The demise of Hezbollah’s president, Hassan Nasrallah, in an Israeli attack in Beirut on September 27 has left the violent Syrian business leaderless at a crucial time.
The head of the northern command of the Israel Defense Forces ( IDF), Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, had told his soldiers to prepare for a potential invasion of Lebanon two days earlier in a speech broadcast around the world.
There is every reason to believe Friday’s ( September 27 ) airstrike, which targeted Hezbollah’s headquarters building in the southern Beirut suburb of Dahiyeh, was in preparation for a possible invasion. It came after weeks of strikes which Israel promises have eliminated many of Hezbollah’s top management.
Halevi told his soldiers on September 25 that they would “go in, kill the enemy that, and quickly damage” Hezbollah’s system. Hezbollah is a part of the Palestinian population, and this approach guarantees the deaths of innocent civilians.
Since 2006, both Hezbollah and the IDF have sought to avoid a direct fight. For decades, they have played tit-for-tat with the logic of fairness to avoid an all-out battle.
Although the brutal October 7 strikes on Israel by Hamas triggered a commencement of hostilities, until last week, both edges were calling for restraint. What has changed? Is a earth war then expected? And if so, what would that mean for Hezbollah and Lebanon?
Israel has a track record of engaging in defense maneuvers in Lebanon that have only actually made its allies stronger over the long term. The destruction of the Palestine Liberation Organization ( PLO ) did not stop Hamas from emerging; rather, it assisted in its creation.
Also, Israel’s achievement of the PLO in southern Lebanon triggered the development of Hezbollah. Israel has shown itself capable of occupying even the smallest piece of Syrian land despite five incursions since 1978.
The increase started on September 18 when Israel detonated dozens of pagers and mobile gadgets owned by Hezbollah workers, killing at least 32 and injuring many thousand persons. Both factors have been preparing for a new issue for years.
This modern attack, which had been planned for years, could be characterized as a tactical masterstroke to put an end to the enemy. The IDF had to act or lose the” surprise” because Hezbollah appeared to be becoming suspicious of the weapons. This suggests that operational concerns are taking precedence over corporate and political ones, which study consistently suggests is not a wise idea.
However, these cuts are believed to possess crippled Hezbollah’s demand in the short term and emboldened the IDF’s management. On September 18, Israel’s defence minister, Yoav Gallant, told Jewish soldiers:” We are at the launch of a new step in the battle — it requires courage, determination and perseverance”. While he made no mention of the exploding tools, he praised the function of Israel’s military and security firms, noting their findings were excellent.
The IDF has developed a strategy over the” Blue Line,” the de facto borders that distinguishes Israel and Lebanon, over the past few years. Hezbollah’s top operatives have been effective and accessible on the Blue Line, which is closely monitored by the IDF, encouraged by the failure of the organization to fight it in the July 2006 war.
This has enabled the Army to picture, identify and track top Hezbollah management, which is why since October 7 we have seen a dynasty of assassinations of its crucial operatives, including Ibrahim Aqeel, a commander of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force, and more recently, Mohammed Sarour in Beirut, as well as many others.
The IDF now believes it has Hezbollah on its knees, or at least one knee. The IDF is currently escalating because it is using the same strategy as in Gaza to bomb any area it can reasonably claim to be a Hezbollah target.
The Lebanese population has been harmed by this. Since October 8th, 2023, the Health Ministry has reported that 1, 540 people have died and thousands of innocent civilians have been hurt, according to the Health Ministry’s statement on Friday. An estimated 1 million people have been displaced from their homes in Lebanon, according to a report from 533 shelters in which over 70, 000 civilians have registered.
Can Hezbollah fight back?
Hezbollah has been temporarily unable to lead itself as a result of the death of Nasrallah, and the demise of a number of its senior figures has deprived it of experienced commanders, many of whom have had recent combat experience in Syria. Additionally, south Lebanon’s bombings are reducing Hezbollah’s stock of rockets and other weapons.
Israel should not, however, accept the fact that Hezbollah is no longer a part of the equation or underestimate the organization. If the IDF makes the error of putting boots on the ground once more, Hezbollah’s real strength has always been in its capacity to melt into the population, and it will be ready to launch a war of attrition with hit-and-run tactics. The failure of all five previous invasions should indicate that the outcome might be a repeat of what took place between 1982 and 2006?
Furthermore, while Iran’s response to the escalation has been muted thus far, it is unlikely to abandon Hezbollah. A long, drawn-out, low-intensity conflict would favour the kind of asymmetric tactics used by the” axis of resistance”, which also includes Lebanon’s neighbour, Syria.
By bombing and displacing the Lebanese population, the IDF aims to reduce morale. On the grounds that they are Hezbollah ammunition and weapons depots, it is now destroying private homes and public buildings.
The Palestine conflict has always been viewed as the main reason for the civil war that erupted in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990. In order to show solidarity with Hamas since the October 7 attack, the IDF is betting on the Lebanese people turning their backs on Hezbollah for launching a new war against them as a result of its rocket barrages into northern Israel.
The IDF should keep in mind the past, even though there are many Lebanonis who oppose Hezbollah and its activities in south Lebanon. Even though Hezbollah is a popular force in Lebanon right now, indiscriminate bombing of the kind we are currently seeing will not be tolerated by the populace indefinitely.
When the IDF invaded south Lebanon in 1982, some Lebanese welcomed them with rice and flowers, describing them as liberators from the PLO. However, that warm welcome did not last.
In 2006, the IDF applied a similar strategy, targeting civilian evacuation convoys and UN compounds. And once again, the tide of public opinion swiftly swung back in favor of “al-muqawimah” ( the resistance ).
Hezbollah is reportedly trying to retake control of the Litani river, impose UN resolution 1701, and allow displaced people to return to their homes. However, Israel and the IDF are naive to believe that, regardless of how successful in the short term, an invasion or a bombing campaign will enable Israeli civilians to live peacefully along the Blue Line for the long term.
Ultimately, the only way forward is for both parties to come to the table and negotiate. The human cost of Israel’s current strategy in Lebanon is awry to consider, and it is likely to spark even more hatred, fostering a new wave of anti-Israel fighters, as opposed to providing the foundation for a long-lasting peace.
Chiara Ruffa is professor of political science at Sciences Po, while Vanessa Newby is assistant professor at Leiden University’s Institute of Security and Global Affairs.
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.