Why Japan will not come to Taiwan’s rescue – Asia Times

With your style agreement, this post originally appeared on Pacific Forum. Read the original below.

Taiwan anticipates that Japan does aid it if China problems.

According to a poll conducted by the Tokyo-based Central Research Services on behalf of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan, 77 % of Japanese people feel connected to Taiwan. Of the survey group, 72.8 % said that the relationship between Taiwan and Japan is “good” or” somewhat good”, while only 1.2 % said it was “bad” or” somewhat bad”.

According to a 2021 Chinese Public Opinion Foundation surveys, nearly 60 % of Japanese believe that Japan would release the Self-Defense Causes to come to their aid in the event of an invasion by China.

Are for hope misplaced?

” People greatly admire Taiwan, they love Taiwan. No other country in the world loves Japan as much as the Taiwanese, which is one of the reasons they love Taiwan.” There is a huge difference between that kind of warm and fuzzy’ we like you, love you’ and everything,” Jeffrey Kingston, a teacher of Asian studies at Temple University, Tokyo, told Voice of America.

” There is an expectation in Washington that Japan would intervene, and I think]the ] political leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party thinks they should intervene, but the public is extremely leery of Japan going beyond its pacifist constitution”, he said.

All of this seems contradictory given the frequent visits to Taiwan by Japanese VIPs who claim that” Taiwan’s defence is Japan’s defence.” The Japan Self-Defense Force ( JSDF) has no military ties to the Taiwan military, aside from a recent Japanese Coast Guard exercise with a Taiwan Coast Guard ship.

Another great example is Deputy Prime Minister&nbsp, Aso Taro, who said that Japan and the US would have to protect Taiwan if China invaded. Nevertheless, his speech was no backed up by the Chinese government.

The Chinese economy is a major factor in Japan’s generally hesitantness to commit to Taiwan, aside from a record of nonviolence and a broken defense relationship. 40 % of Chinese exports were once made up of the China market.

Due to the difficulties of conducting firm that, the Chinese market is no longer as appealing to Japan as it was. Chinese companies are relocating from China and shifting their investment abroad to countries with better running conditions. Still, almost 30 % of Chinese exports are China-bound and for a dependency may hinder, perhaps fatally, any significant preparations for discord.

According to&nbsp, Nakano Koichi, a professor in comparative and Japanese politicians at Tokyo’s Sophia University,” Abe even said that a war in Taiwan—a ‘ disaster in Taiwan ‘—would be Japan’s disaster, but that’s a very serious location that is not really covered or discussed in Japan”.

In 2015, when then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pushed through a big change to Japan’s pragmatist law, lifting a ban on” social self-defense”, he pitched the shift internally to defend Japan and maneuver closer to the US, Nakano said. Entry into a international battle was not possible. The action is still incredibly contentious in Japan, where it was widely perceived by the legal system as an assault on Chinese politics, Nakano said.

Japan’s security practices are those that led to the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security’s section and helped Taiwan. The&nbsp, 1996&nbsp, shuhen jitai&nbsp, commits Japan to support areas adjacent to Japan. China demanded that Taiwan become free, but, Japan refused.

In 2014, the government reinterpreted Article 9 of the law. In the event that an assault on a particular nation was perceived as a threat to Japan, the outcome made it possible for Japan to defend that nation. For a reinterpretation strengthened the&nbsp, shuhen jitai.

However, the government does not recommend a greater responsibility for Japan in the region. A poll conducted in 2023 indicates that nearly&nbsp, 80 %&nbsp, of Chinese approve of tax hikes to support Japan’s increased security expenses. This will complicated, probably fatally, government efforts to prepare the JSDF to make a significant difference in a Taiwan Strait disaster.

Massive increases in Japanese military costs are likely&nbsp, too much, too late&nbsp, to lessen dependence on the US in the occurrence of a possible Taiwan conflict. The JSDF, year after year, misses its selection purpose. The result is it’s an&nbsp, older, understaffed, and stressed power.

Generally, the JSDF has less popular support and respect. A declining population and increased opposition from the private sector all contribute to the JSDF’s difficulties. A JSDF occupation is insecure due to the low pay and poor living conditions.

The&nbsp, bright spot&nbsp, of the JSDF is the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force ( JMSDF), believed to be the strongest in the region after America’s and thus better to China’s still undeveloped but steadily growing naval forces. The JMSDF, however, wo n’t be enough to turn the tide in war.

The Chinese connection with Taiwan is based on a non-governmental marriage. Due to economic and geopolitical considerations, Japan walks a rope with China, trying to avoid presiding over either Taiwan or China.

In response, Japan did not establish formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, is doubtful to negotiate a Taiwan Relations Agreement, and will not sell Taiwan any destructive military equipment.

China’s leadership must strengthen its dependence on the Chinese market and establish a reliable fighting force if it wants to really help Taiwan. Until it does but, “warm and fuzzy” statements may be all it has to offer.

Bill Sharp ( we. [email protected] ) is an associate of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Hawaii, Manoa and adjunct senior fellow at Pacific Forum. Over a period of 23 times, he taught South Asian politicians at Chaminade University of Honolulu, Hawaii Pacific University and the University of Hawaii, Manoa.