The F-4 ( also known as Phantom II ) fighters, which have dedicated themselves unwaveringly to protecting the skies of the Republic of Korea for 55 years, are about to have their fuel flow stopped, putting an end to the jets ‘ fierce deterrent mission on the Korean Peninsula.
After the Korean War, it’s worthwhile to examine why the ROK and the ROK-US alliance rely on the F-4 to fend off the threat from the northern Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ( DPRK) and how the plane met their expectations. South Koreans owe this plane a sizable debt of safety.
The F- 4 was designed to match a variety of administrative needs. The F- 4 was one of the few fighter planes used by the US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. It was built by McDonnell Douglas ( much since merged with Boeing ).
Also, the F- 4 was a device of military politics for the United States. It was supplied to important US friends, including the ROK, the UK, Australia, Israel, and Japan, as well as to Iran, Egypt, and Turkey. Of the 12 countries that operated the Phantom, just Turkey, Greece and Iran continue to do so.
The 1968 determination to get
The ROK’s air power, in contrast to the DPRK, was significantly lower after the Korean War ended. South Korea just had a dozen F- 86 Battle and F- 5As in its air force prior to purchasing the F-4. The North had more than half as many soldiers, better MiGs, with nicely- concealed operating bases. The DPRKcould build up to 150 plane within 5- to- 15 days.
The process of acquiring the F- 4 was hardly straightforward. Chang Ji- ryang, the ROK Air Force Chief of Staff, suggested the acquisition of the F-4 in the” Five- Time Heat Force Enhancement Plan” in 1966 to stable weather supremacy over the DPRK. The partnership between Prime Minister Chung Il- kung and US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara the following month led to a review of F- 4 products.
Convincing the US to create this innovative weapons, a move extraordinary in Northeast Asia at the time, was challenging. The ROK, which had next- and third-generation fighters like the F-105, bought the most recent third-generation fighter, which raised questions for the US about the impact on regional proper balance.
With the capture of the USS Pueblo and the Blue House attack by the DPRK soldiers, a strategic shift took place in first 1968, which heightened hostilities on the island. President Park Chung-hee requested substantial military aid from the US. He pressed on the US to fulfill his expectations, including removing North Korean soldiers from Vietnam. Later, the US promised to provide the F- 4. At the ROK-US conference in Honolulu on April 18, 1968, an agreement was reached to provide 34 F- 4 fighters by the end of the year following the visit of Special Envoy Cyrus Vance.
The age of F- 4 Phantom II
At that time, to successfully run South Korea’s “only” corporate asset, the F- 4, the ROK Air Force set a goal to finish F- 4operational readiness by the later 1970s. They sent 112 workers, including pilots, maintenance, and weapons experts, to the United States to prepare for separate function. On August 29, 1969, the 151st Fighter Squadron ( F- 4 Phantom II Squadron ) was established as they flew the aircraft directly across the Pacific to Daegu Air Base.
Following the fall of South Vietnam in 1974 and the reduction of US forces in Korea under the Nixon Doctrine, a national defense fund- raising campaign was launched, and a substantial sum of$ 33.6 million ( 16.3 billion won ) was raised in a short period. Five additional F- 4 Phantoms, which were named the” Pilseung Squad,” were purchased by the ROK government for$ 3.4 million ( 6.5 billion won ) in 1975.
Eighty more F- 4Ds were acquired. Starting in 1976, The ROK began introducing F- 4E fighters. All told, the ROK Air Force set up a total of 92 F- 4D units, 27 RF- 4C reconnaissance units and 103 F- 4E units.
The core of air superiority on the peninsula
The Phantom’s ability to defeat the DPRK’s main adversary, the MiG-21, was crucial. The Phantom, which defeated the MiG-21, was known as the” MiG Killer” due to its favorable kill ratio during the Vietnam War. Due to several factors, its presence limited North Korean air tactics and gave the US and ROK a lead over the peninsula:
- All- weather air operations: The Phantom performed all air- to- air missions such as DCA ( defensive dounter air ), ESCORT and air- to- ground missions such as AI (air interdiction ) and CAS ( close air support ). It had a back seat for a weapons systems officer, giving it more room for maneuvering during mission planning than previous fighters. It later evolved into a versatile all-weather aircraft with high-performance radar and navigation systems, and carried out air-to-air and air-to-ground missions until the KF-16 was fully operational in 1994.
