In the national election, Donald Trump’s selection of Ohio lawmaker J D Vance as his running mate rekindled concerns of American withdrawal. Vince is renowned for opposing support to Ukraine and for placing an almost singular emphasis on China as the United States ‘ defining security issue.
Vance’s appointment as his evil president may help to shift US foreign and security policy away from the Euro-Atlantic region to the Indo-Pacific if Trump wins in November. And given Vance’s good aspirations for the president in a post-Trump time, this will have significant effects after a Trump administration.
By choosing Vance, Trump plans to switch in his company of American populism. It’s a decision that indicates that the former president now has total control over the Democratic party and its future way. More than anything else, Vance’s nomination as running partner signals the end of the post-1945 isolationist US foreign policy discussion.
Therefore, American officials in Europe are right to be concerned about how much the US is still committed to protecting Europe. Vance officially told his German counterparts that he is “much more engaged in some of the problems in East Asia right now than I am in Europe” at the Munich safety meeting in February 2024.
For Vance, the alternative is a zero-sum activity: arms for Ukraine would be much sent to Taiwan. He argued in a withering op-ed in the New York Times in April 2024 that Washington may start negotiations with Russia and encourage Kiev to abandon its aim of granting Ukraine total independence in the internationally recognized territories of 1991.
Vladimir Putin, the chairman of Russia, agrees with Trump on this point. Unsurprisingly, Russia’s foreign secretary, Sergey Lavrov, promptly welcomed Trump’s find of Vance as his running mate.
There is little chance that the Western friends would bridge this gap if America decided to stop supporting Ukraine. Ukraine would be unable to withstand the continuous Russian assault without American military technology and the intellect and communication network that only the US can offer.
Germany intends to reduce its military support for Kiev from the 8 billion dollars ( US$ 8.7 billion ) provided in 2024 despite Western fears about a possible change in US help aside from Ukraine in the event of a Trump victory in November.
This is made up for by an agreement reached between the G7 countries at their summit in Italy in June 2024 that uses$ 3 billion in interest accrued from frozen Russia assets as leverage to support a$ 50 billion loan to Ukraine.
The German plan to cut diplomatic help to Ukraine sends the politically more offensive message that Kiev’s essential Western allies are unlikely to move in to any US-led coalition.
Small wonder, then, that yet Ukraine’s leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, appears to know the writing on the wall. He has then stated that conversations with Russia may be about to end.
Europe exposed
The most significant and urgent menace to European security is obviously the Soviet aggression against Ukraine. However, a negotiated resolution may result in a negligible improvement of European security in the long run.
Putin’s Russia has proven to be an unreliable dialogue partner when, as the decline of the 2014 and 2015 Minsk peace agreements clearly demonstrates. Russia chose not to pursue the path that offered peace and stability. There is no proof that any new agreement reached with Putin would perform any better.
Additionally, any resolution with Russia to end the conflict in Ukraine is likely to stifle the US’s fear of leaving Europe. A Trump-led administration in Washington would feel even more motivated to finish its security transition to the Indo-Pacific and concentrate solely on China now that the conflict with Ukraine has come to an undeniably temporary conclusion.
This is a chance for ascension Trump-aligned political parties in Europe to support a reduction in defense budgets and an appeasement of Russia, according to experts on both the extreme right and extreme left of the political spectrum. Wining over Russia to the American side is a long-term strategic goal in a White House with a China-focused outlook on the world.
Yet, this would be a serious folly, endangering European security in the long term. It would also give a lacked confidence in the Russian leadership. Additionally, it would disregard China’s significance for European security.
A complete US pivot to the Indo-Pacific is not in China’s interest. Therefore, using Russia as a proxies to stoke hostility in the Euro-Atlantic theater would seem logical. Apart from that, this would deteriorate any chances that Europe might offer any assistance to the US in the Indo-Pacific.
Additionally, it undervalues how much of the US and Europe share a common security issue with Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing’s efforts to create a military, political, and economic counterweight to the US and Europe may still be in their early stages, but they are getting more focused.
This was clearly demonstrated at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in early July 2024, where Russia and China are active members.
So, the issue with European security is not primarily Trump and Vance’s desire to shift their attention away from Russia to China. What does this mean for the transatlantic security community, which was one of the fundamental pillars of international security in the wake of NATO’s founding in 1949, that had its roots in the 1941 Atlantic Charter.
Weakening this transatlantic link will unavoidably strengthen a developing Sino-Russian Eurasian alliance. Therefore, Europe will face a lot of difficulties if the US leaves its traditional role as the guarantor of European security. This includes how much money is being prepared to spend on defense for itself, as well as how the organization responds to these new realities tactically.
In the University of Birmingham’s Department of Political Science and International Studies, Professors David Hastings Dunn and Stefan Wolff are Professors of International Security and David Hastings Dunn is Professor of International Politics.
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