Commentary: Why Prabowo Subianto is winning over young Indonesian voters in a three-way race

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And while it’s just one poll 10 months before the vote and conducted in the aftermath of PDI-P’s disastrous intervention in the U-20 FIFA football event in Bali, the trend has alarmed activists and progressives. A refusal to investigate or even revisit serious and credible allegations of human rights abuses is a feature of the political elite across Southeast Asia.

This has continued in Indonesia under the Joko Widodo, or Jokowi as he is commonly known as, presidency despite hopes in 2014 that his election win would bring answers, if not cases against perpetrators, for the families of victims of alleged state-backed violence.

APPARENT ABSOLUTION FROM PRESIDENT JOKOWI

Indeed, those unanswered allegations were a major aspect of the Jokowi campaign against Prabowo in both 2014 and 2019. That the president tapped his former challenger to join the Cabinet as defence minister shortly after winning his second term underscored criticism that Jokowi had abandoned many of his pre-2014 progressive promises and that the PDI-P had feigned concerns about human rights abuses.

Jokowi spent much of the first half of this year championing Prabowo’s 2024 candidacy with high-profile visits and social media posts. Whether that was to back his minister or to pressure PDI-P boss Megawati Sukarnoputri to name Ganjar is still debated.

PDI-P is still suffering from its bumbling youth football catastrophe, undermining faith in the party’s ability to read the will of the country, and with few other candidates and an apparent absolution from Jokowi, Prabowo has good reason to be feeling confident.

Erin Cook is a journalist covering Southeast Asia politics and curates the weekly Dari Mulut ke Mulut newsletter. This commentary first appeared on Lowy Institute’s blog, The Interpreter.

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Commentary: A dark horse could become Thai prime minister

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However, unlike the Move Forward Party, which has rejected the possibility of working with parties previously aligned with the military, Pheu Thai has options, including forming a coalition with other parties such as Bhumjaithai (71 MPs), the Democrat Party (25 MPs), Chatthaipattana (10 MPs), or even Palang Pracharath (40 MPs).

In the event that Pita’s premiership bid is unsuccessful or the proposed Move Forward Party-led coalition collapses, Pheu Thai may seize the opportunity to propose one of its three candidates for the premiership. These include Thaksin’s youngest daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra, real estate tycoon Srettha Thavisin, or former attorney-general Chaikasem Nitisiri. 

Among these contenders, Srettha, a former CEO of Sansiri, one of Thailand’s largest real estate developers, and a member of an elite family, stands out as a promising frontrunner due to his broad acceptability, potentially even by the Senate.

Although Srettha has long been associated with the Shinawatra family, particularly former prime minister Yingluck, his foray into politics only began formally when he assumed the role of chief advisor to Paetongtarn. Upon announcing his candidacy for the premiership, Srettha became the face of the Pheu Thai Party’s economic policies, including the controversial 10,000 baht digital wallet policy.

SRETTHA THAVISIN’S COMMITMENT TO PHEU THAI

Srettha’s unwavering commitment as the Pheu Thai candidate for prime minister is evident. He has transferred his shares in Sansiri to his daughter and resigned from all his positions at the company. Sansiri, which is listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, has a market capitalisation of 27.4 billion baht (US$790 million).

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Commentary: Battle of Indonesia’s kingmakers – a rift between Jokowi and Megawati?

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In this author’s view, Jokowi has implemented this strategy so that Prabowo and Ganjar would clear the first round of the presidential election and go head-to-head in a second round. 

For months, various credible polls have indicated that none of the three leading candidates – Prabowo, Ganjar, or Anies – will be a dominant contender sweeping up more than 50 per cent of the national vote. 

By touting Ganjar and Prabowo as a possible successor, Jokowi might be hoping that both would easily advance to the run-off. Often in third place in recent polls, former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan, who is running on a campaign platform as the candidate of change and is clearly Jokowi’s least favoured, is expected to lose in a three-way race.

Given his huge popularity, Jokowi’s clear endorsement of either Ganjar or Prabowo would certainly influence the 2024 election outcome. Two prominent survey organisations, LSI and SMRC, recently reported that public approval of Jokowi has reached 82 per cent. 

JOKOWI’S PERSONAL STAKE

In recent polls, increases in support for Prabowo might be attributable to Jokowi’s repeated endorsement of Prabowo as a potential candidate, while Ganjar’s popularity decreased especially after he (and PDI-P) opposed Israel’s young athletes’ participation in the under-20 FIFA World Cup (originally planned to be held in Indonesia) earlier this year.

