Commentary: Cambodia’s next leader Hun Manet presents a new era for the country’s global relations

His exposure to different ideas and approaches is likely to play a role in shaping his leadership style in both domestic and international political landscapes.

The relationship between Cambodia and the US has been tense due to the US’ interference in Cambodia’s democracy and human rights issues.

After the election, the US derided the polls as “neither free nor fair” and announced visa bans on individuals it said had undermined democracy. It also paused several foreign assistance programmes in Cambodia.  

“As the ruling Cambodian People’s Party forms a new government, authorities have an opportunity to improve the country’s international standing, including by restoring genuine multi-party democracy, ending politically motivated trials, reversing convictions of government critics, and allowing independent media outlets to reopen and function without interference,” US State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said.

China, Cambodia’s key partner country, on the other hand congratulated Hun Sen on his victory. 

“China and Cambodia belong to one community with a shared future,” said Chinese President Xi Jinping in his congratulatory letter. 

Although the Cambodia-China relationship is expected to remain core to the nation’s foreign policy, under Hun Manet’s administration, a robust implementation of hedging and diversification strategies is expected.

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Commentary: Thailand’s emerging new political alignment

Instead, it is Pheu Thai, which ran a respectable second place in the May election with 141 seats, which now appears to be taking the lead in forming an alternative, conservative coalition.

Even before the election, there were rumours that the conservative parties had been negotiating with Pheu Thai with the prospect of forming a coalition. One report circulating in Thai social media even claimed that Thaksin had met with a close aide to King Vajiralongkorn, former army commander, General Apirat Kongsompong, on the Malaysian island of Langkawi in April. 

In its election campaign, Pheu Thai was careful not to antagonise the monarchy, by refusing to support calls to reform the draconian lese majeste law, which forbids criticism of the monarchy.

In recent days the Pheu Thai leadership has publicly met with representatives of the conservative parties. These include the military-backed Palang Pracharat party, led by the politically influential general Prawit Wongsuwan. The two parties have more in common than one might think. 

In government, Palang Pracharat contained many politicians from Thaksin’s own former Thai Rak Thai party. Prior to the 2023 election, some Palang Pracharat politicians rejoined Pheu Thai, Thai Rak Thai’s successor party.

The other prospective partner is Bhumjaithai, another conservative populist party, which came third with 70 seats. Bhumjaithai is also part of Thaksin’s political network, having broken away from another earlier Thaksin party, Phalang Prachachon, in 2008.

THAKSIN AND PHEU THAI REMAIN A POWERFUL FORCE IN THAI POLITICS

Add some of the smaller parties and a Pheu Thai-led conservative coalition would have a majority of seats in the House of Representatives. This would be acceptable to the military-appointed Senate – and be able to form the government.

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Commentary: Isn’t it ironic Matty Healy’s kiss brought Malaysia together for a moment?

Others felt the pushback from conservative groups left Malaysia missing out on the potential “gold mine” that went to Singapore. Music fans had earlier lamented that Coldplay will play six shows in Singapore, compared to just one in Kuala Lumpur.  

Food and retail vendors, including small-time entrepreneurs, were hurt by the festival cancellation, after investing money and time to boost revenue at the event. Local bands also lost an opportunity to perform on the big stage.

FODDER FOR STATE ELECTIONS

Ironically, Matty Healy achieved something few have been able to do in Malaysia, even if only momentarily: He brought the country together, across the political divide, in anger against his disrespectful and offensive behaviour. 

So much so, that those on the conservative bench had to create a point of contention and chose to falsely accuse Mr Fahmi of blaming PAS for the cancellation of the Good Vibes Festival. The communications minister had long taken responsibility for the decision, and a police report has been filed against the false accusation.  

This incident will undoubtedly be milked and manipulated in the build-up to the state elections, seen as a referendum not only on Mr Anwar’s performance but also on his multiracial vision for the country.

But entertainment news will likely be forgotten as voters’ attention turns back to more vital bread-and-butter issues. While large international events like the music festival boost the national economy, these don’t usually take place nor make an economic impact in the conservative states to begin with.

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Commentary: Stony silence over Qin Gang saga does China’s reputation no favours

On Jul 17, when asked to confirm whether Qin was still the foreign minister, Mao told the reporter to check the ministry’s website which listed Qin as the foreign minister and said she did not have any new information. So, a foreign ministry spokesperson could not directly confirm the foreign minister was still the foreign minister, and a reporter had to check the ministry’s website to confirm he was?

Mao has my sympathy, though. She knew the Qin-related questions would pop up every day she walked into the briefing room, but apparently, she was not authorised to say anything on that matter, not even to confirm that Qin was still foreign minister even though on paper he was.

