As the US prepares for nuclear preparation tabletop exercises, China’s rapidly expanding arsenal and growing strategy are reshaping the international nuclear balance, raising concerns about a possible showdown over Taiwan.
The US Air Force is planning a table practice to evaluate readiness for several nuclear-related cases, according to US Lieutenant General Andrew Gebara, who made the announcement at the Air &, Space Forces Association event near Washington, DC.
The War Zone mentions that the training, which is scheduled for later this month, aims to prepare for potential low-yield nuclear weapons use in Europe, nuclear demonstrations or testing, and adaptation to local problems involving nuclear power.
According to Gebara, Gebara said that the US Air Force needs broader training at all levels, including more military ones, beyond the conventional tactical level.
The statement notes that this change is a result of the changing nature of nuclear risks, which now include a wider range of people and supply techniques, including low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. It mentions that the results of the exercise will be discussed at the approaching CORONA commanders meeting.
China’s evolving nuclear approach reflects its desire for safe deterrence and international fame, while the US Air Force attempts to improve its preparation for tactical nuclear situations.
David Logan and Phillip Saunders mention that China’s atomic strategy has long been up for debate, with six key concepts emerging to explain its development of nuclear weapons in a July 2023 China Strategic Perspectives statement.
The most notable of these, according to Logan and Saunders, are the nuclear weapon and safe second-strike models, which suggest China intends to maintain a survivable nuclear pressure against adversarial capabilities, especially those of the US.
They point out that the nuclear weapon model extends this deterrent to include regular threats, particularly in a potential discord over Taiwan, while the second-strike model focuses on deterring large-scale atomic attacks.
According to Logan and Saunders, the Great Power status design serves the greater purpose of enhancing federal prestige.
In terms of radioactive skills, China is claiming to be moving beyond its earlier “lean and successful” barrier and is aiming to outpace the US and Russia.
Although there is little empirical data to support these models, Logan and Saunders point to different theories that suggest China is attempting to establish regional nuclear conflicts or asserts its supremacy in the nuclear site, such as theatre deterrence and nuclear supremacy.
Finally, Logan and Saunders say that the governmental politics type attributes nuclear developments to domestic opposition between China’s military and political institutions, but this, too, has poor support.
They point out that China’s development of nuclear weapons seems to be motivated by a combination of unwavering decency and a growing need for international notoriety, with a smaller focus on developing nuclear weapons.
As China’s atomic strategy develops, its rapid army expansion and development efforts reflect a clear desire to strengthen its corporate capabilities.
According to Hans Kristensen and various authors in a January 2024 content for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, China has about 500 nuclear weapons. Their estimates suggest this amount could increase to 1, 000 by 2030 and 1, 500 by 2035.
Kristensen and others highlight China’s use of JL-3 missiles, new missile silos, and advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBMs). Moreover, they mention that China has rescinded a atomic mission from its planes and is developing an air-launched nuclear weapon.
They mention the US Department of Defense’s ( DOD ) China Military Power Report 2023 aligns with these findings, emphasizing China’s potential to deploy these warheads at higher readiness levels.
The authors add that China’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal is fueled by its proper desire to increase its deterrence capabilities and safeguard regional security.
But, Kristensen and others make the point that the standard opaque and rely on available sources, satellite imagery, and expert analysis make it challenging to accurately assess China’s nuclear capabilities.
What’s obvious, though, is that China’s rapid nuclear development increases the risk of radioactive force in any conflict over Taiwan, with the US perhaps responding in kind.
Matthew Kroenig discusses the possible scenarios for deliberate atomic usage in a Taiwan conflict involving the US and China in a report from the Atlantic Council in September 2023. In the event of a high-stakes conflict, Kroenig points out that both parties might take nuclear increase into consideration.
He says that for China, nuclear use may manifest in various forms: signaling, demonstrating handle with a test or attacking US forces or Taiwan itself to force a swift resolution. In the same vein, he claims that the US might consider stopping a Chinese invasion or responding to Chinese nuclear use with limited nuclear strikes.
Both sides, according to Kroenig, would have trouble halting escalation if they used nuclear weapons to avoid a full-fledged nuclear exchange. He warns that a mistake on either side’s part could cause a protracted nuclear exchange with serious global effects.
He makes the mention that as China increases its nuclear arsenal, the US must prepare both conventional and nuclear responses, including by strengthening regional missile defenses and reevaluating the size and deployment of its nuclear forces to deter Chinese aggression.
The US is becoming less and less adept at resolving the complex risks of nuclear escalation in a potential conflict over Taiwan, in contrast to China’s rapidly expanding nuclear capabilities.
Andrew Metrick and other authors make it clear in an August 2024 report for the Center for a New American Security ( CNAS ) that the US is insufficiently prepared to deal with China’s nuclear escalation risks, particularly in a protracted conflict.
The writers note that as China’s nuclear capabilities expand, the potential for nonstrategic nuclear use in the Indo-Pacific increases, creating conditions that challenge traditional US deterrence approaches.
They point out significant gaps in US doctrine and capabilities, noting that US strategy, which was heavily influenced by Cold War strategies, is insufficient to address China’s evolving nuclear posture.
They point out that tactical nuclear exchanges, particularly in a limited conflict over Taiwan, are more plausible now due to the Indo-Pacific’s unique geography and operational environments.
Metrick and others say these scenarios expose the US to platform vulnerabilities, signaling challenges and a lack of appropriate nuclear responses, especially in managing China’s coercive nuclear strategies.
They also mention that the US faces significant decision-making difficulties when addressing China’s potential nuclear weapons use, as divergent viewpoints on appropriate responses could cause political gridlock.