- Powerful armament: In an era when the magnitude of firepower was considered crucial for strategic attacks, the Phantom’s 15, 000- pound ( 6.8- ton ) payload capacity was overwhelming. Prior to the development of the long-range air-to-ground guided missile SLAM ER with the F-15K, the Phantom’s Popeye missile was the only weapon capable of bombing Pyongyang. The Popeye had more destructive power than the 230kg SLAM-ER missile, and it had a warhead that could penetrate 2 meters of concrete.
- Strategic retaliationcapability: When the scramble siren sounded, the Phantom could be armed with a Popeye missile and accurately hit targets 112km away with a margin of error within a meter within 30 minutes. The Phantom became a crucial strategic asset for decades-long direct retaliation against provocations from North Korea. The ROK even organized a “ready to- kill” unit with F-4E fighters to retaliate against North Korea following the 1983 terrorist attack in Myanmar Aung San, underscoring the Phantom’s strategic value and operational readiness.
- The Phantom, a platform and a significant illustration of how the ROK- US alliance overcame the difficulties of autonomy and security, was not just a platform but also a significant example of how the ROK- US alliance overcame these difficulties. It enabled the ROK military, which had no military power after the Korean War, to gain independent capabilities. It represented the US alliance’s early trust and continued improvement. By conducting air operations jointly in the Korean theater, the ROK and US forces improved operational interoperability, contributing to strategic deterrence and defense through the strong bond of the ROK-US alliance.
The “immortal Phantom”
On June 7, the Phantom will make its final flight, concluding over five decades of service. The lessons learned from operating the Phantom serve as reminders of the value of strategic considerations when making military acquisitions. The Phantom’s legacy and symbolism will endure, continuing to safeguard the ROK as an immortal guardian.
Jinki Lee, PhD, is an officer for US Policy Planning at the US Ministry of National Defense and a fighter pilot for the ROK Air Force. Hanbyeol Sohn, PhD, is an associate professor at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU).
The F-4 ( also known as Phantom II ) fighters, which have dedicated themselves unwaveringly to protecting the skies of the Republic of Korea for 55 years, are about to have their fuel flow stopped, putting an end to the jets ‘ fierce deterrent mission on the Korean Peninsula.
After the Korean War, it’s worthwhile to examine why the ROK and the ROK-US alliance rely on the F-4 to fend off the threat from the northern Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ( DPRK) and how the plane met their expectations. South Koreans owe this plane a sizable debt of safety.
The F- 4 was designed to match a variety of administrative needs. The F- 4 was one of the few fighter planes used by the US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. It was built by McDonnell Douglas ( much since merged with Boeing ).
Also, the F- 4 was a device of military politics for the United States. It was supplied to important US friends, including the ROK, the UK, Australia, Israel, and Japan, as well as to Iran, Egypt, and Turkey. Of the 12 countries that operated the Phantom, just Turkey, Greece and Iran continue to do so.
The 1968 determination to get
The ROK’s air force, in contrast to the DPRK, was significantly lower after the Korean War ended. South Korea only had a few F- 86 Sabres and F- 5As in its air force prior to purchasing the F-4. The North had more than twice as many fighters, superior MiGs, with well- concealed operational bases. The DPRK could deploy up to 150 aircraft within 5- to- 15 minutes.
The process of acquiring the F- 4 was hardly straightforward. Chang Ji- ryang, the ROK Air Force Chief of Staff, suggested the acquisition of the F-4 in the” Five- Time Heat Force Enhancement Plan” in 1966 to stable weather supremacy over the DPRK. The partnership between Prime Minister Chung Il- kung and US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara the following month led to a review of F- 4 products.
Convincing the US to create this innovative weapons, a move extraordinary in Northeast Asia at the time, was challenging. The ROK, which had next- and third-generation fighters like the F-105, bought the most recent third-generation fighter, which raised questions for the US about the impact on regional proper balance.
