A contentious viewpoint on nuclear arms is that they have the potential to maintain harmony by making war so hazardous that nations work harder to prevent it. & nbsp,
Some neo-realist foreign ties experts agree with this viewpoint. They emphasize that there was never a warm US-Soviet warfare, despite decades of strained relations between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
The worry that even a conflict fought with standard arms may rise to the use of nuclear weaponry, against which neither side could justify itself, may have been cited as obstructing factors. Moscow and Washington supported opposing sides in proxy war, but they both acted extremely cautiously toward one another’s military troops out of fear of complete annihilation.
Is Northeast Asia today related to this understanding of Cold War background? John Mearsheimer, one of America’s most well-known neo-realist scholars, presented the” radioactive peace” rationale to the Korean Peninsula on August 30 at the 2023 Korea Global Forum in Seoul.
Mearsheimer argued that having nuclear arms is preferable to having none at all for North Korea. & nbsp:” I believe that having a nuclear-armed North Korea makes the Korean Peninsula more peaceful than not.”
According to Mearsheimer, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea( DPRK) acquired nuclear weapons to counteract two security threats: first, its conventional military forces weakened compared to those of South Korea, making it open to invasion by its southern cousins. & nbsp,
Second, Pyongyang” has to care a lot about the United States ,” which is obsessed with bringing about regime change in North Korea and” would like nothing more than to do so.”
The US and the Republic of Korea( ROK) are discouraged from attacking North Korea, while Pyongyang dares not use its nukes due to the likelihood of US nuclear retaliation, he said, adding that” war on the Peninsula is extremely unlikely.” & nbsp,
Mearsheimer contends that nuclear arsenals held by North Korea and the US-ROK alignment force both sides to act slowly, promoting peace and stability, just as they did during the Cold War.
However, there are several arguments against the idea that DPRK weapons bring about peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Mearsheimer’s claim that Pyongyang acquired atomic weapons because it thought South Korea, the United States, or both would strike unless stopped by something other than the DPRK regular causes is a key component of his argument.
That presumptive conviction is unquestionably false. Since the 1990s, at least, the combined power of US and ROK regular troops has surpassed that of DPRK military causes. Additionally, for six decades following the end of the Korean War, the United States dominated North Korea with nuclear weapons in an irregular manner. & nbsp, However, Washington and Seoul decided against attacking or invading the North.
A potential counterargument is that, despite the fact that there was never a real threat of an unprovoked US / ROK attack, the Kim regime is still in danger. It is plausible that the government holds such a belief, nbsp. & nbsp,
North Korean officials frequently claim that Washington is determined to go to war with the DPRK, especially during US-ROK military exercises. The US attack andnbsp also destroyed a large portion of North Korea during the Korean War, and the British government, NBP, threatened to employ nuclear weapons before Pyongyang had them.
The DPRK’s actions, but, cast doubt on the idea that the Kim regime actually fears US attack rather than just expressing it for home propaganda. & nbsp, Kim can claim unjustified credit for deterring the anticipated enemy anger by projecting the image of a strong and aggressive foe, giving the government an excuse for domestic economic weakness. & nbsp,
In reality, Pyongyang has consistently carried out its own small-scale and occasionally devastating attacks against South Koreans for many years because it is so certain that its enemies will not attack. & nbsp,
These included detonating a bomb in 1983 that killed ROK officials in Rangoon, Burma / Myanmar, bombing an airplane operated by Korean Airlines in 1987, killing all 115 people on board, and sinking the Cheonan & nbsp in 2010, which killed 46 South Korean sailors.
Pyongyang discovered that South Korea has been reluctant to engage in a military fight with the DPRK for two reasons.
Second, even if they could conquer North Korea for a small military cost, neither the ROK government nor North Korean society would be interested. While they support the idea of reunion in theory, they are concerned about the cost of rebuilding the North and how difficult it will be to lead a populace that lacks democratic experience and is ill-equipped to contribute to an innovative free market economy. In addition, & nbsp,
Second, Seoul, and consequently Washington, have long been discouraged from using military force due to the possibility that Seoul — where a large portion of the ROK’s wealth and population are concentrated— would be destroyed by North Korean retaliation using conventional munitions delivered by artillery and rockets. & nbsp: Before purchasing nuclear weapons, the DPRK effectively already possessed the capability to thwart a significant US / ROK attack.
