The , Financial Times , recently , reported , that when US President Joseph Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida meet in April they will reveal a plan to rebuild the connection between US and Chinese troops in Japan.
With an emphasis on enhancing operational efficiency, the goal is to improve the effectiveness of the People’s Republic of China ( PRC )’s ( PRC ) threat.  , For reports produce a flurry of pleasure, if not wish, as the basic concept is a good one and years late.
Despite having a six-decade defense partnership, US and Japanese forces ( aside from the two navies and the missile defense sector ) are still unable to work together effectively and would be difficult to engage in joint combat, even if Taiwan is attacked by China.
Up, US and Chinese forces are less than the amount of their components.
Speak of a reform also brings up images of suddenly having a shared headquarters in Japan where American and Chinese soldiers can focus on their respective responsibilities in the name of Japan. For an HQ could , arrange training, workouts and patrols as well as prepare and do what’s necessary for peace and war operations.  ,  ,
You mean there is n’t such a headquarters? No, there is n’t.  , And this really is a necessity for any sort of serious , Japan- US defence strategy.  , Usually, everything is done on a careless ad hoc schedule.  ,  ,
Is this about to become solved? When you read the Financial Times  post a few times, the enthusiasm wears off.
It appears that the goal is to rejigger US Forces Japan by putting a four-star general in charge ( currently a three-star ), letting it organize some exercises, share more information with the new Japan Self-Defense Force ( JSDF) joint operational headquarters, which is scheduled to launch next year.  ,  ,
But, for the near future, the best” order” of all US forces in Japan may stay in Hawaii at US Indo- Pacific Command headquarters.
The article does indicate that some believe will be given to a more efficient operating partnership with the JSDF sometime in the prospect.
But, for now, little reported in the Financial Times , item will do much, if anything,  , to enhance the capability of US and Japanese troops to work together – and, if push comes to shove, to battle together.
First, assigning a four- star general to USFJ is n’t exactly salvation on the wings.  , Four- star generals ran the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for over 20 years.  , How did they do? Winning wars does not appear to be a requirement for generals who are promoted to the top rank.
There are exceptions to everything, of course. I’d change my mind if retired Admiral Robert Willard and his team, who served from 2009 until the 2018 name change, were to be sent to Japan with proper marching orders and authority.
Second, without any operational control over anything, USFJ looks likely to continue its principal role as the “designated apologists” ( said only half tongue- in- cheek ) when Japan complains about something the American military has done.
Although a four-star commander may have more influence, USFJ will still appear irrelevant when it comes to Japanese and US forces carrying out real operations and fighting.
Japanese forces are now coordinating with USINDOPACOM in Hawaii, which is ineffective to say the least. It would be better to establish a headquarters ( or something doing that thing ) in Japan to handle the bilateral relationship and to appoint a commander with real operational authority, as in being able to start a war.
This calls for a different perspective and structure from what is in place right now. And, of course, the Japanese would also have to be fully invested, devoting the necessary attention and resources.
This is not immediately apparent because neither side is working on either side. Over the years, there have been some good ideas and some people have pointed out these flaws. But there has never been any interest where it matters, whether it be in the military or in the civilian world.
Indeed, US alliance managers told us for decades:  ,” The relationship has never been stronger”, adding that every exercise held with the Japanese was a “great success”  , that” strengthened interoperability”.
And the , commanders in Hawaii since, say, early 2012 onwards could not be bothered to push for bringing Japan and the US closer together in a meaningful, spelled operational, way.  , Not that the Japanese ever really pushed for it either.
The , Financial Times article quotes now- retired Admiral Philip Davidson, who was USINDOPACOM commander from 2018- 2021, as saying:
The most encouraging security development in East Asia in this century is Japan’s new national security policy. The recognition that the defense strategies of our two countries have converged makes better sense in our day-to-day control and management system. This is the logical next step.
It was a logical next step years ago, and for the duration of the Davidson administration, in my opinion. Every top leader of that command, at least since Admiral Samuel Locklear’s arrival in 2012, should have prioritized this and should have been given the appropriate evaluation.  ,
Without a strong JSDF that is well connected to US forces and capable of working together, it will be difficult for the US to maintain its hold on the Indo-Pacific or prevail in a potential conflict.  , And it was obvious back then.
Too much time was wasted – by people in Washington and Hawaii who had position and title , ( and presumably responsibility ) – while China built into a powerful military and a serious threat.
Even at this point, it’s unclear whether there is a need to strengthen the US-Japan military ties so that it can wage a war effectively. Making flimsy changes and putting a four-star at USFJ with a slightly expanded role of” send a message” to China does not suggest urgency.  ,  ,
As if the Chinese were n’t smart enough to understand US- Japan actual operational capabilities. But let’s see what is announced at the Biden- Kishida meeting.  , Maybe we’ll be surprised and maybe we wo n’t.
The American and Japanese relations are such strangers after 60 years, and they are far too superficial in many ways to be considered Potemkin. Again, the exceptions of the two navies and missile defense demonstrate that it can be accomplished if tried.
However, there is some positive news: Japanese and American forces are doing a lot of good work at lower levels. If Biden and Kishida gave the directive to “do the necessary so we can fight together ( and go down to Yokosuka Naval Base if you need some ideas ),” they would be surprised how quickly things could come together.  ,  ,
But, Newsham, enough with the complaining.  , What’s your advice for getting a joint/combined US- Japan headquarters in Japan?  , Here’s one idea:  , Establish a” Joint Task Force Nansei Shoto” . ,  ,
This would have an immediate real- world mission: defending Japan’s southern islands ( also known as the Ryukyu Islands ) and nearby areas. That calls for real day-to-day coordination, specifically assigned forces, command and control, and planning to carry out the joint patrols, exercises, and planning required to defend an area that is already under Chinese control.  ,
Put the actual headquarters on Okinawa.  , But, if necessary,  , you could run it out of Kyushu. This strategy would also have significant political and psychological effects on both South Korea and Taiwan as well as Japan and the US.  , But even more on the PRC.
Get this right, and then expand it to include the US-Japanese military partnership as a whole. What is the difficulty?  , As hard as you want to make it.
Grant Newsham , is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He is the author of the book ,
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