Recent months have generated a lot of discussion about what a potential following Donald Trump administration in the United States might mean for China, Russia, Ukraine, and the Israel-Palestine conflict. But there’s one more land closely watching the race: Iran.
Another Trump administration could present a considerable risk to the Persian leadership, especially given the recent tit-for-tat strikes against Israel, the looming danger of a wider Middle East war, and other important internal issues.
A new Trump administration could be a risk to the administrative creation in such a situation: a potential financial impact, bolder military actions against the regime, and more organized protests.
Renewed financial stress
In 2018, Trump withdrew the US from the Iran nuclear deal negotiated by his predecessor, Barack Obama, and imposed crippling sanctions on the state as part of his “maximum force” promotion on the Egyptian government.
Iran’s next- vice chairman, Eshagh Jahangiri, described the following year as the” toughest” since the Islamic Republic’s inception. Trump’s plan reduced Iran’s oil exports to a historical low of under 400, 000 barrels per day, considerably slashing the government’s petrodollars, which represent about 70 % of government revenues. Also, between 2018 and 2020, Iran’s national currency depreciated by more than 600 %.
Iran’s oil imports increased after Joe Biden was elected president in 2020. Iran’s oil exports, according to a recent report, increased by around 1.56 million barrels per day over the course of the first three weeks of 2024. Democrats in the US accuse the Biden presidency of not imposing sanctions on Iran despite the White House’s assertions that it does.
With Iran’s economy also weakened, Trump’s potential profit could take a new wave of force. Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture has noted, for example, that a Trump return will trigger Iran’s oil imports to” experience once”.
A Trump transfer would require being prepared for “increased restrictions pressure and an economical shock,” according to the head of Iran’s Parliament Research Center, who also highlighted the nation’s current US$ 3.7 billion budget deficit.
Another finance specialist, Morteza Afghe, struck a more severe word when he warned of a potential” decline of Iran’s business”. Afghe believes that Trump would be even more determined to intensify his “maximum stress” campaign on Iran as a result of President Ebrahim Raisi’s more stern anti-West policies and the ruling of dramatic factions in congress.
Now presently, Trump’s sweeping victory in the Republican nominations earlier this year coincided with a 20 % decrease in the Egyptian rial’s value.
Security repercussions
On the surveillance before, Trump’s probable profit is reminding the Egyptian management of a major loss under his presidency: the 2020 killing of General Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ‘ Quds Force, in a US airstrike.
When he was killed, Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, described Soleimani as the architect behind the Iran- backed militia networks in the Middle East, known as the” axis of resistance”. Khamenei also said he “bows to Soleimani” for his achievements with the Quds Force. The significant impact that the US strike had on Iran’s security interests is illustrated by this.
In addition to the deaths of two generals in a recent Israeli airstrike on the Iranian diplomatic compound in Syria’s capital, seven members of the Quds force were killed. Iran launched an unprecedented retaliatory attack on Israel, which Trump then retaliated by reposting a threatening tweet from 2018.
He also said at a rally:
]Israel is ] under attack right now. That’s because we show great weakness. ]… ] It would not have happened if we were in office.
A potential Trump return could make the Iranian leadership feel even more vulnerable in light of this rhetoric and the heightened tensions with Israel. For instance, it might lead to more US or Israeli military action against Iranian proxy militias in Syria and Iraq or even bolder strikes against Iran itself.
Even before the recent Israel- Iran tensions, Mehdi Mohammadi, an advisor to Iran’s parliament speaker on strategic affairs, said Iran’s national security could face “very difficult” years under another Trump presidency, reintroducing the prospect of “maximum threats” against Tehran.
Homelessness becoming more and more unrest
Elections were held earlier this year for the Assembly of Experts, the body that appoints the supreme leader, and Iran’s parliament. Only 41 % of voters turned out, according to reports. In the capital of Tehran, turnout was only 24 %, the lowest in the history of the Islamic Republic.
This is the third election in four years with voter turnout below 50 %, including two parliamentary elections and one presidential election. Prior to 2020, voter turnout typically exceeded 60 % or even 70 %.
Given the declining voter turnout and three significant, nationwide protest movements since 2017, Iran’s leadership is at the center of the most severe legitimacy crisis in the Islamic Republic’s history.
This has coincident with the hardliner’s election as president in 2021 and the election of radical groups in the new parliament, which won numerous seats in the process.
These lawmakers want Iran to impose even stricter restrictions on domestic life, including stronger internet censorship and stricter Sharia law, and challenge the US and its allies.
Media outlets within the nation have suggested that the rise of ultraconservative, unpopular political figures could exacerbate public dissatisfaction with the regime. In such circumstances, a second Trump presidency’s potential economic effects could lead to a new wave of nationwide demonstrations.
And if Trump is elected, Iran’s supreme leader would be about 86 years old when he took office. A Trump presidency would elicit even more uncertainty at a crucial time in Iranian politics.
Amin Naeni is PhD candidate at Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.