Also, Mao’s exchanges with foreign reporters over Qin were all excluded from the readouts in the ministry’s website, keeping up the charade that “China’s diplomatic activities are moving forward normally”.

OLD HABITS DIE HARD

The shoe finally dropped on Tuesday (Jul 25) when the National People’s Congress Standing Committee replaced Qin with Wang Yi, his predecessor. At the briefing next day, Mao continued her stonewalling strategy by referring reporters to Xinhua reports as to why her former boss was removed – but Xinhua reports did not give any reason.

Meanwhile, the ministry was busy scrubbing Qin’s name and speeches from the official website, as if his seven-month tenure had not happened at all. One section which listed China’s foreign ministers since the People’s Republic was founded in 1949 no longer includes Qin. He was only listed as China’s ambassador to the United States from 2021 to 2023.

On Friday, the ministry quietly began to reinstate references to Qin which were erased on Tuesday, apparently because of intense media scrutiny. But the damage was done.

Old habits die hard. The ministry’s actions remind me of the antics popular in the heyday of Mao Zedong after leaders were purged. Such moves are counterproductive and ridiculous.

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Commentary: Another failed attempt to address Myanmar conflict – what’s next?

CONTINUOUS FAILURE

Several months after the coup, ASEAN members and the Myanmar junta agreed upon the Five Point Consensus.

This included an immediate end to violence in the country, dialogue among all parties, the appointment of a special envoy, humanitarian assistance by ASEAN and a visit to Myanmar by the envoy to meet with all parties.

This has become the primary reference for ASEAN’s conflict resolution approach in Myanmar.

However, until now, the junta has largely ignored the consensus, leading to a rift within ASEAN over how to further engage the junta.

The four-day high-level conference still resulted in no significant progressing in resolving Myanmar crisis except calling for “inclusive dialogue in Myanmar”. There is no clear time frame and outputs achieved during the conference.

This has raised doubts over the ASEAN’s capability to make visible peace progress in resolving the conflict especially during Indonesia’s time as chair.

Last month, Thailand and Laos held a closed informal meeting with the junta in Thailand to explore “alternative solutions”.

The meeting received mixed receptions from other ASEAN member states. Some accused the Thai government of sabotaging Indonesia’s efforts.

Meanwhile, Myanmar’s opposition group released a statement criticising ASEAN’s “continued” failure to resolve the crisis.

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Commentary: Thailand moves forward in social media election

SYDNEY: In Thailand’s general election in May, the Move Forward Party (MFP) emerged as the big winner with 151 seats thanks in large part to social media.

While all major political parties were actively campaigning online, the MFP’s influence far outstripped their opponents. The key to the MFP’s online success was its fan base, who came together, largely organically, to promote and support the party.

As one of the world’s most social media active countries, social media platforms were key battlegrounds for Thailand’s May 14 general election. With more than 80 per cent of the population now on social media, online campaigning was no longer optional.

The most popular hashtag used in the lead up to the election day, across Facebook, Twitter and TikTok was #election23, and the MFP dominated online conversations relating to the election and its content was engaged with the most.

Compared to other parties, Thai people talked, shared and interacted with the MFP online the most. This made MFP content most visible to social media users as platform algorithms prioritise the most popular content.

On Facebook, 56 per cent of the most popular posts using the hashtag #election23 were about the MFP. These posts garnered more than 10 million interactions (such as liking and sharing) with more than 80 per cent eliciting positive sentiment.

Pheu Thai came second with 15 per cent of the posts using #election23 being about the party. Pheu Thai posts produced 1.6 million interactions – more than six times fewer than the MFP.

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Commentary: Malaysia state polls will complicate already prickly federal-state ties for PM Anwar

CENTRALISED POLITICAL POWER

For a long time, political power in Malaysia has been largely centralised at the federal level. The few states governed by the opposition were regularly denied resources, both financial and central support for their economic programmes. 

During Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s first stint as prime minister heading the Barisan Nasional (BN) government, for 22 years beginning in 1981, the states of Kelantan and Terengganu were denied royalty payment from oil and gas extracted from the states by national oil corporation Petronas.

Kelantan fell to the opposition in 1990, becoming a PAS stronghold since. PAS wrested control of Terengganu in 1999 and suffered a similar fate from the Mahathir government at the time.

But things were shaken up after the 2018 general election when BN was ousted from power after ruling for six decades, starting a chain of events that pushed Malaysia into a prolonged period of political uncertainty. Power changed hands three times before the 2022 general election. 

