China is revealing Indonesia to ocean going grey zone strategies — competitive works between states in short supply of all-out warfare — in the North Natuna Sea. China pursues these objectives within the knowledge that Philippines will fail to correctly respond.
The latest North Natuna Sea crisis between December 2019 and January 2020 saw the incursion of Chinese fishing vessels, backed by coastguard plus maritime militia, in to Indonesia’s exclusive financial zone (EEZ).
Indonesian maritime law enforcement officials claim these types of incursions have not halted since then — they have got simply become much less publicized. China upped the ante in August 2021 following a Chinese survey ship spent seven days conducting seabed umschlüsselung inside Indonesia’s EEZ.
Jakarta has been relatively noiseless on the matter despite up to nine Indonesian navy and coastguard patrol craft observing the encroachment below apparent purchases not to intervene. A December 2021 Reuters survey suggests that China has effectively crossed Indonesia’s “red line” by demanding that Indonesia stop going in the region.
China feels that it has “overlapping maritime rights” with Indonesia, according to its interpretation of an “ informal understanding ” attained with Jakarta about maritime territory within the 1990s.
But Beijing’s actions are less about waging a legal dispute compared to it is a gradual tactical push to get Jakarta to inadvertently or even implicitly acknowledge China’s maritime rights. Since China controls important strategic areas in the South China Ocean, it feels more confident within pushing the package.
Hegemonic powers are expected to expand until they cannot consider any further territory or even face sufficient level of resistance — but Indonesia has failed to push back. Its diplomatic reaction to the incident has been tepid, even if officials insist that they have conveyed their discontent independently. Its security reaction was also haphazard, inconsistent and largely symbolic.
There is certainly no strong financial or political pushback from Jakarta.
Indonesian policymakers are ambiguous about the goal of pushing back against China. Some think that getting China to renounce its “nine-dash line” claims to the South China Sea is simply unattainable.
Others such as Indonesian President Joko Widodo prefer crisis resolution over avoidance to avoid strategic noise crowding out their domestic agenda. Many believe that China’s actions are merely a law enforcement issue, not a strategic issue.
This lack of clarity is the 1st sign of tactical failure. Rather than seeking a limited and possible goal of ending China’s illegal incursions into the North Natuna Sea, Indonesian policymakers settle for a diluted response. These hollow acts, such as keeping a cabinet meeting aboard a warship, can be sold domestically as “strongly asserting” Indonesia’s sovereignty.
Such muddled thinking is partly due to Indonesian policymakers’ insistence that the country will not risk a claim in South China Sea disputes.
Indonesia has a strong zwei staaten betreffend relationship with China and its position within the South China Sea is legally identified under international regulation. This means Indonesian policymakers are prone to viewing gray zone incursions as short-term maritime police force problems, rather than a broader strategic gambit simply by China.
The lack of clarity leads to a lack of strategic coherence needed to integrate a wider range of diplomatic, military and economic instruments into an all-out pushback towards Chinese encroachment.
Instead, Indonesia compartmentalizes the problem simply by separating its bilateral ties with China from the North Natuna Sea issue, the South China Sea dispute and great power politics. This approach is ostensibly realistic given the complexity of those issues and the fact that China is one of the most domestically polarising international policy issue of today.
The Indonesian elite are also progressively dependent on the personal benefits and general public goods China provides, especially those extended during the outbreak . But as they worry more about community scrutiny over negotiations with China, Indonesian strategic policy will become less transparent.
China’s greyish zone strategy works when there is a lack of visibility in Indonesia. Policymakers seem unable to get pregnant of the range of options between surrendering silently or going to battle over fisheries.
These flaws clarify Jakarta’s failure in order to launch a meaningful response to Beijing’s greyish zone tactics. Indonesian policymakers have however to seriously contemplate the various options available, such as establishing minilateral ocean going alliances or reviewing Chinese Belt and Street Initiative projects.
In case Widodo is not thinking about directing a strategic response, each stakeholder — from the navy and coastguard to the foreign ministry — will develop its own disparate plan of action.
An ideal response would involve Indonesian policymakers articulating a restricted and attainable objective of pushing back again against China within the North Natuna Ocean. With measurable objectives, Indonesia could better specify the appropriate tools to achieve them. But more importantly, Indonesia needs to integrate — not simply coordinate — they of statecraft to properly respond.
Nothing of these outcomes are likely to occur soon. Maritime “encounters” and “crises” between Indonesia and China will recur every now and then. China’s steady inroads will continue even if Indonesia claims rhetorical victory within each instance. The particular underrated success associated with grey zone techniques lies in the proper delusion that Philippines is holding on to.
Evan The Laksmana is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center on Asia plus Globalization at the Nationwide University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Open public Policy. He is also a non-resident fellow using the Lowy Institute to get International Policy. A version of this article was first published right here within an Institute associated with Defence and Proper Studies Paper.
This article was first released by East Asian countries Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School associated with Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific cycles on the Australian National University . It is republished within Creative Commons license.