Okinawa isn’t in the news nearly as much as it was some years back when most reporting focused on noisy protest groups demanding that US military forces leave. The Japanese government sometimes even seemed to wish the Americans might go away and only return when needed.
Times have changed. Nowadays the reporting is mostly on the China threat. And Tokyo is presumably glad the Americans are still around on Okinawa.
It never hurts to remember why US forces are there.
What is the strategic importance of Okinawa?
In military matters, geography is supremely important. Okinawa (using the name to refer to the entire Ryukyu Island chain, and not just the main island of Okinawa, for the sake of convenience) is key strategic geography by virtue of its location. Okinawa sits in between the southern Japan mainland, Taiwan and China. And it is also close to the Korean Peninsula.
Whoever occupies Okinawa has an advantage. For US forces, Okinawa bases allow a “forward presence” that simplifies air, sea, and ground operations in the region. And this region is where today’s “great power rivalry” is playing out most intensely. Some argue that a fight with China is likely to break out in this neighborhood.
Okinawa bases facilitate offensive military operations, of course. But they are also useful defensively, although the difference between offensive and defensive operations is often a matter of interpretation.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has to tread carefully if it moves in the East China Sea. And even a Chinese assault on Taiwan would be vulnerable to US and Japanese forces operating out of Okinawa. Emplacing anti-ship missile batteries and anti-aircraft systems on Okinawa’s islands would also close off large areas of ocean to the Chinese navy and air force, and could do the same for parts of Taiwan.
Also, Okinawa is a useful platform for surveillance and intelligence collection activities that are an indispensable part of military operations.
Looking farther afield, Okinawa bases also allow the Americans to operate more easily throughout the entire Western Pacific and beyond. The US Marine-led response to the 2015 Nepal Earthquake in fact was launched from Okinawa. Also, Okinawan bases are available in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula.
China knows the answer
China is well aware of the importance to Japan’s defense of Okinawa – and forward basing in particular. And it would like US (and Japanese) forces gone.
Consider how China has built artificial islands and established military bases in the South China Sea. This extends forward People’s Liberation Army operating capabilities. It allows the PLA to dominate or control sea and airspace much farther from the Chinese mainland than would be the case without the islands. Okinawa provides similar advantages to whoever holds its islands.
And don’t forget the political significance of Japan defending its territory against Chinese aggression. China has stated its intentions to eventually “retake” Okinawa (the Ryukyus) and not just the Senkaku Islands.
Tokyo is demonstrating political will. The joining together of the Japanese and the Americans for mutual defense of Japanese territory and to ward off Chinese expansion is a clear sign of political determination by the world’s two major democracies.
How might US forces on Okinawa be used in the case of a conflict with China over, say Taiwan?
Potentially those islands would be used as launch points for attack by air and naval forces against Chinese forces, but the Marines and Army would use them when employing long-range precision weapons, air and missile defense systems. This would help prevent Chinese forces from operating in the area. US air and, to a lesser extent, naval forces operating from Okinawa are also part of the defensive web.
Don’t forget that Okinawa is just as important to Japan and Japanese forces as it is to American forces. And for the same reasons. But the Americans are the ones who have the real capability to operate farther afield against the PLA.
Okinawan-based forces might also be employed to support the US presence in the Philippines, among other places in the region, as supporting elements in the event of a Taiwan fight.
Are the Okinawa bases losing relevance in the new age of modern warfare?
Weapons and hardware are changing, but war itself hasn’t changed all that much. Consider the Ukraine war. It looks a lot like old-fashioned war in many respects.
But aren’t the bases sitting ducks for missile attacks?
Sort of. But sort of not. Any base anywhere is vulnerable to Chinese missile attack even Guam, Pearl Harbor, San Diego and maybe even Camp LeJeune, North Carolina. The same of course applies to Chinese military bases.
So it’s important to harden your bases as much as possible ー both physically, say with concrete aircraft shelters, and also with proper missile defenses and other defense measures. But you also want to be able to hammer the enemy hard enough so he knows he will receive as much as or more than he delivers.
What’s the alternative? Pull back to Colorado and burrow into the Rocky Mountains?
Keep in mind as well the distinction between military operations before a war starts and military operations after the war starts. During peacetime, a military does all sorts of things to train, exercise, prepare and establish its position. And also things like humanitarian assistance/disaster relief activities.
If you demonstrate you’re a serious military, capable of fighting ー and positioned in a number of different places ー and with a lot of “allies” or “partners,” then an enemy is less likely to try his luck with you. And he might also worry about having to take on the entire might (military, economic, political) of the USA and its friends.
All this adds to deterrence ー which, if things go right, prevents a war from starting in the first place.
Once the shooting starts, everything is different. And that’s when you’ll know whether you did what was necessary in peacetime.
Does the US need to rethink its Pacific deployments to better contain China?
Yes, and it is doing so. Major bases of the sort that are on Okinawa are important and useful. But a military must not put all its eggs in one basket ー as the US has done. The Americans have too few major bases in Asia outside Japan.
The Americans should be operating from many different locations in Asia.
Opportunities have recently opened up in the Philippines and in a few other places such as Palau and Papua New Guinea. Also, facilities in Northern Australia are finally being used to their potential.
But the US military’s top leadership squandered 20 years. And it did not do what was necessary to establish access and position itself in as many places as possible in the region. The brass even turned down invitations by a number of countries to come and set up shop.
To its credit, the US military now is scrambling to spread itself out. But it’s late in the day.
Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine Corps officer and a former US diplomat. He is the author of the book When China Attacks: A Warning To America. This article was first published by JAPAN Forward and is republished with permission.