On October 31, Syrian Prime Minister Najib Mikati laid out a three-step peace plan for the fight in Gaza. He said something that might appear commonplace to American audiences:” We will acquire the right of Israel and the rights of the Palestinians.”
But in a nation that has yet to understand Israel, let only entertain the idea of peace talks, his words had the potential to incite anger.
Mikati described his plan in a conversation with The Economist. His strategy calls for a five-day peace followed by an end to warfare for all time. Therefore, a global conference may be called to finally address the problem by putting the ever-elusive two-state solution into practice.
Without a doubt, Mikati’s strategy reflects the more reasonable preferences of the Middle Eastern populace. The majority of those who are not directly involved in the conflict want to see an instant end to what is commonly regarded as Gaza’s significant and collective punishment. To address the underlying problems, they also call for an expansion of international political work.
It is obvious that many people in the Muslim world do not view the October 7 problems as isolated occurrences. And that Israel and the West, who they believe failed to significantly pursue the two-state option at the expense of Arab dignity and social appearance, should bear some of the blame.
However, Mikati’s strategy itself is barely novel. It is a reiteration of the Egyptian peace program that the much more powerful Saudi Arabia demanded in 2002.
So why, when his nation has yet to resolve its own issues with Israel, is a caretaker prime secretary( only the president, which Lebanon hasn’t had in two years, you presides over an apparent hopeless peace plan ) leading the way?
No desire to go to combat
The growing concern in Lebanon that the nation will be forced into a battle it just cannot afford to take part in is the first and most pressing reason for Mikati’s action.
Since 2019, the Palestinian state has been essentially bankrupt, and the nation has experienced one issue after another ever since. According to World Bank estimates, its economy has shrunk by 39.9 % of GDP since 2018, while the Lebanese Pound has lost more than 98 % of its value.
The government’s debt-to-GDP ratio was listed at 283.2 % in 2022, while average inflation reached 171 %.
Due to this financial crisis, which was made worse by the incredible explosion at Beirut’s slot in August 2020 and later energy and grains crises, Lebanon is currently experiencing one of the worst economic conditions in its history. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that there isn’t a particularly strong desire for battle.
Social motivation is the second driving force behind Mikati. Lebanon has usually held a unique place in the Israeli-Arab issue. While some of the nation view it as an existential concern due to concerns about Jewish anger, others have taken on a more indifferent stance.
The Syrian government has avoided taking any military action against Israel since a quick involvement in the Egyptian war against it in 1948.
Some people have come to associate the Iran-sponsored” Party of God” with opposition against Israel as a result of Hezbollah’s success in driving Israel out of the north of Lebanon in 2000 and its small campaign against it in 2006. The government hasn’t done much to stop Jewish encroachments and assaults on Syrian infrastructure, despite the best efforts made by many of the country’s leaders to distance themselves from Hezbollah.
Hezbollah continues to gain a lot of authenticity in Lebanon for its opposition movements, frequently citing Israel’s continued activity of the Shebaa Farms as an official justification.
There are a few communities in this 16-square-mile region that Lebanon claims. It is located on the Syrian-Lebanese border, which even passes through the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
17 % of respondents in Lebanon said they” strongly favor” or” favor” normalization between Arab states and Israel, according to a survey by the Arab Barometer from 2022.
Lebanon was ranked second among the nations surveyed as a result. Additionally, the two countries above it, Sudan( 39 %) and Morocco( 31 %), are both parties to the contentious Abraham Accords, which Israel and various Arab states signed in 2020 and 2021. Just 5 % of Egyptians and Jordanians responded in the same way, in contrast.
Even among the more overtly hostile Lebanese toward Israel, it appears that a number of engagement rules established over time between Hezbollah and the Israeli military — including the prohibition of attacking civilians and military outposts— have contributed to the current state of affairs.
In fact, a different survey this week by the Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar, which is frequently regarded as being in favor of Hezbollah, revealed that 68 % of respondents opposed direct engagement, while only 52 % supported limited” operations” to maintain pressure on Israeli forces.
However, one shouldn’t conflate a lack of desire for battle with acceptance or even tolerance of Jewish domestic and regional activity, not least in the most recent conflict with Hamas.
Over the past few weeks, protests have been occurring throughout Lebanon and the rest of the place, expressing unity with Palestinians and denouncing the West’s ostensibly unequivocal support of Israel.
Additionally, 73 % of respondents to Al Akhbar’s survey opposed a neutral Lebanese position in the conflict while 80 % supported Hamas’ operations. This is consistent with the opinions of many others in the Muslim world and various developing nations, who believe that Israel is either at fault or that its revenge in Gaza has gone too far.
With his fresh peace program, Mikati is attempting to maintain such delicate balances. The rest of Lebanon did remain anxiously awaiting the outcome of his plan as it possibly fails, as the fate of the nation( and the region ) will determine the next few weeks and months.
Tarek Abou Jaoude teaches as a teaching fellow at the University of Portsmouth in politics and international relations.
Under a Creative Commons license, this post has been republished from The Conversation. Read the original publication.