Russian troops marching in Red Square, Moscow, on May 9 to celebrate President Xi Jinping’s “no-limits” relationship with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, is a clear sign that the country’s Vladimir Putin is totally committed to its “no-limits” relationship.
Xi’s individual participation in the festival, which took place as part of a status visit to Russia, highlights that China is also supporting Russia. Beijing hoped that this help would be clearly understood in the capital of Kyiv, Washington, and Europe.
Xi didn’t make the last-minute choice by traveling to Moscow and having his army goose-step down Red Square. Nor were the numerous agreements signed by the two officials and their mutual declaration anything other than a continuation of a well-established style of deepening ties between Russia and China.
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this pattern has grown. However, the depth and breadth of China’s dedication to Russia at this time is definitely related to the global order’s overall upheaval, which has only gotten worse since Donald Trump’s returning to the White House.
The Trump administration has taken measures to restore balance, perhaps because of market instability. China and the US have come to terms to reduce the trade duties they have on each other. However, there is still confusion, particularly regarding how the complicated relationships between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow did turn out and where the rest of the world will fall.
Russia and China released a joint declaration on May 8 following Xi and Putin’s discussions in Moscow. The two officials ‘ intentions were highlighted in the statement’s emphasis on “enhancing the cooperation of their techniques and to enhance the practical assistance on maintaining and strengthening global strategic security, as well as to jointly address common problems and threats in this circle.”
In their subsequent media releases, they once more reaffirmed this resolve. Putin emphasized that he and Xi “personally control all aspects of]the ] Russia-China partnership” and that they will do everything to improve bilateral relations and international relations.
A Foreign read-out of the discussions was equally crystal clear regarding the regional position. Xi reportedly stated that” China is working with Russia to make the special responsibilities of big countries and permanent members of the UN Security Council in the face of unilateralist countercurrents, harassment, and acts of energy politics.”
This clear indication of how near Moscow and Beijing are to Putin and Xi physically is significant for both countries. Russia’s need to show that American efforts to isolate itself from the world have failed.
The very common combination of ties with Russia is, in China’s opinion, a signal above all to the US. China is willing to point out that Trump’s attempts to “un-unite” Moscow and Beijing, which the British chairman described as important during an exam with US talk show host Tucker Carlson in November 2024, have largely failed.
But, beyond the glossy surface of the activities in Moscow, Putin is trying to make out that not everything is as well for Russia. Despite the numerous public displays of Xi and Putin’s camaraderie, the bilateral relationship continues to be incredibly irregular.
Without the aid of China, Russia may not be able to continue fighting Ukraine. Russia’s war sector, which reached a record deep of almost US$ 250 billion in 2024, needs to be supported in large part by deal between Russia and China. Their industry has increased by more than 60 % since 2021, but it has only slightly increased since 2023.
China’s influence on the international stage is also beneficial for Russia. Few leaders in developing nations would have supported Putin if Beijing had adopted a clear position opposing Moscow’s hostility.
In this situation, Russia would likely include lost organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS group of emerging economies as programs to advance its wider goal of restoring its former position as a great authority.
Putin has had a moderately successful track record with that agenda. However, the list of participants at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024, was shorter because South Africa and India’s leaders were not present at Russia’s Victory Day celebrations.
A double-edged sword
High-level representatives from Iran and North Korea were not notably absent from the celebrations in Moscow. Moscow and these two important allies signed strategic partnership agreements in June and January, respectively, in June and January.
Tehran’s ambassador was sent to Moscow to meet with them. It may have made up for Putin in a different, significantly more important way.
According to reports, Iran is reportedly preparing to deliver launchers so that Russia can use the short-range ballistic missiles that were delivered last year. This would increase Russia’s reliance on Iranian-made Shahed drones in Ukraine, which has historically been most apparent in the use of Iranian-made Shahed drones.
A military envoy led by three-star general Kim Yong-bok was sent to North Korea. Kim is regarded as the leader of North Korean forces engaged in western Russian battles in the Kursk region, where Ukrainian forces seized territory in August 2024 as a potential bargaining chip in upcoming negotiations with Russia.
In a statement on April 28, Putin officially acknowledged the participation of North Korean troops in this operation. In a highly choreographed and televised meeting with his chief of general staff, Valery Gerasimov, he acknowledged the defeat of Ukrainian forces there two days after making the announcement.
The evidence of Russia’s close ties to its three main allies, China, Iran, and North Korea, is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it shows that Putin is not at all isolated on the global stage.
However, it also reveals that Russia has grown more dependent on these relationships than would fit Putin’s goals of restoring its great-power status. Unfortunately, neither can offer much of comfort to Ukraine and its allies.
Stefan Wolff is University of Birmingham Professor of International Security.
This article was republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.