On May 14, 2025, President Donald Trump will meet with the Saudi crown prince, the Emirati and Qatari rulers, and hold a mountain that is being highly touted as high-stakes. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will not be invited and will be closely watching.
Netanyahu remarked that the Republican Party’s policies in the Middle East would certainly advance Jewish interests and get closely aligned with Netanyahu himself, just like many other members of his right-wing alliance.
But that’s not how it’s going to work out. Of course, Washington continues to be Israel’s most important international alliance and major supplier of arms, as is evident in formal communications. Trump is, however, advocating a Middle Eastern strategy that occasionally conflicts squarely with Netanyahu’s and his government’s goals.
In fact, Trump is undermining long-held Netanyahu jobs by pushing for an Iran nuclear deal, which Trump’s first leadership unexpectedly reversed. Jewish right-wing organizations are so alarmed that rumors have been circulating that Trump did announce punitive US support for a Palestinian state before the Riyadh visit, which would be a clear withdrawal from Washington.
As a writer of Israel and the Middle East, I am aware that Trump’s plan in Riyadh represents a culmination of US policies, particularly those that involve developing security ties with Arab Gulf monarchies, something Israel has long accepted but not publicly supported.
However, the journey may even open up a lot of communication between Trump and Netanyahu.
Trump’s second policy-driven overseas visit to the Persian Gulf since becoming president, the four-day journey there, appears to be more concerned with strengthening economic and security relations between the US and its traditional allies.
Trump is anticipated to finalize trade agreements between the US and the Arab Gulf States, including extraordinary hands purchases, US investments, and even the Qatari government’s pending present of a grand 747 designed to serve as an Air Force One.
Additionally, a safety partnership between the US and Saudi Arabia is possible.
So far, but good for the state of Israel. Israel was now working on closer ties to the Gulf states prior to the attacks of October 7, thanks to agreements and diplomatic ties with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates through the Abraham Accords, which the Trump presidency itself helped facilitate in September 2020.
A prospective standardization of relations with Saudi Arabia was also on the horizon.
Getting to Tehran
But concerns that Trump and Netanyahu are extremely not on the same site will be on the plan this week in Riyadh. And that begins with Iran.
Iran won’t be represented at Trump’s summit, but it will be prominent because it coincides with the US president’s ongoing political discussions with Tehran regarding its nuclear program.
These discussions have now spanned four sessions. And despite pressing issues, American and Egyptian delegations still job optimism about the possibility of a deal.
Trump’s method marks a change of course, having previously turned down a similar offer that he is now primarily looking to build in 2018. Additionally, it suggests that Netanyahu’s distinct preference for strong armed conflict with Iran is being reflected in the US’s current opposition to the idea.
Gulf nations are also favoring diplomatic relations with Tehran as a way to stop Iran’s nuclear interests. Saudi Arabia, Iran’s long-term regional rival, has become extremely hostile toward Iran as a result of its continued opposition to the Obama-era Iran nuclear politics.
The Royal defense minister traveled to Tehran in April to prepare for the latest US-Iranian negotiations.
Netanyahu has relied on the need to immediately bite this risk and the looming danger from an Iranian nuclearized country to his political career. He repeatedly attempted to destroy President Barack Obama’s original efforts to reach an agreement with Iran, which led to the Iran nuclear deal in 2015. However, Netanyahu had more success with Obama’s leader, enabling him to persuade Trump to end the deal in 2018.
Netanyahu has been irritated by Trump’s abrupt turn on Iran conversations, both because it took place and because it was revealed in such detail. The US president called Netanyahu to the White House in April, and he was in full public embarrassment when he claimed Washington was pursuing political discussions with Tehran.
Yemen conflicted
The ongoing conflict between the US, Israel, and the Houthis in Yemen provides a clear sign of the possible tension between the Trump presidency and the Jewish state.
Israel responded after the Houthis fired a weapon at the Tel Aviv airports on May 4 that caused it to close and cause the withdrawal of numerous international flights, devastating an aircraft and other services in Yemen’s money.
Trump made the announcement just a few hours after the Israeli attack that the US would no longer strike the Houthis because they had” surrered” to his demands and agreed not to obstruct US ships ‘ passage in the Red Sea.
It became evident that Israel was not a part of this fresh agreement between the United States and the Houthis. Trump’s statement was even noteworthy in terms of timing, and it might be used as a way to calm the region ahead of his Saudi Arabian journey. A component was likely to be in part due to the fact that it might facilitate smoother negotiations with Iran, which is the main sponsor of the Houthis.
Timing is likewise important in Israel’s most recent assault on Yemeni ports. On the day that Trump will begin his trip to Saudi Arabia, they occurred on May 11. Netanyahu perhaps be sending a message to the Houthis as well as the US and Iran by doing this. The Houthis ‘ continued attacks might render atomic negotiations more difficult.
Bibi’s social survivalist strategy
For the sake of holding up his far-right partnership, which includes people who want full power of the Gaza Strip and de facto invasion of the West Bank, critics of Netanyahu have long argued that he prioritizes continuing conflict in Gaza over regional quiet.
Some political commentators have argued that this is the primary reason why Netanyahu resisted entering the final stage of the peace deal with Hamas in March, which would have required the removal of the Israeli army from the Gaza Strip.
Israel’s military has mobilized since the peace was broken in order to launch a new assault on Gaza, which is expected to begin after Trump’s trip to the Gulf.
It seems obvious that de-escalation is not on Netanyahu’s plan when people of the Netanyahu government declare that they are openly supporting the continuous employment of the strip and declare that bringing back the remaining Jewish victims is no longer a major concern.
Trump has just taken note of both the dire situation in the victims and the Gaza humanitarian crises. Israeli-American prisoner Edan Alexander was released, but the US is also negotiating with Hamas regarding a ceasefire and support, ignoring Netanyahu.
The lower penny
Trump’s existing US strategy in the region may all have a greater purpose: to safe billions of dollars in Gulf money for the American economy and, some have said, to himself. However, a firm Middle East is necessary for that, and a looming Iran and Gaza conflict might impede that goal.
Of course, it’s also a long way off to reach a political arrangement regarding Tehran’s nuclear plans. Additionally, Trump’s international policy is notoriously vulnerable to unexpected turns.
His administration is extremely pursuing policies that conflict with the interests of the latest Israeli government, whether motivated by a dealmaker’s instincts to follow trade and economic deals with rich Gulf states or by a real – and related – desire to stabilize the region.
University of Notre Dame professor of history and peace studies Asher Kaufman
The Conversation has republished this article under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.