Israel had been anticipating a significant harm from Hezbollah for months in retaliation for the group’s arrest of Hezbollah chief Fuad Shukr in Lebanon at the end of July.
That attack suddenly occurred early on Sunday, and Israel appeared to be prepared. What the Israelis claim to have prevented a significant Hezbollah abuse could have been launched. At the same time, Hezbollah even claimed victory.
But, what can we generate of the latest tit-for-tat between the two sides, and where does the place go from here?
At this point, it is obvious that both Hezbollah and Israel have resisted any further motion. Hezbollah has justified this by stating that this is only the start of its reaction to Shukr’s murder and that it has the right to pursue further action once the operation’s success has been evaluated.
Israel claimed to have witnessed preparations for the launch of probably a thousand rockets across the borders and that it had intercepted around 100 aircraft in southern Lebanon and targeted 270 goals, including rocket launchers. If a full-fledged war were to break out, it is believed that Hezbollah would be able to launch 3, 000 weapons a day.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the activity as a victory, but added that Israel will continue to attack if necessary.
Hezbollah denies Israel’s attacks did little harm, saying it only fired into “empty rivers”.
Hezbollah also retaliated by launching numerous Katyusha missiles into northern Israel at the same time. Because of their limited range, which is up to 40 meters, these rockets are not the largest in its arsenal, making them suitable for use only on north Israeli targets. He claimed that the missiles were intended to obliterate Israel in exchange for a flood of robots. In the assault, one Jewish Navy sailor was killed.
In his speech by video on Sunday ( August 25 ), Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, seemed to be apologizing to the Lebanese people for putting them in this position. Hezbollah is both a political and military force, and it needs to make sure it stays in the Palestinian political system to continue to win support.
However, Nasrallah claimed that Hezbollah had succeeded in achieving its goals and that the organization was encouraging Lebanese who had fled the country to return. However, that may be a little early, because it is still unclear how this will all enjoy out.
What is Iran wondering?
Most economists had assumed that the shooting of Shukr in Beirut and Ismail Haniyeh, the death of Hamas chief, would result in a planned retaliation. This might have included Iranian weapons and missiles, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and perhaps Shi’a radical parties in Syria and Iraq as well as the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
But that did n’t happen. And that could suggest a few things.
First, Iran at this stage is good trying to work out the best way of responding to Haniyeh’s shooting. In retaliation for the bombing of an Iranian diplomatic building in Damascus that resulted in the deaths of several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) members, it launched more than 300 missiles, drones, and rockets into Israel in April. However, almost all of them were shot along without doing any significant harm.
A repeat of that would show Iran does n’t have the capacity to seriously pursue Israel’s interests.
Iran would not want to build a larger hostile hit because it might lead to a bigger conflict at the same time. Tehran also opposes the Americans and Israelis as justifications for launching a coordinated invasion on its nuclear facilities.
Iran is probably trying to find a middle ground between its April reach and a significantly stronger response. It is obvious that this will take some time.
It may also indicate that there is a heated debate between those in Iran’s newly elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who is known to be a bit moderate ( in Iranian terms ), and the IRGC, which has been threatening an extremely hard-line response to Israel for some time.
Iran may have simply chosen to solely launch offensives against Israel through its proxies because it is currently only ready to launch offensives against Hezbollah and the Houthis. This does n’t mean the danger is over, though, because there is always the potential for misinterpretation between such hostile antagonists.
Netanyahu under stress
Even though this is a really challenging job, Netanyahu is still facing pressure from his cabinet’s right, which has long pushed for removing the Hezbollah danger from Israel’s northern border. Israel tried it once before in 2006 and largely failed.
Around 60, 000 Israelis are currently residing in temporary lodging in northeastern Israel as a result of the Hezbollah risk, along with about 60, 000 others. They want Netanyahu to make their gain safer.
It is challenging for Israel to support military threats on two sides. Israel’s government has now been fighting Hamas in Gaza, and to some degree, protecting northeastern Israel from Hezbollah assaults for almost 11 weeks.
The continuous Israeli military is not that large either. It only has about 169, 000 regular army, meaning it may depend on up to 300, 000 conscripts to meet its present needs.
And the issue with hiring reserve personnel is that it hurts the business because they leave their jobs. The Fitch Ratings agency downgraded Israel’s rating from A to A minus in just the past few weeks, reflecting both the increased geopolitical risks and the fact that the country’s economy is n’t functioning as it should be. The defense wants to take a crack because the nation is perpetually at war.
Netanyahu is afraid of any kind of pause in the conflict, fearing it may cause his coalition to revolt and result in an election that he would likely lose.
Since the Hamas assault on October 7th, his whole approach has been to restore his security credentials. To regain the trust of the public, he must be able to demonstrate that he can deal with any risk to Israel. He has also put an end to Hezbollah attacks and restore the trust of those who reside in northern Israel.
Hezbollah has even stated that it will stop its problems if there is a ceasefire in Gaza, which appears to be going on for a while. In that context, we are stuck in a loop that wo n’t end until the ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas are resolved.
And with the challenges that are still abound, it’s unlikely to be happening immediately.
Ian Parmeter is exploration professor, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University
This content was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original content.