This post originally appeared on Pacific Forum, and it has since been republished with authority. Read the original around.
A “provisional agreement” was signed by the Philippines and China on July 21 to end a conflict over a submerged reef in the South China Sea and within the Philippines ‘ Exclusive Economic Zone ( EEZ ).
The Philippines would be able to replenish the BRP Sierra Madre that was grounded on Minute Thomas Shoal with the help of the deal. Evidently, China sought to perceive the agreement to support its improper states within the Philippines ‘ EEZ. On July 27, the Philippines was able to replenish the Sierra Madre.
While nine Chinese ships ( including three , People’s Liberation Army Navy warships ) shadowed the mission, the Philippines claim there was no interference. China, on the other hand, claims to have undertaken “on-the-scene” audits of the sale.
Whether or not China harmed this specific recharge goal, it is likely to harmed these missions once more by asserting a right to inspection.
The Philippines does reject the interim agreement for this reason, and it should supplies the BRP Sierra Madre with whatever materials and methods it deems appropriate. If China continues to interfere, the Philippines may take up the United States’ , present to help in the resupply , operations.
In its interpretation of the interim agreement, China wants to compel the Philippines to take ipso post the claim that China has constitutional authority over the South China Sea.
China claims it must be informed in advance of any supplies operations, that Manila you simply take “living needs”, and that China is entitled to “on-site validation” of the materials sent.
This basically confirms China’s legitimate ownership of the Next Thomas Shoal as well as indirectly gives legitimacy to China’s possession of a variety of additional characteristics in the Philippines ‘ EEZ.
Manila would acknowledge that China is legally owned and that all decisions made by the Philippines are made by China’s great practices. This is , improper in global law , and undesirable for the Philippines ‘ national interests.
Another issue with Beijing’s view is that it renounces both the Philippines ‘ apparent need for natural resources as well as legal authority.
The Philippines is a fresh and growing state (unlike China ) that needs to supply its people. It will also significantly need the , power tools available , from the South China Sea.
To give up these tools not only sets a law that discredits the rule-based world order, but it also discredits the Philippines ‘ financial future.
What’s really going on below?
China’s actions in the South China Sea has received a lot of controversy since 2014, but its actions has constantly been revisionist over the past 50 years. For instance, in January 1974, China attacked and seized certain , Vietnamese-occupied functions in the Parcel Islands.
In the late 1980s, China , skirmished with the Vietnamese , at Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands. And of course, in violation of international law, it started building territories inside of the Philippines EEZ in 2014. Different states like as , Indonesia have faced Chinese abuse.
China wants to expand its safety perimeter and manage the South China Sea because it wants to manage the assets there.
China’s actions not just violates the , United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, per the , Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 decision, but it is also possibly a contravention of the UN Charter,  , Article 2, Part 4. China is attempting to undermine the now stressed rule-based global order by violating international laws on a number of levels.
The issue with the temporary agreement is that it provides legal justification for China’s often improper deeds. It is another case of China’s extended use of “lawfare“. It grants power to China where it lacks all legitimate standing. This is the first move in a slog to acknowledge China’s ownership of the Philippines ‘ EEZ.
Otherwise, the Philippines may continue to reject all of Beijing’s says inside the Philippine EEZ. It may continue to assert its right and , demand with the United States , on aid in resupplying the BRP Sierra Madre. In fact, the Philippines and the US may use force rather than force white zone maneuvers.
Manila’s legal say should be backed by lasting and effective job. Therefore, the Philippines may create a more permanent existence at the Second Thomas Shoal in addition to continuing the resupply operations.
There are a number of possibilities that the Philippines and the US may choose in terms of law enforcement. Second, the Philippines may resolve some of its pending sea disputes with its neighbors. The Philippines has previously , settled specific disputes through negotiation.
This strategy is useful inasmuch as it is peaceful. However, using internationally recognized dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve various unresolved issues would be a great step in demonstrating the value of the democratic order as opposed to China’s dismissal of the rule of law.
Next, the Philippines can continue to apply the rule of law to proclaim its freedom, such as it did in June when it , filed a claim , with the UN to expand its continental shelf. This once demonstrates the option to China’s method.
Third, the Philippines might file a new lawsuit with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in relation to China’s death of wildlife.  , The Philippines considered this in later 2023.  , The US, for its part, has the tools and legal knowledge to provide the Philippines help. Also, it has the ability to impact world view in a way that asserts continuing consciousness of China’s sophistry.
The rule of law is no respected in Beijing. However, it cannot because of the autocratic nature of its program. The PRC’s attempt to secure legal support for its then unsupported and illegal South China Sea claims is the subject of the interim agreement.
By negotiating privileges that China has no legal state to, the Philippines and other like-minded countries may not support or otherwise justify China’s actions. Doing so would destroy the world rules-based purchase.
Michael Tkacik ( [email protected] ) holds a JD from Duke University School of Law and a PhD from the University of Maryland. He is Stephen F. Austin State University’s doctor of state, and he also serves as the head of the School of Honors.
His study interests focus on the Indo-Pacific. He has published widely in publications such as Analytical Strategy, Defense &, Security Analysis and International Relations.