Putin’s partial mobilization a recipe for disaster

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent statement of a “partial mobilization” of 300, 000 Russian personnel to fight within Ukraine sounded important. It isn’t.

The official position, fleshed out by Protection Minister Sergei Shoigu , was that the new Ruskies conscripts would be drawn from those with past military experience plus individuals with special abilities.

But the truth is that this is policy on the fly. It will cause a flood of unaccustomed, often elderly plus infirm Russians to the front lines. At best it will buy Putin time over an additional cold Ukrainian winter season. At worst, it will result in battlefield chaos and potentially bulk slaughter.

Either way, the decision means that still more Russians, as well as Ukrainian army personnel and civilians, will be sacrificed over the altar of Putin’s hubris.

Haphazard call-up

Paradoxically, Putin’s call-up reaches once both extremely selective and apparently random.

Russia’s cultural minorities – many of who live far from the main power centers of Moscow and St Petersburg – remain primary objects associated with Russian mobilization attempts. In particular, Buryats through Russia’s Far East plus Dagestanis from the Caucasus have been disproportionately targeted .

Meanwhile, Putin continues to insulate city elites, who could cause him the most problems if they become radically opposed to the war. Those studying at Russia’s state universities , usually the privileged children of Putin’s “nomenklatura” that will go on to become the following generation of bureaucrats, are exempt from mobilization.

But those in the 2nd rank of private education institutions , often from Russia’s locations, are eligible to be conscripted into private army companies such as the infamous Wagner group, brought by “Putin’s chef” Yevgenyi Progozhin .

So much regarding arguments, then, through domestic nationalists that Russia is the “ Third Rome ”, quietly uniting people through different ethnicities plus creeds. In fact , because has been the case repeatedly in Russian history, the nation’s minorities continue to be considered to be objects of suspicion and potential refuse, and used since replaceable labor or even cannon fodder within Russia’s wars.

A Russian marine takes his position during the Union Courage-2022 Russia-Belarus military drills in the Obuz-Lesnovsky training terrain in Belarus. Picture: Screengrab / Ruskies Defense Ministry Press Service

There are also indications little thought went into who will get called up, plus why. Some local districts appear to be working under a quota system , with police roaming public places plus issuing call-ups in order to passers-by, including people over 60 and those along with chronic health problems .

Elsewhere, anti-war demonstrators – and also innocent bystanders – have been arrested plus immediately drafted into the military.

Some 261, 500 Russian males are estimated to have fled the country. Draftees have been presented with ancient and poorly kept old army equipment, including rusty assault rifles.

Others called up in the Russian-occupied Donetsk province associated with Ukraine have been issued Mosin rifles , which were developed in the past due 19th century and are no longer in creation.

Exactly why mobilization?

All this is a recipe to get military disaster. But there are clear reasons why Putin decided to say yes to the mobilization he previously long resisted. Very first, Russian hardliners were calling for him to do more to aid the armed forces and bring the campaign to a close.

Having expended a huge quantity of its precision-guided munitions , and not being able to establish air superiority, it’s difficult intended for Russian forces in order to accurately strike Ukrainian command-and-control centers, in addition to key infrastructure like power generation.

Mobilizing a huge push (which some state will ultimately reach over a million people ) is one way to exhibit his hard-line domestic critics Putin is certainly listening.

Second, a large portion of Russia’s armed forces (some 60-70% of its total conventional capacity) has already been committed to Ukraine and is nearing fatigue after seven months without respite. Delivering new recruits towards theatre will allow Russian front-line forces to rest and regroup for a fresh energy in the European spring.

All this indicates Russian offensive procedures in Ukraine are effectively on hold. The best that Putin’s conscript army can perform is to act as a blocking force whilst Moscow tests Western european patience and willingness to bear the cost of reduced energy supplies.

At the same time, the Kremlin has upped the particular ante on its nuclear threats , strongly hinting it will consider using tactical nuclear weapons if the area it holds in Ukraine’s East (which will be formally annexed by Russia after the sham referenda in four provinces) is usually attacked by Ukrainian forces.

But Putin’s statement that he is “ not bluffing ” on the nuclear question should hardly inspire confidence regarding the power of their position. Increasingly his are the actions of the damaged leader seeking to convey strength.

A weakened Putin

That in itself raises a conundrum for both Ukraine and the West: may a weakened Putin decide to lash out, and at what point?

As Caitlin Talmadge , a mature expert on nuclear strategy in the United States has recently suggested, leaders faced with certain defeat may decide to take programs of action that might otherwise be irrational.

While using technical nuclear weapons towards Ukrainian (and actually NATO) targets could be viewed by Putin as a bad option, he may come to view it as his least-worst one if the strategic situation continues to degrade, or if his own domestic power foundation comes under substantial threat.

Russian President Vladimir Putin watches the Triumph Day military march at Red Sq . in central Moscow, May 9, 2022. Photo: Sputnik and Mikhail Metzel

However , we should also be mindful that will Western capitulation is certainly precisely what Putin desires. That would starve Ukraine of vitally required military supplies, as well as heavy weapons in order to push its benefit after the impressive gains from the counteroffensive around Kharkiv .

Putin has been consistent through the entire crisis in pursuing a strategy of “ compellence “: to demonstrate to Ukraine and its Western backers that he has a higher appetite intended for risk.

Under those circumstances, and given both Ukrainian sovereignty and Western credibility are both on the line, it’s absolutely important Putin’s adversaries show him who actually occupies the position of strength.

Matthew Sussex , Fellow, Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National College

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