Commentary ,Asia (Page 6)

“OPPOSITION-LESS” APPROACHES TO GOVERNING

The position of major parties regarding the future of direct elections appears largely instrumental. The National Awakening Party (PKB), which Baswedan’s running mate Muhaimin Iskandar heads, has advocated for the regional parliaments’ appointment of governors. This is despite Baswedan’s popular election as Jakarta governor, like Jokowi before him, being foundational to his viability as a presidential candidate now.

The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), whose candidate Ganjar Pranowo was a two-term elected governor of Central Java, has also indicated support for the idea. A draft legislation was recently put forward for a framework for governing Jakarta once the new capital city Nusantara officially replaces it as the nation’s capital.

The Bill proposes that future governors would be appointed by the president on the regional legislative council’s recommendation – an idea touted by the PSI, the self-proclaimed youth party now led by Jokowi’s youngest son, Kaesang Pangarep.

The preference shown by many political parties for greater control over executive leader appointment processes reflects agitation at what they see as the vagaries and increasing expense of direct elections plus the need to find “electable” candidates.

Any further narrowing of the field for political contestation, such as a return to closed-list voting systems or parliamentary appointments of regional leaders, would close the door on the possibility of any disruptive outsiders contesting gubernatorial or legislative posts. This would be most detrimental to those sectors of civil society without ties to, or utility value for, political elites who will face greater barriers to electoral participation and vulnerability to repression. This would extend to outlier parties excluded from a ruling coalition.

As we have seen over the past decade, few have remained committed to being an effective opposition – a role which comes with risks, such as targeted criminalisation.

A Prabowo presidency, then, may see an expansion of “opposition-less” approaches to governing, framed by nationalist tropes of safeguarding unity. The logic of this approach, already embraced by Jokowi, is to remove parliamentary opposition and curtail the emergence of rival power bases. This is done not by overt repression but co-optation into large ruling coalitions managed via negotiations and inter-elite deals.

Prabowo has said that he intends to include “all sides” in any future government. This would resemble his preferred integralist “consensus” (musyawarah)-based model, as envisioned in Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, and serve to further strengthen the power of the executive.

In such a scenario, core democratic processes such as elections may be maintained, albeit on a reduced scale but largely stripped of their potential for delivering substantive change. Such processes will nonetheless continue to provide an important avenue for public participation and for conferring legitimacy on the status quo.

If Prabowo can maintain his popularity like Jokowi has done, he may feel emboldened to flex his authoritarian muscle and push once more for a rollback of the post-1999 constitutional amendments and the end of direct elections.

Ian Wilson is a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is also Senior Lecturer in International Politics and Security Studies, Academic Chair of the Global Security Program and Co-Director of the Indo-Pacific Research Centre at Murdoch University, Western Australia. This commentary first appeared on the Institute’s blog, Fulcrum.

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NO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT WANTS TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED

Not only activists, but even some experienced observers have advocated such measures, including the provision of lethal aid to the NUG. They have argued that, should these ideas get picked up by governments, the opposition movement would be in a good position to consolidate its recent gains and make further advances against the junta.

For various reasons, however, few if any of these recommendations are likely to be accepted.

To date, the international community has made some helpful gestures but it has kept the civil war, and the opposition movement, at arm’s length. It has refused to recognise the NUG, or to establish direct contact with Myanmar’s many ethnic armed organisations. Foreign governments and international organisations have also baulked at providing aid to the opposition movement, particularly across national boundaries.

In explaining this approach, officials have invariably cited customary diplomatic practice and sovereignty issues, but it is plain that there is also a strong element of self-interest.  Whether or not they believe in the opposition cause, or simply fear the historical durability of Myanmar’s military regimes, it is clear that no foreign government wants to become directly involved.

The conflict appears to offer a clear choice, between those forces repressing the Myanmar people and those fighting for a more open, humane and democratic system. However, the conflict is a very complex one, loaded with the kind of ambiguities and contradictions that policymakers hate.

Besides, external involvement in the civil war would not guarantee an acceptable final outcome.

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“It’s a big bonus,” he told me. “Unfortunately, it won’t last long. In the Philippines context, it may last one to two decades.” The benefit of a second dividend will come only if the country can make this group more productive by investing in the quality of workers.  

While it’s time to jettison stereotypes about Filipinos having large families, there’s also a city-rural divide. The Manila area saw its total fertility rate decline to 1.2, well below the national figure, while it’s 3.1 in an autonomous region of the southern island of Mindanao.

“People are becoming more aware of their opportunities,” explained Carmela Aquino-Cabral, a fertility specialist at Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital, one of Manila’s largest maternity hospitals. “There’s more to life than being a mum.” 

The ground war matters greatly. One recent morning, I accompanied a team of volunteers from the Likhaan Center for Women’s Health into the Tondo district, one of the capital’s most impoverished. The lanes were narrow and muddy. Satay and fish cooked on open-air stoves; children scampered about while parents or grandparents leaned out the windows of makeshift shops.  

