Commentary: With PDI-P nomination of Ganjar Pranowo, Indonesia headed for three-way presidential race

Prabowo is Jokowi’s minister but is not seen as the president’s heir. Prabowo can be said to be the most important man behind Anies in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Many Anies supporters became Prabowo supporters for the latter’s failed 2019 presidential bid.

But now Prabowo is projecting himself as someone who is free from perennial politicking. He seems confident that political momentum is on his side and has downplayed the possibility that he will settle to be Ganjar’s vice-presidential running-mate.

ELITES ARE BEGINNING TO MANOEUVRE

Not only have the party coalitions been shaken by Ganjar’s nomination but the elites are also beginning to manoeuvre. Several names have been floated as vice presidential candidates.

Sandiaga Uno, the minister of tourism and creative economy, has already signalled his ambition by quitting his Gerindra deputy chairman post. It is widely believed he did so to join the PPP, an Islamic party whose heyday was during and immediately after the New Order.

Sandiaga, one of the richest people in the country, will be a hot commodity for any of the three potential presidential election candidates. As a running-mate, Sandiaga’s war chest will boost anyone’s campaign.

Meanwhile, Ganjar’s electability will influence how Indonesia’s biggest parties jostle for positions in 2024. President Jokowi is trying to become a kingmaker and may yet facilitate a grand coalition. Given his closeness to two of the three candidates, Jokowi will win if either Prabowo or Ganjar become president.

However, if Jokowi’s idea of a grand coalition fails to materialise in the sense of a clear consensus on a single sure winner, the current three-way race would most likely lead to two rounds of presidential election voting (because no candidate pair will secure a majority of the national vote).

In that scenario, Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election outcome would be more in the people’s, not the politicians’, hands. While two rounds of voting will add to electoral costs, democracy is worth the price.

Made Supriatma is a Visiting Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s blog, The Fulcrum.

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Commentary: Could Thai voters put a third Shinawatra in power after Thaksin and Yingluck?

Not many of the senators would vote for Paetongtarn or Pheu Thai’s two other candidates, real estate tycoon Srettha Thavisin, and veteran lawyer Chaikasem Nitisiri, in the premiership selection in parliament after the general election. A majority of the senators is expected to support either Prayut, who switched to the new United Thai Nation party, or Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit Wongsuwan, leader of Palang Pracharath.

Even if Pheu Thai can form the majority alone, senators may abstain from the vote. Pheu Thai would need the support of other opposition parties or major government parties to cross over to vote for Paetongtarn to win the premiership with 376 votes. This may not happen.

THAKSIN’S FINAL BET

But Thaksin is probably still pinning his hopes on Pheu Thai’s landslide victory in May that could make his dream of returning home from exile come true. A resounding mandate to form the next government could give it more leverage to overcome the senate vote.

Thaksin had been instrumental in fielding Yingluck as a surprise candidate of Pheu Thai in the 2011 general election. It swept 265 House seats with the slogan “Thaksin thinks, Yingluck acts!”

This time, he has sent in yet another surprise candidate, Paetongtarn. But for now, he has avoided being seen to do anything for his daughter or Pheu Thai.

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Commentary: Lessons from the cancellation of Indonesia’s under-20 FIFA World Cup hosting rights

Yet, this momentum and euphoria changed into polemics by the final weeks of March 2023. The heightened debate over the participation of Israel’s youth team involved government officials, politicians and social activists, particularly the governors of Bali and Central Java, Wayan Koster and Ganjar Pranowo, respectively.

Wayan referred to the trauma to his province’s residents caused by the 2002 Bali bombings despite the Bali police chief’s guarantee of safety for the U-20 event, while Ganjar awkwardly stated that he supported the success of the Cup but rejected Israel’s presence in Indonesia. Several organisations and political parties like the Democratic Party of Indonesia-Struggle (PDI-P) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) also voiced their objections.

Almost a month has passed since FIFA’s decision to cancel Indonesia’s host rights. In hindsight, this episode raises an alarm in terms of Indonesia’s policy coordination and implementation.

POLITICISATION RISK OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

First, Indonesia does not have any diplomatic relations with Israel, like many other majority-Muslim countries, as a consequence of the Indonesian constitution’s mandate. In the existing regulatory framework, the two governors had cited Foreign Ministerial Regulation No 3 of 2019 when rejecting the presence of the Israeli players, although the foreign ministry has said that the regulation should not be used in this way.

Here, it seems that there has been little or no coordination across ministries and the relevant departments to identify all the consequences of this policy or to ensure consistency in its implementation.

Indonesia has had a difficult history over the issue of Israeli athletes in sports. In 1958, Indonesia, Turkey and Sudan dropped out of the World Cup qualifiers to avoid playing against Israel. During the 1962 Asian Games, the Indonesian government refused to issue visas to Israeli participants. In 2006, Indonesia pulled out of an international tennis tournament because it was held in Tel Aviv.

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