With the capture of the USS Pueblo and the Blue House attack by the DPRK soldiers, a strategic shift took place in first 1968, which heightened hostilities on the island. President Park Chung-hee requested substantial military aid from the US. He pressed on the US to fulfill his expectations, including removing North Korean soldiers from Vietnam. Later, the US promised to provide the F- 4. At the ROK-US conference in Honolulu on April 18, 1968, an agreement was reached to provide 34 F- 4 fighters by the end of the year following the visit of Special Envoy Cyrus Vance.
The age of F- 4 Phantom II
At that time, to successfully run South Korea’s “only” corporate asset, the F- 4, the ROK Air Force set a goal to finish F- 4operational readiness by the later 1970s. They sent 112 workers, including pilots, maintenance, and weapons experts, to the United States to prepare for separate function. On August 29, 1969, the 151st Fighter Squadron ( F- 4 Phantom II Squadron ) was established as they flew the aircraft directly across the Pacific to Daegu Air Base.
Following the fall of South Vietnam in 1974 and the reduction of US forces in Korea under the Nixon Doctrine, a national defense fund- raising campaign was launched, and a substantial sum of$ 33.6 million ( 16.3 billion won ) was raised in a short period. Five additional F- 4 Phantoms, which were named the” Pilseung Squad,” were purchased by the ROK government for$ 3.4 million ( 6.5 billion won ) in 1975.
Eighty more F- 4Ds were acquired. Starting in 1976, The ROK began introducing F- 4E fighters. All told, the ROK Air Force set up a total of 92 F- 4D units, 27 RF- 4C reconnaissance units and 103 F- 4E units.
The core of air superiority on the peninsula
The Phantom’s ability to defeat the DPRK’s main adversary, the MiG-21, was crucial. The Phantom, which defeated the MiG-21, was known as the” MiG Killer” due to its favorable kill ratio during the Vietnam War. Due to several factors, its presence limited North Korean air tactics and gave the US and ROK a lead over the peninsula:
- All- weather air operations: The Phantom performed all air- to- air missions such as DCA ( defensive dounter air ), ESCORT and air- to- ground missions such as AI (air interdiction ) and CAS ( close air support ). It had a back seat for a weapons systems officer, giving it more room for maneuvering during mission planning than previous fighters. It later evolved into a versatile all-weather aircraft with high-performance radar and navigation systems, and carried out air-to-air and air-to-ground missions until the KF-16 was fully operational in 1994.
- Powerful armament: In an era when the magnitude of firepower was considered crucial for strategic attacks, the Phantom’s 15, 000- pound ( 6.8- ton ) payload capacity was overwhelming. Prior to the development of the long-range air-to-ground guided missile SLAM ER with the F-15K, the Phantom’s Popeye missile was the only weapon capable of bombing Pyongyang. The Popeye had more destructive power than the 230kg SLAM-ER missile, and it had a warhead that could penetrate 2 meters of concrete.
- Strategic retaliationcapability: When the scramble siren sounded, the Phantom could be armed with a Popeye missile and accurately hit targets 112km away with a margin of error within a meter within 30 minutes. The Phantom became a crucial strategic asset for decades-long direct retaliation against provocations from North Korea. The ROK even organized a “ready to- kill” unit with F-4E fighters to retaliate against North Korea following the 1983 terrorist attack in Myanmar Aung San, underscoring the Phantom’s strategic value and operational readiness.
- The Phantom, a platform and a significant illustration of how the ROK- US alliance overcame the difficulties of autonomy and security, was not just a platform but also a significant example of how the ROK- US alliance overcame these difficulties. It enabled the ROK military, which had no military power after the Korean War, to gain independent capabilities. It represented the US alliance’s early trust and continued improvement. By conducting air operations jointly in the Korean theater, the ROK and US forces improved operational interoperability, contributing to strategic deterrence and defense through the strong bond of the ROK-US alliance.
The “immortal Phantom”
On June 7, decommissioning day, the Phantom will make its final flight, concluding over five decades of service. The lessons learned from operating the Phantom serve as reminders of the value of strategic considerations when making military acquisitions. The Phantom’s legacy and symbolism will endure, continuing to safeguard the ROK as an immortal guardian.
Jinki Lee, PhD, is an officer for US Policy Planning at the US Ministry of National Defense and a fighter pilot for the ROK Air Force. Hanbyeol Sohn, PhD, is an associate professor at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU).