The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel was surprising in many aspects. The motorized paragliders, despite their slow speed, served as a wake-up call for countries dealing with potential border infiltration issues.
The graphic videos depicting hostages being abducted across the breached “smart fence” were certainly horrifying, particularly for the Republic of Korea (ROK): The Israeli fence is modeled after South Korea’s, with its cutting-edge sensors and closed-circuit TV situated in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
Yet, despite subsequent heated debates in National Assembly hearings, it seems the ROK is safe for now, for several reasons. These include distinct operational environments and recently upgraded defense and radar systems.
The geographical difference between the flat southern regions of Israel and the mountainous DMZ, which is laden with countless landmines and air-defense guns, makes a direct comparison unfeasible.
Also, the ROK does not experience a daily influx of workers crossing the border, a factor that enabled some working visa-holding Palestinians to turn into belligerents on October 7.
Lastly, the ROK’s indigenous TPS-880K multifunctional radar, recently fielded by LIG (a LG subsidiary), can detect very small drones and paramotors within a nine-mile range and a little more than a mile in altitude.
The radar can instantly issue C4 (command, control, comms, and computer) orders to varying types of air-defense guns, as well as the low-altitude combined anti-aircraft weapon (Bi-ho Hybrid) and ROK sentries, serving as the linchpin of the integration of the ROK’s DMZ weaponry.
While human error is always possible, as was evidenced by a North Korean drone that infiltrated Seoul last year, the integrated, automated defense system appears quite sufficient in addressing systematic invasions.
However, the conversation about border security has sparked further debates over the ROK military’s plan to partially revoke the September 19 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), in which both countries agreed to “completely cease all hostile acts against each other” and implement military confidence-building measures in the air, land and sea domains.
To foster inter-Korean reconciliation, the 2018 CMA established no-fly zones around the DMZ, essentially halting aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities by the ROK-US alliance.
The CMA’s raison d’être, aimed at decreasing inter-border clashes, has lost its justification due to recent shifts in global security concerns wherein previously unthinkable military moves, like Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and subsequent drone warfare, have become the new norm.
This has required the alliance to reconsider and revoke the clause prohibiting DMZ ISR activities.
North Korea’s launching of its first reconnaissance satellite, condemned by the international community due to its use of illegal ballistic missile technology that threatens the “global nonproliferation regime,” has resulted in a game of brinkmanship, leading to the complete abandonment of the CMA on November 23.
In this volatile security landscape, the rapidly changing demographics of the ROK represent a wake-up call for both the ROK and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as the North is formally known.
With roughly 1.32 million foreign residents in the greater Seoul metropolitan area (GSMA) within 50 kilometers (30 miles) of the DMZ, an unprecedented challenge has emerged for both Koreas.
The involvement of numerous countries as prime stakeholders protecting the lives of their citizens transforms potential incidents involving hostages, or casualties in the GSMA, from a purely inter-Korean issue to an international crisis.
For the DPRK, the existence of diverse stakeholders offers strategic advantages, buying time and creating extra room to maneuver. The recent Hamas attack and international hostage abductions resulted in extremely complex multilateral negotiations involving the US, Israel, Hamas, Qatar and Egypt.
An established international entity, preferably a security-related one, would have facilitated the negotiation much more easily, but the lack thereof stalled subsequent hostage release deals.
Remember that old UN Command?
Interestingly, this changing landscape is not actually disadvantageous for the ROK. In fact, while the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s attempt to revitalize the United Nations Command (UNC) must have been planned long before the Hamas attack, its plan to galvanize the long-quiescent structure has gathered international attention.
The UNC, much like NATO, functions not only as a collective defense mechanism but also to protect the increasing number of foreign nationals in Korea. No longer a pure battle command, the UNC has managed inter-border military and civilian issues over the last several decades under the 1953 Armistice.
On November 14, a ministerial-level conference in Seoul – with all 17 UN sending states, or countries that contributed combat troops or supporting personnel in the 1950 Korean War – reaffirmed the spirit of the 1953 Armistice and pledged that they would repel any future attack on the ROK.
The revitalization of the UNC appears an attractive countermeasure in the event of international-scale hostage abductions or casualties due to DPRK attacks. The UNC, a coherent entity with military and government representatives from around the world, can facilitate international negotiations as the sole conduit to prevent inter-agency and inter-country complications and confusions, drawing on its time-tested experience in dealing with civilian populations.
Of course, some might argue that subtle and sensitive negotiations are not always suited for the military. They might also contend that civilian foreign service officers and personnel specializing in hostage negotiations would be more appropriate. However, such claims themselves further justify the revitalization of the UNC in regard to ramping up its manpower and inviting the presence of such specialists.
This approach addresses legitimate concerns about the need for diplomatic and negotiation expertise within the UNC, ensuring a comprehensive and well-rounded approach to addressing complex international challenges.
The ROK, traditionally a very homogenous nation, is embracing rapid immigration and the presence of foreign laborers due to its birth rate crisis. Next year alone, a record number of approximately 160,000 new, legal foreign laborers will arrive, taking up positions at small local farms and factories, some of which are located within 30 miles of the DMZ.
With the presence of foreign nationals, including those represented by the UN sending states and the UN Command, any DPRK move that jeopardizes their safety would prompt the Yoon administration to reinforce the UNC with support from relevant member states.
Such a scenario goes against the DPRK’s best interests. Despite the traditional DPRK rhetoric calling for dismantling the UNC (given the UNC’s position outside of the UN’s direct purview), the current security circumstances do not favor any reckless actions from the DPRK.
The changing demographic landscape and increased international presence in South Korea make it imperative for the DPRK to tread cautiously.
James JB Park is a former staff member of the Korean Presidential Blue House and National Security Council. A reserve officer of the Republic of Korea Army, he is currently pursuing graduate studies at Columbia University in the United States.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the ROK government, the Presidential Blue House or the ROK military. This article was first published by Pacific Forum and is republished with permission.