct unconventional naval operations.
Both nations have interests in enraging strategic maritime areas, including Russia’s Arctic and China’s Taiwan Strait. Their submarine fleets help them prevent adversaries from entering these disputed areas, while collaborative drills strengthen their capabilities to operate in these areas and extend their reach beyond their waters.
China and Russia are treading carefully due to underlying tensions over strategic autonomy and technology transfer, which prevent them from fully committing to a formal alliance despite their expanding naval cooperation.
In a June 2022 article for Trends Research &, Advisory, Ash Rossiter mentions that Russia is concerned about China reverse-engineering its military equipment. Russia is unsure whether China can copy its technology, undermining its arms sales, or potentially surpassing it, according to Rosenstein.
For instance, he mentions that China’s Yuan-class submarine, which was sold to Pakistan, undoubtedly had elements from Russia’s Kilo-class submarine.
He points out that this dynamic complicates China and Russia’s strategic partnership because Russia must balance the advantages of cooperation with the potential long-term drawbacks of empowering a technologically advanced China.
In a report from the China Aerospace Studies Institute ( CASI) in October 2022, Elizabeth Wishnick mentions that Chinese and Russian officials have shied away from a full-fledged alliance because they are concerned about the restrictions that a relationship might place on their strategic autonomy.
Wishnick claims that the disparate viewpoints on the benefits of a formal alliance are reinforced by this ambiguity. She points out that China emphasizes “partnerships rather than alliances” in its official documents. While Russia echoes this sentiment, Wishnick notes, it has occasionally hinted at the possibility of deeper cooperation.
She argues that China and Russia’s strategic collaboration is dynamic but cautious, with no intention to form an official alliance to protect each country’s strategic autonomy.