The US Navy is developing its most significant drama nuclear weapons in decades, the sea-launched, low-yield boat weapon, as a result of rising nuclear tensions with China.
Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe stated in a statement to the US House Armed Services Committee that the US Navy will decide the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, Nuclear ( SLCM-N) project’s delivery date by 2034 in a significant way in a statement released this month.
In response to local deterrence gaps, especially given the expansion of adversarial capabilities, Wolfe’s statement highlights the importance of developing a scalable, adaptable nuclear strike option.
He claims in his statement that the SLCM-N system has already established a dedicated business and is conducting thorough professional, architectural, and integration assessments for all types of missile, fire, warhead, and subsystems.
However, the affirmation makes some important points, such as adapting a nuclear weapon to a cruise missile that has been traditionally designed and ensuring compatibility with ships from Virginia, as well as preserving nuclear security and reducing operational disruptions.
Despite those difficulties, the speech claims that Strategic Weapons Facilities is working on building infrastructure to support storage and handling without compromising existing Trident programs.
It emphasizes that achieving the 2034 original operational capability goal requires ongoing funding and rapid workforce growth.
In light of rising geopolitical rivals and the need for credible scalable barrier options in the region, the milestone determination from FY26 will officially begin acquisition and crystallize the program execution strategy, setting the stage for one of the US Navy’s most significant atomic modernization efforts in decades.
According to the US Department of Defense ( DOD ) 2024 China Military Power Report ( CMPR ), which contextualizes the motivation behind the redesigned SLCM-N program, China already has 600 operational nuclear warheads and will have over 1, 000 by 2030.
For regional deterrence and proportionate response, the report also mentions China is developing a nuclear triad in addition to developing advanced delivery technologies like fractional orbital bombardment systems ( FOBS ) and low-yield warheads.
The report makes the point that China’s actions indicate otherwise despite its no-first-use ( NFU) policy, and that it may turn to nuclear weapons when conventional attacks threaten its nuclear arsenal or the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), especially in a Taiwan emergency.
It adds that integrating conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as ambiguous use thresholds, may make administration of crises and increase power more difficult.
According to the US Strategic Posture Report for 2023, further US theater radioactive capabilities are required in Europe and the Indo-Pacific to hinder Russia and China, both. It recommends that these capabilities be scalable, scalable, and offer options for changing yields.
Additionally, it adds that the US president needs to have a range of militarily viable nuclear options to hinder or counter limited nuclear use in theatre conflicts. Additionally, it raises concerns that US deterrence is less credible in situations where corporate weapons seem disproportionately physically deployed.
In a November 2022 Atlantic Council report, John Harvey and Rob Soofer mention the SLCM-N’s features as responding to a US potential difference in response to the threat of minimal nuclear work.
Additionally, it asserts that while US nuclear capabilities are not always swift, may not be durable, and may be prone to adversary defenses, China has more options at the local level.
In a January 2025 Hudson Institute report, Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton point out that the US air-based nuclear arsenal is resilient in the Pacific because most US air bases in the Pacific lack large softening against China’s long-range hit capabilities, making them vulnerable for a pre-emptive attack.
In a June 2020 article for The Strategist, Thomas Mahnken and Bryan Clark discuss the US sea-based nuclear arsenal, arguing that all of its missiles become inaccessible at once if an alert nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN ) can’t launch its missiles, doesn’t communicate with commanders ashore, or is destroyed.
Mahnken and Clark point out that if there is only one SSBN on patrol, its absence might result in the loss of the entire leg of a nuclear triad.
In contrast to those flaws, a US Congressional Research Service ( CRS ) report from February 2025 states that deploying the SLCM-N aboard surface ships or nuclear attack submarines ( SSN) provides greater availability and regional presence, while being forward-deployed, resilient against pre-emptive attack, and capable of piercing air and missile defenses.
Given that the US already has low-yield nuclear options like the Long-Range Standoff Missile ( LRSO ), the B61-12 gravity bomb, and a low-yield variant of the Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile ( SLBM ), David Kearn asserts in a January 2025 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that the weapon is redundant.
At a crucial time, Kearn adds that the high costs associated with the SLCM-N program, which is priced at US$ 10 billion but likely even more, could discourage funding, infrastructure, and labor from other initiatives like upgrading the Trident II D-5 SLBM and the Conventional Prompt Strike ( CPM) hypersonic weapon.
He points out that the US industrial base is already struggling to produce conventional and nuclear weapons, with the US nuclear infrastructure finally starting to recover from decades of neglect and underinvestment.
There is a strong incentive to keep a conflict below the nuclear threshold given the arguments for and against the SLCM-N, especially in light of a potential US-China conflict over Taiwan.
In a Taiwan conflict scenario, Edward Geist and other authors make the point that the US must employ a restraint, calibrated force, and real-time adaptability strategy to prevent nuclear escalation in a RAND report from November 2024.
Geist and others argue that the only goals must be to prevent a Chinese invasion, not to threaten the regime’s survival or to use China’s nuclear deterrent, both of which could lead to a first strike.
They stress that while long-range strikes are necessary, they must be conducted with escalation in mind, avoiding ambiguous tactics that might be mistaken for nuclear preemption.
Importantly, Geist and others stress that the US must anticipate Chinese misperceptions, acknowledging that red lines are frequently fluid and opaque, and that accurate intelligence updates, precise signaling, and robust crisis communication channels are necessary to stop miscalculation or unintentional escalation.
They also urge strategic humility, stressing that winning without a nuclear disaster depends not on vengeful, judgment-sensitive warfighting, and acknowledge that even minor tactical choices can lead to disastrous outcomes.