US President Joe Biden noted that relations with Beijing do” melt quite soon” during the G7 summit in Hiroshima in May 2023. Four months later, the United States and China have made significant initial moves to throw the balloon event behind them and, more importantly, to mend their tense relationship.
Re-opened lines of communication and nbsp have been established, assurances exchanged, working organizations formed, and progressive onward progress noted. Even in areas where the two sides had previously disagreed, such as export controls & nbsp, progress was made. & nbsp,
The main places where dialogue continues to lag are the lack of commitment on their mutual price hikes and on senior-level security exchanges. & nbsp,
However, even on this latter front, a temporary workaround involving senior Chinese Foreign Ministry officials and top Pentagon officials from Asia has been arranged & nbsp, on more than one occasion.
A” window of opportunity” to secure useful deliverables is created by the proposed meeting between Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in San Francisco in November 2023. & nbsp,
In exchange for Beijing cracking down on online suppliers of fentanyl predecessors, Washington may reduce the Institute of Forensic Science from its Entity List( a US business limitations list ). & nbsp,
Additionally, the two parties really amend, update, and publicly renew their umbrella science and technology agreement, which was the first to be signed following normalization in 1979.
It is still unclear whether the proposed” handrails” will be able to withstand US election year rhetoric. The discrepancy between the two nations’ competing strategies and their perceptions of the roles of neighboring nations, however, presents a greater obstacle to developing enduring proper frameworks for US-China relations.
Building” situations of strength” with a” latticework of alliances and partnerships” to dictate the terms of competition to China has been the focus of the Biden administration’s China strategy & nbsp. & nbsp,
In terms of the economy, the US” five-pillar strategy” aims to follow a broad industrial policy at home, collaborate with like-minded partners to create enlightening techno-industrial bases, move beyond conventional trade agreements to new international partnerships, raise significant sums of money for global anti-poverty and climate change efforts, and defend fundamental technologies with” a small backyard, large fence.” & nbsp,
Four of the five columns don’t support or intend to break away from China.
The administration now seeks to” cement a” floor” under its working relations with Beijing after assembling specialized coalitions like the Quad, AUKUS, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and the & nbsp, US – Japan, and South Korea trilateral framework and subsequently shaped the strategic environment around China.
According to China, the US’s strategy aims to stifle its technological advancement while financially excluding, politely isolating, and militarily encircling it. Washington’s system of relationships, partnerships, and smaller groupings is not seen as a barrier to punishment and stability; rather, it is viewed as an accelerant of big energy conflicts.
China must maintain a gentle balance. Since the Trump administration labeled China as a & nbsp, revisionist power & nwps, and sparked an trade and technology war, the main external ballast of its modernization strategy— an enabling international environment supported by dense Trans-Pacific Trade and Technology Exchanges — has shifted to its disfavor.
Moscow, China’s most significant political power, is viewed with hostility by the European Union, its preferred monetary rival today. It looks at Beijing, by expansion, uncomfortably. & nbsp,
The fact of Beijing’s conundrum is to strike a balance between these two relationships to its advantage while also developing guiding principles to guide China-US ties toward peaceful coexistence.
Regarding their passions, terms of commitment, and conceptions of order, the United States and China hold divergent views. A” framework of peace” with a predictable system of rules and relationships among big powers is unlikely to come given the ongoing reorganization of the Indo-Pacific’s corporate furniture. & nbsp,
A stable equilibrium andnbsp won’t result from a conflict between competing interests, and the government’s promotion of” on demand” assistance on one-sided words wont change the underlying trends.
In the future, it’s essential that Beijing and Washington openly discuss their opposing viewpoints within a unified model. Regardless of how shaky each party’s assurances may initially seem to the other, the goal should be to develop overarching ethical understandings and incorporate them into how they conduct their relationships over time. & nbsp,
With good belief that upholds continuity between words and deeds, both nations should proceed. These shared beliefs might inspire frequent deeds.
President Biden and President Xi presented” Five No” during their virtual meeting in November 2021, and they were reiterated in Bali the following year. The United States” does not get to start a new Cold War, does not want to alter China’s political system, do not support Taiwanee democracy, no one wants to go to war with China, and none of its alliances are being rekindled at China ,” according to the statement.
China” does not seek to change the existing international order or interfere in the United States’ internal affairs and has no intention of challenging or displacing the U States ,” according to President Xi & nbsp, who was reciprocated by” three nos” in Bali. These guidelines offer a sensible and stable platform for long-term relationships.
The two presidents should commemorate their” noes” in a joint statement, much like the Nixon-Brezhnev” Basic Principles,” agreement & nbsp of 1972, which promoted productive cooperation in exchange for restraint and moderation.
Near-term objectives may be secured by Washington and Beijing at the San Francisco APEC Summit. In this new & nbsp, era of strategic competition, they should also work to close the gap between their competing strategies by committing to a revised relationship based on these fundamental understandings.
Senior Fellow Sourabh Gupta works at the Washington, DC-based Institute for China-America Studies.
This andnbsp, post, and was initially published by East Asia Forum and are being reprinted with a Creative Commons license.