We were a few kilometres, and a whole world, away from the glass towers, fashionable cocktail bars and five-star hotels of the Makati enclave. It’s a regular beat for Cabello and her three colleagues.

These women are foot soldiers of a demographic revolution that’s gaining converts block by block – they hope. “I do share my own experiences, I am using the pill,” said Cabello. “In the long run, people will believe in us.”   

There are no easy solutions for developed nations so reliant on imported labour. Strengthening tertiary education and vocational training is vital, as is addressing poor pay and working conditions for professions like nursing.

For its part, the Philippines must tread carefully – it still has a long way to go before it becomes an aged society, but there is always the danger of overcorrection and being left, like others in the region, with a labour shortage of its own.

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TALK IS CHEAP

North Korea has long used explosive rhetoric in its relationship with South Korea and the US. It now faces a “boy who cried wolf” problem.

Even if Mr Kim means what he says this time, even if he plans to strike, there is no way for outsiders to know that he means it this time. Pyongyang routinely talks about annihilating its enemies, nuking Washington, turning Seoul into a sea of fire, and so on.

Outside media tends to latch onto particularly outlandish comments from the leadership, but South Koreans have long since tuned all this stuff out. Mr Kim and his officials simply have no rhetorical credibility anymore.

CRISES FOLLOW SOUTH KOREAN AND AMERICAN DOMESTIC POLITICS

In 2010, 2013, and 2017, there were analogous war crises. In 2010, North Korea military actions against South Korea killed 50 people; in 2013, North Korea told foreigners to evacuate South Korea because war was imminent; in 2017, Mr Kim and former US president Donald Trump exchanged nuclear threats. We are now in a similar situation.

A thread links these four “crises” – the rise of hawkish presidents in South Korea and the US. In each instance, a more belligerent South Korea or US president entered office, taking a tougher line on the North.

Current South Korea President Yoon Suk-yeol has done the same. And in each instance, North Korea’s response was to aggressively push back, pursuing a manner of offensive deterrence with extreme retaliatory threats.

Eventually, temperatures dropped after the North made its point – again – that it will fight. This is likely the case this time too, although there are some lingering risks.

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DEATHS CLIMBING AS BIRTHS FALL

The death rate is climbing as an inevitable result of the population ageing, and also an upsurge of COVID-19 in the first few months of 2023.

The population is ageing mainly because the birth rate is falling.

China’s total fertility rate, the average number of births per woman, was fairly flat at about 1.66 between 1991 and 2017 under China’s one-child policy. But it then fell to 1.28 in 2020, to 1.08 in 2022 and is now around 1, which is way below the level of 2.1 generally thought necessary to sustain a population.

By way of comparison, Australia and the United States have fertility rates of 1.6. In 2023 South Korea had the world’s lowest rate, 0.72.

China abandoned its one-child policy in 2016. In 2021 the country introduced a three-child policy, backed by tax and other incentives.

But births are continuing to fall. In part this is because of an established one-child norm, in part because the one-child policy cut the number of women of child-bearing age, and in part because economic pressures are making parenthood less attractive.

China’s National Bureau of Statistics says employees of enterprises work an average of 49 hours per week, more than nine hours per day. Women graduates earn less than men and are increasingly postponing having children.

One hope is that 2024 will see a bump in births, being the year of the dragon in Chinese astrology, a symbol of good fortune.

Some families may have chosen to postpone childbirth during the less auspicious year of the rabbit in 2023. At least one study has identified such an effect.

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Anies kicked off his opening statement with an attack on Prabowo’s track record in Cabinet.

Anies, the former Jakarta governor, chided Prabowo that the defence ministry has a large budget but couldn’t protect its website from a 2023 hack. In a bid to up the ante, and apparently referring to Mirage jet fighters from Qatar, Anies said the ministry that Prabowo leads plans to buy used primary weaponry hardware but half its troops don’t have housing.

According to the 2024 state budget, the defence sector is allocated 139.1 trillion rupiah (US$9.27 billion) or 5.6 per cent of total central government expenditure.

Ganjar piled in, also questioning the purchase of used jet fighters, which would require three years training for air force personnel as part of the technology transfer.

Appearing ruffled, Prabowo explained that military aircraft and warships have a 25 to 30 year life span. The plan to buy Mirage fighters from Qatar, he said, was no problem as they could still fly another 15 years, and buying new planes requires a longer delivery period of up to seven years.

Ganjar then sought to turn the debate to defence strategy, declaring he would prioritise naval capacity.

“No attack will come overland as Indonesia is an archipelago. Thus, the sea must be fortified,” Ganjar replied to a question from Prabowo on what defence area he would prioritise and how the budget would be increased to satisfy that need.

He said the Indonesian Navy has told him it needs sensor technology and sonars to guard the country from seaborne attack. Ganjar pledged to increase the defence budget up to 2 per cent of Indonesia’s gross domestic product – up from 0.78 per cent presently. This can be achieved by boosting economic growth from the present 5 per cent to 7 per cent, Ganjar said, allowing domestic defence industries to build tanks, helicopters and submarines, and enhance cyber technology.

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