Asian media reported on May 11, 2025, that one of the country’s most effective personal businesses, Vingroup, offered to take complete control of the North–South high-speed rail project.
Yet, less than 24 hours later, the stories immediately vanished as links disappeared, articles went offline, and state-controlled media stopped reporting. The repression was caused by the fact that the entire plan had been leaked online, revealing terms that shocked the community and sparked a backlash.
The document, signed by Pham Nhat Vuong, Vietnam’s second businessman and founder of Vingroup, was reportedly addressed to Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Deputy Prime Minister Tran Hong Ha on May 6, 2025.
VinSpeed, a previously established Vingroup subsidiary, requested in the letter that it be the only investment and operator of the$ 61 billion railroad job. A zero-interest loan over 35 years was requested from VinSpeed to pay for 80 % of the figure, or$ 49 billion, while the state was required to cover the remaining 20 %. The plan did not include expenses for removing weeds, which led to rumors that the position would cover them.
In order to raise additional funds, the company also requested to be designated the buyer for real estate and urban development projects along the railroad route, particularly those that are close to channels. Additionally, it requested the right to employ the state loan as time working capital for its larger business operations.
Finally, it suggested setting a price floor for tickets at 60–75 % of the current airfare rate caps.
The public outcry, which was mostly expressed online, wasn’t the plan’s motivation, but rather its terms. Some people questioned in chat rooms why a private company may ask tens of billions of dollars worth of interest-free open loans, regain control of located real estate, and set value levels with little transparency and no competition.
By May 12th, the proposal’s majority in the news had vanished. The story was reintroduced two days later, on May 14; this time depicted as a patriotic initiative that was in line with the Communist Party’s objectives.
However, the initial leak had already sparked a much larger discussion about private capital, political power, and the future direction of Vietnam’s economy under new leadership.
Interpreting the fallout
The media fallout and the VinSpeed leak turned into a live experiment with how power, capital, and policy are bargained over in communist-ruled Vietnam. Three broad interpretations have come into play.
One interprets the incident as proof that Vingroup, which is regarded as the country’s most politically connected private conglomerate, may have lost some of its unspoken Party protection.
Despite VinFast’s difficulties and rising debt, the organization continues to receive limited state support. VinFast’s campaign abroad and, most recently, the government’s approval of a metro line to Can Gio suggest strong political influence within the Party.
The proposal is perceived as being overreach in a second sense. In light of this analysis, Vingroup made a knowingly unviable bid to appear patriotic without taking any risks. The group might have preferred to bow out without appearing obstructive given its tight finances.
However, this view is undermined by the state media campaign on May 14. VinSpeed reaffirmed its interest far away from backing away, in full compliance with Party messaging and in public. The group is now clearly committed to the pitch, regardless of any errors that might have occurred.
A third, and arguably more grounded, perspective views the proposal as a genuine offer from a powerful actor who erred in the moment. The North–South high-speed railway is not just another infrastructure project. It’s a significant national initiative because it’s politically symbolic, daunting, and economically significant. Many people saw Vingroup’s attempt to take full control as the only investor as a strategic overreach.
Other political or business wing groups that saw Vingroup’s bid as a threat to their own interests were likely to encourage or intensify the leak, and from this perspective, the resultant public outcry.
The state’s choice to halt the publication of the proposal likely contributed to the state’s decision to do so. The quick resumption of media coverage on May 14th, now with carefully worded patriotic framing, suggests not a rebuke but a rebalancing.
There is also a more obscure possibility. What if Vingroup’s Party leadership and those close to Vingroup’s Vuong were the ones who decided to restrict state media coverage following the leak?
The state media’s purge may have been more about damage control than censure because of growing public outcry and elite resistance in the air. People close to Vuong may have worked in the background to buy time, rewrite the narrative, and reintroduce the proposal under safer political cover. Faced with unexpected public blowback and intra-elite friction.
Private-Partnership Partnership
The VinSpeed incident sent a fresh, unambiguous message from the Party’s apex. To Lam, the general secretary of the Communist Party, published a significant economic article titled” A New Driving Force for Economic Development” on May 11 the same day the Vingroup headlines broke.
To Lam has consistently emphasized that the private sector is essential to Vietnam’s economic future since taking office as party chief in July 2024. To Lam makes the observation that Vietnam’s economic growth depends on a stronger private sector in his various articles. He has stated that he wants private companies to account for 70 % of GDP by 2030.
This change in perspective is supported by policy. The Politburo made its most pronounced declaration of support for private enterprise in decades, Resolution 68, in May 2025.
The resolution calls for “rapidly developing large enterprises, medium-sized enterprises, and regional and global private economic groups,” stronger legal protections for property rights, and easier access to capital.
Although it borrows from China’s playbook, the language is new and compelling, suggesting a move to encourage strong, homegrown conglomerates as state-supported champions in a socialist-oriented market economy.
The leaked VinSpeed proposal blew up just days after Resolution 68’s release. The conflict exposed a deeper conflict between the new pro-private reform movement’s political repercussions and the perceived privilege’s political cost.
Resolution 68 calls for fairness in the game, fair access to legal protections, transparency, and civil, not criminal, remedies. In his own words, “administrative thinking must shift from control to collaboration—treating enterprises as partners as partners, not police,” Lam writes in his article.
What happens when those “partners” demand more than the general public will tolerate? The inconsistentness it revealed may soon be forgotten, but it won’t.
Vingroup privilege, public outcry, etc.
Public legitimacy still matters in a system that claims to combine socialism and private enterprise. The general public can protest even in Vietnam or China through backlash and mockery rather than through courts or ballots.
Private entrepreneurs are protected by Resolution 68’s legal protection. However, it runs the risk of acting as a shield only for the wealthy and powerful unless it clearly stops cronyism.
The VinSpeed case demonstrates that even overreach can be corrected if the actor changes. The real danger is not that elites try to extract more than their fair share; rather, it’s that with the right message and timing, they can succeed. A memo that is leaked later turns into patriotic policy.
What happens when the next business simply declines to request a zero-interest loan on paper but instead quietly accepts it through land swaps, land swaps, or zoning adjustments done in a legal sense?
In that case, Vietnam might still be expanding. However, it will be a model with shared rules rather than selective access. The Party must now determine whether it can bring about growth and prosperity, as opposed to whether it can draw a line that even its preferred businesses can’t cross.
Without it, Vietnam’s reform will be a volatile agreement that will bring prosperity to a select few, limited improvements to some, and ultimately a bad deal to many.
Leo Tran writes about global strategy, trade, and international affairs. His articles have appeared in Kyiv Post, The Chicago Tribune, and The Diplomat. He also writes for Vietnam Decoded.