Almost 30 % of Americans claim they don’t practice any religion. The so-called” nones” now make their voices heard and represent about 30 % of Democrats and 12 % of Republicans. Businesses lobby on behalf of liberal humanists, agnostics, and various nonreligious individuals.
It’s simple to believe that this demographic will have more sway as more individuals leave religious organizations or not join them in the first place. However, as a psychologist who studies politics and religion, I was curious as to whether there was any proof that this shift in church might really have an impact on politics.
There are good reasons to be dubious about the influence of affiliated Americans at the polls. Voter mobilization has long relied heavily on spiritual organizations, both on the left and the right.
Younger people tend to vote less frequently and to be spiritually unaffiliated. Additionally, exit polls from new elections indicate that fewer voters than the general population does get religiously unaffiliated.
Most importantly, it’s challenging to categorize the” unaffiliated.” Just one-third of them declare themselves to be agnostics or atheists. There is a smaller base of liberal activists, but they tend to have different ideologies from the larger, non-religious group, such as being more concerned with the separation of church and state.
Experts and political analysts run the risk of missing important information about this sizable and different constituency by classifying all unconnected people as” the nones.”
calculating the figures
I used information from the Cooperative Election Study, or CES, for the 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020 presidential elections to gain a better understanding of which segments of morally disaffiliated communities cast ballots. To verify voter turnout information, the CES compiles extensive studies and pairs up specific respondents with those surveys.
These assessments differed from enter surveys in a few significant way. For instance, these survey samples showed that total validated voter turnout appeared higher in some groups than exit polls had suggested, not just the unaffiliated.
However, I was able to identify some significant differences between smaller groups of the affiliated because each survey example contained over 100,000 respondents and precise questions about religious affiliation.
My research, which was published in the journal Sociology of Religion in June 2023, revealed that the voter turnout among the affiliated is divided: Some unafiliating groups are more likely than respondents who identify as spiritually affiliated, and some are less likely.
Particularly in more recent elections, people who identified as atheists and agnostics were more likely to cast ballots than respondents who were conscientiously affiliated. For instance, after accounting for important demographic variables of voting, such as age, schooling, and salary, I discovered that respondents who were not religiously affiliated were each about 30 % more likely to have a verified voting record in the 2020 election.
People who described their church as” nothing in particular ,” or about two-thirds of the unaffiliated, were actually less likely to participate in all four elections under those same settings. For instance, I discovered that, compared to only about half of the” nothing in particulars ,” 7 out of 10 agnostics and atheists in the 2020 election sample had verified voter turnout records.
Collectively, these groups’ voting patterns have a tendency to negate one another. The nones were equally likely to have a participation record as respondents who were religiously affiliated once I took age and education into account for another voting predictors.
2024 and later
The role of religion in right-wing advocacy has come to light as a result of growing Holy nationalism, which promotes fusing national identity and social power with Christian values.
However, faith and one group do not mesh well. There are many Democratic electors for whom religion is unimportant, and the social left also boasts a diverse alliance of religious organizations.
Republicans and Democrats will need to think more effectively and deliberately about how to appeal to these citizens if the percentage of people without a spiritual tie continues to rise.
According to my research, neither party can handle the unconnected as a single, cohesive group or take them for granted. Politicians and experts will instead need to focus more on what encourages vote, particularly what guidelines encourage vote among young adults.
For instance, some activist organizations refer to someone as” the secular values voter ,” or someone who is increasingly driven to cast a ballot out of concern for the separation of church and state. The secular ideals voting story is somewhat supported by the evidence I did find that the average atheist or agnostic vote is about 30 % more likely to move out than the typical religiously affiliated vote. That description does not, however, apply to all” nones.”
Given that some unconnected people also claim to have religious and spiritual beliefs and practices, it might be more beneficial to concentrate on America’s growing religious diversity rather than its declining religious affiliation.
In the past, religious communities have served as significant locations for democratic organizing. However, motivating and empowering citizens today may require searching across a wider range of area institutions to locate them.
reevaluating presumptions
Regardless of their political ideologies, there is great news in these results for everyone. It may not be the case, contrary to social scientific ideas from the 1990s and 2000s, which claimed that renunciation of religion was a larger pattern in declining political commitment, such as voting and volunteering.
My studies found that the affiliated respondents who reported continuing to attend religious services had the lowest likelihood of casting a ballot. Their turnout rates were lower than those of both unconnected people who previously attended and those who usually attended spiritual affiliates.
This conclusion is consistent with earlier studies on political commitment, religion, and religion. For instance, researchers Jacqui Frost and Penny Edgell discovered a comparable pattern in working among respondents who were not morally affiliated.
In a previous study, sociologist Jaime Kucinskas and I discovered that both religious and spiritual practices— including yoga and meditation — were strongly correlated with political behavior. According to these studies, there is evidence that social withdrawal is not always associated with a lack of formal religion.
If political management can implement policies that assist them in turning out and encourage them to turn out as well, new potential voters may be willing to participate as the spiritual landscape changes.
Evan Stewart teaches anthropology as an assistant professor at UMass Boston.
Under a Creative Commons license, this article is republished from The Conversation. read the article in its entirety.