Iran and Israel are at battle. In reality, the two parties have been fighting for years, but the conflict has mostly occurred under secret and covert operations.
The nature of the conflict has been altered by the new actions of both sides in this again” dark battle.” It is not evident that de-escalation is on the ocean.
On October 1, 2024, Iran launched a large, clear strike against Israel notionally in punishment for Israel’s two assassinations of Hamas head Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah’s chief, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
In six weeks, there was a second storm like that. According to many accounts, Israel was not seriously harmed by the preceding Persian invasion on April 13 that included over 300 missile and cruise missile launches and strike robots.
Israel’s quick military answer therefore, an attack against a single developed Egyptian air defense system in the Isfahan state, was somewhat measured. Perhaps because of this, and good in part because of US encouragement of restraint.
The measured change from April was widely seen as a sign that both parties would prefer to de-escalate instead than engage in continuous open warfare. However, additional Israeli military operations that followed have sparked escalatory Iranian military actions, thereby bringing the issue back into focus.
Israel’s military leaders announced in June that they were “ready to face” Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Palestinian militant group whose frequent jet attacks against north Israel have prompted tens of thousands of people to evacuate the area after Hamas ‘ capabilities and authority were undermined in the Gaza Strip.
Israel spins north
Israel’s tilt from Gaza toward Lebanon coincided with the July 31, 2024, death of Hamas ‘ social commission president, Haniyeh, during his remain in Tehran. The purported Jewish activity was seen as an affront to Iran’s autonomy. The domestic security apparatus of Iran was exposed through an embarrassment as well, which highlighted its fragility and absorption.
Even though Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei , vowed a “harsh response”  , against Israel, by September, Iran had taken no action.
Many Middle Eastern analysts were unsure whether the Egyptian response would actually materialize and, in turn, what it would mean for Khamenei’s commitment to his proxies due to Tehran’s inaction.
If Iran’s command did choose caution following the assassination of Hamas ‘ leading political figure, the same could not be said of its response to Israel’s microfluidic operation against Hezbollah in the middle of September.
Israel launched a covert operation to create chaos and confusion in Hezbollah’s authority through the use of damaged violent communication devices. Israel finally carried out attacks eliminating Hezbollah’s top officials including Nasrallah.
The Israeli army next launched what the country’s officials describe as a “limited]ground ] activity” into southern Lebanon to reduce Hezbollah posts along the northern borders.
The Israeli @IDF confirms that Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the Hezbollah terrorist organization and one of its founders, was eliminated yesterday, together with Ali Karki, the Commander of Hezbollah’s Southern Front, and additional Hezbollah commanders.
Many Middle Eastern experts and even Iranian military leaders believed that Tehran’s October 1 attack against Israel was primarily a retaliation for the two ostensible assassinations against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.
These were certainly key factors. But as an expert on Iran’s defense strategy, I argue that Iran’s leaders also felt compelled to attack Israel for three equally, if not more important, reasons: to slow Israel’s advance in Lebanon, to save face, and to restore deterrence.
Challenging Israel’s advance
Iran wants to halt and possibly reverse Israel’s efforts to defeat Hezbollah, especially as it launches ground forces into southern Lebanon. Israeli ground forces must now battle what is perhaps the most effective guerrilla fighting force in the world, which successfully fought the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2006 with success.
Israel’s strategy and operational planning and execution ability are far superior to that of Hezbollah, despite the fact that it is still in the middle of a localized war and even after Israel’s leaders announced its intention to engage in it.
And that is a major blow to Iran’s view of the Islamic Republic as its” Axis of Resistance “‘s crown jewel.
In this respect, the Oct. 1 retaliatory strike by Iran can be seen as an attempt to afford Hezbollah time to appoint replacement leadership, regroup and organize against Israel’s ground invasion.
The brutal art of save face?
Additionally, it aids Iran in preserving its face, particularly in how other parts of its external proxy network view it.
Orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC – Tehran’s primary arm for coordinating external operations – Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support enabled and encouraged the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack against Israel – even, as it has claimed, Iran had no prior warning of the assault.
Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. With many of its members either dead or hiding and unable to launch a coherent offensive campaign, causing Israel’s military leaders to claim that Hamas has been successfully overthrown as a threat, has undoubtedly contributed to this lack of support.
Unsurprisingly, Iran is glad to enable Palestinians to fight Tehran’s enemies and absorb the human costs of war, because this arrangement primarily benefits the Islamic Republic.
Once the fighting in Gaza started, the IRGC was nowhere to be found.
Iran ca n’t afford to sit back and watch now that Israel has turned its attention to Lebanon and achieved a number of initial tactical victories against Hezbollah. For two main reasons. First, a year of fighting in Gaza has demonstrated that Israel is willing to take any threat that might exist along its borders, including a willingness to withstand the pressure of international political pressure or to operate within Iran’s borders.
Second, other Iranian proxy organizations are monitoring Iran to see if Tehran will continue to support them or to step down, as it appears to have done with Hamas.
Reclaiming deterrence
Perhaps above all, in Tehran’s calculus over how to respond is Iran’s need to restore a deterrence.
The two defining features of Iran’s interrelated external, or “forward defense“, and deterrence strategies is its regional network of militant proxies and its long-range weapons arsenal, which includes a large number of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones.
In two ways, these Iranian defense tactics aim to deter enemies from attacking Iran: first, by imposing a punishment on Israel and other regional US allies with proxy militia or long-range weapon attacks, and second, by providing scapegoat targets for Iran’s enemies to launch their anger. In effect, Iran’s proxy forces act as proxy targets that pay the costs for Iran’s hostile policies.
Iran’s ability to deter attacks against the country is threatened by Israel’s continued support for Hamas and its ongoing operations against it. For the Islamic Republic’s leaders, this is an unacceptable risk.
Who plays the next move?
The leaders of Iran are likely to have been motivated by these interconnected imperatives to launch a second significant, direct missile attack on Israel on October 1. It is unknown how successful the strike will be in achieving any of Tehran’s goals.
Despite unverified cellphone videos that show several ballistic missiles detonating after reaching land in Israel, the Islamic Republic claimed that as many as 90 % of the ballistic missiles hit their intended targets.
What is almost certain, however, is that this will not be the last move in the conflict. Israel’s operation in Lebanon is unlikely to stop until it accomplishes its goals for border security. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has threatened to punish Iran for its most recent retaliatory attack.
In response to this warning, the IRGC leaders issued a counter-warrant of their own, saying that Iran will once more engage in unspecified” crushing and destructive attacks” if Israel militarily responds to the October 1 attack.
Rhetorically, neither side is backing down, militarily this may be true, too. Make no mistake, this is a war. The nature and scope of Israel’s next move will determine how the war with Iran develops.
Aaron Pilkington is a Fellow at the University of Denver’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies.
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
