The US has unveiled a next-generation air-to-air missile, signaling a potent new weapon to counter China’s expanding Anti-Access/Area-Denial ( A2/AD ) strategies around Taiwan and the wider South China Sea.
This quarter, The War Zone reported the US Navy has confirmed the existence of the AIM-174 weapon, an air-launched version of the SM-6 surface-to-air weapon that marks a innovative section in its long-range security features.
Following reports of sightings during US Navy exercises in 2024, including images of Super Hornet aircraft carrying the missile during Hawaii’s Rim of the Pacific ( RIMPAC ) war games, the missile was first made publicly known.
The AIM-174, with an estimated collection of 320 meters, provides superior air-to-air, anti-ship and ballistic missile intrusion features, extending beyond the reach of lineage marine missile systems.
The weapon is described as a part of the US Navy’s wider effort to combat China’s growing propensity to thwart US troops ‘ capability to invade critical areas through a network of anti-ship arms, long-range ballistic missiles, and supersonic risks, according to The War Zone.
According to the cause, the AIM-174 allows US Navy airplane to employ targets at intense ranges beyond device awareness, leveraging advanced “kill web” systems that utilize connected sensor data from various air, sea and space-based platforms.
The US Navy’s defensive and offensive abilities in the Pacific drama are significantly improved by its advantages, especially in situations involving a possible conflict with China over Taiwan or the South China Sea, despite The War Zone’s claim that the rocket’s full capabilities remain defined.
The AIM-174 is anticipated to be crucial in extending the US Navy’s reach and shielding carrier strike groups from increasingly sophisticated Chinese threats as it enters service.
A” shooting the archer” approach allows the AIM-174 to be used, removing missile carriers before they can strike US carrier battlegroups or Pacific bases.
In November 2022, Asia Times reported that China’s strategic bomber, the Xian H-6K, was discovered carrying a brand-new, air-launched hypersonic ballistic missile, possibly a CM-401, highlighting its A2/AD and standoff strike capabilities against US forces and bases in the Pacific. The missile has formidable combat characteristics, including a speed of up to Mach 6 and a range of 290 kilometers, with the ability to perform terminal diving attacks.
The H-6 K’s air launch capability significantly extends the missile’s range and performance. Similar to Russia’s Kinzhal hypersonic missile, the H-6K underscores China’s strategy to diversify its hypersonic weapon platforms, including ship and road-mobile launchers, to counter US and allied forces.
By putting its own personal touch on modern air defenses, China’s hypersonic advancements aim to deter adversaries and pose a significant threat to US military installations in Guam and Wake Island.
Aside from targeting missile carriers, the AIM-174 can be used to hit large, slow and vulnerable high-value aerial targets such as tankers, airborne warfare and control ( AEW&, C ) and special mission aircraft. These could include sophisticated airborne electronic warfare platforms.
Last month, Asia Times mentioned that China’s Y-9LG airborne electronic warfare platform, with its “balance beam” radar, can disrupt enemy communications, radar and navigation systems while gathering intelligence on threat emitters.
This platform, which entered service with the People’s Liberation Army-Air Force ( PLAAF ) in early 2023, operates from a standoff position similar to the US Air Force’s EC-37B Compass Call.
The Y-9LG’s deployment underscores China’s strategic investment in airborne standoff intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ( ISR ) and airborne early warning and control ( AEW&, C ) systems. This development is a part of China’s wider plan to improve its ability to use electronic weapons and establish information dominance in potential conflict scenarios, particularly in the Pacific.
However, the AIM-174’s reliance on kill webs may also be its vulnerability. Nicholas O’Donoughue and other authors claim in a January 2021 RAND report that the vulnerabilities of US kill chains and kill webs are a result of their reliance on networked systems and information sharing across various platforms.
O’Donoughue and others emphasize that a break in any part of this chain, such as sensors, communication links or decision-making processes, could disrupt the entire chain’s functionality.
According to them, vulnerability makes US kill chains and kill webs susceptible to cyberattacks, electronic warfare, and other disruptive technologies that aim to attack the chain’s weakest links. The traditional linear kill chain in the US is becoming more sophisticated “kill webs,” where data from various sensors and shooters are distributed across different domains to create more adaptable and resilient systems.
O’Donoughue and others point out, however, that these kill webs are also vulnerable because of their greater complexity. They make the case that effective real-time data synchronization and integration are required for distributed kill chains that involve a number of sensors and platforms. They point out that failures in these areas can cause delays or inaccurate targeting, which could allow adversaries to exploit system gaps.
In line with targeting US kill chains or kill webs, Joel Wuthnow, in a March 2023 presentation for the Institute for National Strategic Studies ( INSS), mentions that China’s” system destruction warfare” concept represents the core of the People’s Liberation Army’s ( PLA ) modern operational strategy.
Wuthnow makes note of the doctrine’s intention to defuse an enemy’s capacity to conduct coordinated operations. According to Wuthnow, it targets critical operational systems, including command structures, reconnaissance intelligence, firepower and support capabilities, using both kinetic and non-kinetic methods.
He makes the claim that China’s goal is to disrupt crucial decision-making processes in adversary systems through coordinated strikes, which could involve sophisticated precision weapons to devastate key command and control nodes, electronic warfare, and cyberattacks.
He notes that the PLA’s focus on “multi-domain precision warfare” further exemplifies its reliance on emerging technologies, such as AI and big data, to enhance these attacks.
Wuthnow points out that the PLA’s modernization efforts, including new hardware like the J-20 stealth fighters, Type-055 cruisers and advanced missiles equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles, are geared toward enhancing its system destruction capabilities.
He claims that these developments are in line with China’s strategic goals for 2027-2049, which highlights the importance of information warfare and joint combatants in its military operations.
He claims that even with the PLA making strides in these areas, institutional laggards like centralized decision-making and limited joint experience may still present challenges.