As for the US, Washington has made significant efforts since the beginning of the long-running nuclear weapons crises to try and convince the Kims that overthrowing them is not on the table, rather than being” fascinated with government change” in Pyongyang.
Stress over human rights violations is a common aspect of US government efforts to overthrow hostile foreign governments, but from 2017 to 2023, the Trump and Biden governments vacated the position of particular envoy for North Korea’s rights issues.
The pre-nuclear DPRK state would have seen the day when it was known to be developing its atomic weapons as the height of its risk if it had been afraid of a US invasion. & nbsp,
Before the North attained nuclear symmetry with the US and possibly the ability to pose a threat to US territory, the United States would have had the greatest incentive to release preventing strikes or regime-ending invasions. & nbsp, Pyongyang should have kept its nuclear ambitions as secret as possible if it was afraid.
Otherwise, the DPRK government made fun of the US, suggesting that it was eager to employ nuclear weapons to murder Americans even before this capability was in use. A military commander informed William Perry that DPRK nuclear weapons could strike his hometown of Palo Alto, California,” the next day” when Perry led a group to North Korea in 1999.
In 2013, North Korea released a video showing how & nbsp, New York, was destroyed by nuclear power. It provided Washington, DC, and nbsp with comparable treatment to a 2016 videos.
If Pyongyang’s accomplishment of nuclear weapons was motivated by fear of an invasion by the US or South Korea, as Mearsheimer claims, then North Korea may feel more secure as a result. & nbsp, Mearsheimer’s argument is refuted if North Korea was not afraid of attack even before it acquired nuclear weapons.
According to the facts, Pyongyang may have been looking for a nuclear capability for different reasons as well, such as to use it as leverage, boost the regime’s reputation, or coerce its opponents into making concessions.
Whatever the philosophical merit of Mearsheimer’s claim, it is undeniable from empirical evidence that North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons has heightened rather than eased hostilities on the Peninsula. Unless Pyongyang forces a crisis upon them, & nbsp, Washington, and Seoul have demonstrated that they are content to ignore North Korea.
The DPRK administration’s nuclear capacity demonstration, followed by its stated plans to make that capability more dangerous to its enemies, elicited responses from the USA and the ROK, which in turn prompted Pyongyang to respond in kind. The Peninsula is no” more peaceful ,” but rather is experiencing a downward spiral.
In response to the DPRK going nuclear, the South Korean government declared that if a nuclear attack appeared to be inevitable, it would be difficult, aggressive, and nbsp to target the North Asian leadership with missile strikes.
By announcing that US” proper assets” will frequently visit the ROK, Washington made an effort to win back South Korea’s trust in US extended punishment. In retaliation, Pyongyang unveiled a regulation in late 2022 that permits an enemy suspected of aiming nuclear weapons at the DPRK management. & nbsp,
The deployment of nuclear-capable US platforms to South Korea could satisfy the requirements outlined in the new law for Pyongyang to launch a nuclear strike, according to the DPRK defense minister & nbsp earlier this year. & nbsp, This is not how stability and peace appear.
Finally, Mearsheimer’s argument fails to explain the stability-instability paradox, which international relations experts refer to as the & nbsp. Nuclear-armed adversaries may be so convinced that the other side is discouraged from using their nuclear weapons that both are encouraged to engage in conventional military adventurism.
The Kim regime may use stronger and more frequent regular military attacks against South Korea than before because it will have dismantled America’s nuclear umbrella over the Peninsula if and when Pyongyang believes it has a sufficiently strong second-strike capability, which means it could withstand an American nuclear attack and still hit up hard enough to cause undesirable death and destruction on the US homeland.
This might make it possible for a DPRK strategy to use nuclear force to compel Seoul to comply with Pyongyang’s social demands after initially undermining North Korean confidence in US protection.
In the Korean Peninsula, where none of the three major actors always behave as a general idea may determine, the Cold War idea of nuclear peace performs poorly. Andnbsp, Pyongyang’s nuclear arms implementation has exacerbated the predicament.
Older brother Denny Roy works at the East – West Center in Honolulu.