It also led to a shakeup in how elections were carried out. All states, except Sabah and Sarawak, traditionally synchronised their state assembly elections together with the national polls, but only three states did so in November 2022. 

WHAT IMPACT DO STATE ELECTIONS HAVE ANYWAY?

The uncoupling of state and national polls has stirred a separate debate. While opposition politicians argue that the ability to dictate the timing for the state polls grants them greater autonomy, in reality it allows the federal government with all the resources at its disposal to overwhelm regional political entities.

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Snap Insight: Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s abrupt removal is embarrassing for Beijing and Xi Jinping

PATH FOR “WOLF WARRIOR” DIPLOMACY

For China’s diplomacy, it has meant confusion, as the change in minister has seemed to seize the mechanisms of the ministry and led to other countries unable to advance their diplomatic goals. Mr Qin missed a key Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers’ meeting in Indonesia, for instance, and a host of bilateral and multilateral meetings that went with it.

Furthermore, Mr Qin’s ouster makes it less clear how China’s diplomats should present themselves: Should they be bold and brash as Mr Qin had been earlier in his career as a wolf warrior, or cautious and less combative to avoid a similar fate?

Even with the most-senior diplomat, Wang Yi, being a similarly confident and at times abrasive voice, lower-level Chinese foreign service employees keen for promotion are unlikely to want to stick their neck out right now.

Over time, Beijing will no doubt bring greater stability to the top of the ministry, installing another minister and moving on from Mr Qin’s short tenure. But for now, the abrupt way in which Mr Qin was kicked to the kerb, with his silent disappearance creating a vacuum for speculation, has just created turbulence and disorientation in China’s diplomacy. 

Christian Le Miere is a foreign policy adviser and the founder and managing director of Arcipel, a strategic advisory firm based in London.Continue Reading

Commentary: Indonesia’s new capital Nusantara can’t afford the tangled wires of Jakarta

But the practical dangers are more pressing for pedestrians and nearby residents, such as the potential for electrical short circuits and fire hazards. Some outages have also been reported due to animal disturbances, including from birds and monkeys.

Public complaints over years have gone unaddressed, highlighting that the messy cables not only decrease the electricity supply but carry a cost for quality of living and national productivity.

AVOIDING URBAN PAINS IN NUSANTARA

In part to resolve Jakarta’s urban pains, the government has pledged to build a new Indonesian capital city Nusantara, in East Kalimantan. Nusantara will apply the “smart city” concept, using multi-utility tunnels for the installation of a host of public services, including electrical lines, fibre optical cables for telecommunications, and water pipes, taking lessons from cable deployments in developed countries, particularly in Japan and some European nations.

The goal in Nusantara is to no longer have a network of cables above the ground, which will minimise the need for public disruption.

Instead, a technician can easily do maintenance inside the multi-utility tunnels when a network needs to be fixed or replaced. A single control room with digital monitoring will also make it easier to track down leaks or damage within the system.

The concept has been used since 1850 for cable and pipe utilities under Paris. The Chiyoda district of Tokyo adopted a multi-utility tunnels system in 1926, which has survived significant earthquakes that have hit the city above.

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Commentary: Will third time be a charm for Thailand to pick next prime minister?

Ultimately, Pheu Thai is likely to collaborate with the incumbent coalition parties, hoping that the powers of incumbency and the MFP’s dissolution will give it a clear advantage over alternative pro-democracy parties in the next election, due by 2027.

MINORITY GOVERNMENT

Alternatively, Thailand could end up with a minority government comprising incumbent coalition parties if Pheu Thai doggedly refuses to work with them for the sake of optics for progressive voters.

Senators could do the incumbent coalition a final favour before ending their term in May 2024 by backing caretaker deputy premier and former coup conspirator Prawit Wongsuwan as the new prime minister.

It would be unwise to underestimate the longevity of Mr Prawit’s government. The same institutions that wrecked Mr Pita’s bid in the past two weeks, coupled with defections and other extra-parliamentary measures, could artificially prolong the minority government’s shelf life for years to come.

Foreign investors and businesses will hardly be enthused. With parliament being a veritable minefield due to the risk of no-confidence motions, legislative activity will be sidelined in favour of executive decisions on policymaking.

Businesses should expect slower reforms – often devised opaquely and without meaningful consultation with the private sector – and a dearth of fresh ideas to innovate investment policies and spearhead economic liberalisation of sectors, especially those that are dominated by politically connected conglomerates.

Thai voters may have rejected years of military rule but it may be a political void, rather than change, that awaits.

Harrison Cheng is a Director in risk consultancy firm Control Risks.

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