Silence may also be interpreted as encouragement. When a superior knows what his subordinates are up to and can stop them but does not do so, this may be taken as approval to carry on.
It has happened in hierarchical organisations like the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF).
In 1983, a SAF reservist died when he was dunked repeatedly during a Commando School training course. Because they knew what was going on and failed to stop it, the course commander and supervising officer were convicted of abetment of the offence of causing the reservist’s death.
A more recent case involved the death of an SCDF full-time national serviceman, who drowned when he was ragged by other servicemen in his unit during a “celebration” of his impending end of service.
Similarly to the earlier Commando case, the unit commander and deputy commander were convicted of abetment of the offence of causing the victim’s death, since they were aware of what was going to happen and did not intervene to stop it.
There is no reason to assume that the principle does not apply to private companies. So if Abel, the managing director, knows that his sales manager Baker is paying bribes to get business, Abel’s silence may be interpreted by Baker as authorisation to carry on doing so.
The third sort of abettor is one who intentionally aids the giving of bribes. Intentional aiding implies knowledge.
Suppose Baker intends to pay a bribe. Baker asks Charlie, the financial controller, for funds.
If Charlie honestly does not know what the funds are for, he is not guilty of corruption. But if Charlie knows that bribes are to be paid, he will be as guilty as Baker and liable to the same punishment.
WILFUL BLINDNESS
Closing one’s eyes to obvious illegality and not asking questions, in order to avoid actual knowledge, is known as wilful blindness.
In an appropriate case, wilful blindness may be equated with actual knowledge by a judge. The safe rule is, if there is suspicion of corruption, ask pointed questions and put a stop to it.
In the above examples, Abel, Baker and Charlie may be in Singapore but the bribery is to occur abroad. This does not give them any immunity, even if they are not Singaporeans.
They can be prosecuted here if they commit acts outside Singapore which would be an offence if done in Singapore.
Where a company is involved, business may be done through a subsidiary rather than by the company itself. The subsidiary will have its own directors. These often are employees of the parent company and function as nominees, reporting back to their superiors in the organisation.
In the case of a group of companies, it is necessary to identify the key decision makers. The one who actually hands over the bribe is likely to be at the bottom of the totem pole. The key decision makers will be higher up.
Even if the subsidiary is based abroad, the executives and/or directors of the parent company may be aware of what is going on.
This is a question of fact. CPIB presumably will keep sniffing around until they discover how far up the rot goes.