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Snap Insight: Thailand has voted for change, but will change happen?

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AN OPPOSITION COALITION

But Thai voters have called for change at the ballot box before. In the last general election in 2019, Pheu Thai had won the most seats but was unable to secure the numbers for a coalition government. Move Forward’s predecessor Future Forward Party was the third-largest party in parliament after the 2019 election.

It’s likely that Pheu Thai and Move Forward Party will form a coalition government. Palang Prachrath (led by General Prawit Wongsuwon) may cut a deal with Pheu Thai and Move Forward Party.

Even though Move Forward’s Pita had vowed to form a government that is “anti- dictator-backed, military-backed parties”, such a coalition would break up the military-skewed senate’s stranglehold on the subsequent race to the premiership.

SPECTRE OF A MILITARY COUP?

However, the entire house of cards will fall in the case of a military coup, in a country that has seen two military coups ousting democratically elected governments in the last two decades. Prime Minster Prayut Chan-o-cha may not rule out military action yet, as there are many military figures who have been bound to his Senate and parties since the 2014 coup.

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Commentary: Amid graft probe in Malaysia, migrant labour reform becomes an urgent challenge for Anwar’s government

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Since the early 1990s, Malaysia has been recruiting workers from a host of countries, beginning with Indonesia and the Philippines, before enticing labour from countries, such as Myanmar, Vietnam, Nepal, and India. But it is Malaysia’s conscription of Bangladeshi workers that continues to attract the most adverse public opprobrium and allegations of graft. 

Exporting labour is big business in Bangladesh and the ties between the players that control the foreign recruitment chain in both countries are very strong.

There are reportedly more than 1,300 registered agents operating in Bangladesh and the bigger players among them have operations in Malaysia that deal directly with a private entity called Bestinet Sdn Bhd. Bestinet secured exclusive rights in 2013 to operate a foreign worker management system that supervises the movement of workers into Malaysia.

Typically, a single recruit pays roughly RM20,000 (US$4,500) to the cast of players in the convoluted recruitment process. The hefty fee is paid largely through loans that immediately lock workers into a debt bondage that can only be paid by working long hours and accepting poor living conditions. 

A government appointed task force that was set up in 2018 to review foreign worker management observed that the entire system was riddled with mismanagement and corruption, reported The Edge Malaysia last month.

The recommendations for a complete overhaul to the Bestinet-managed Foreign Workers Centralised Management System were eclipsed in Malaysia’s subsequent political strife, which saw the change of three administrations before Mr Anwar took power in November.

Mr Santiago and other labour reform activists noted that the trade is extremely lucrative and runs into several billion dollars annually.

“The country is paying too high a price and nothing short of bringing down the current opaque system and replacing it with a more transparent straightforward process to recruit workers is what is needed,” Mr Santiago added.

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Commentary: Thailand’s election could be highly consequential for the country and the region

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ELECTION SCENARIOS

The key factor determining post-election scenarios will be how well former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s Pheu Thai party performs. Thaksin has lived in self-imposed exile since 2008, but remains the driving force behind the party, now ably led by his daughter Paetongtarn. Paetongtarn has said her goal is to capture 310 seats. Such a landslide would allow Pheu Thai to take the prime ministership and dominate a coalition with smaller parties.

Even so, Pheu Thai will likely fall short of this high bar, in part because the progressive Move Forward party will split the anti-establishment vote. Move Forward’s predecessor party, Future Forward, won 80 seats in 2019, but may perform less well due to subsequent electoral changes, despite polling strongly. Move Forward has the most distinctive and ambitious policy agenda of any party in the election, seeking to reform Thailand’s constitution, end military conscription and reform the lese-majeste law.

Most analysts point to a coalition government involving elements from both Pheu Thai and conservative and parties as the most likely electoral outcome. General Prawit Wongsuwan, Prayut’s long-time deputy, is positioning himself as the candidate of political reconciliation and openly mooting the idea of a coalition with Pheu Thai. A tie-up between opposing political forces may seem odd, but in the pragmatic world of Thai politics, any deal is possible.

Pheu Thai is cagey about these prospects, fearful that talk of allying with conservative parties could damage its electoral prospects. And Thaksin probably still has majoritarian instincts. While he may be open to a pragmatic deal, he has proved incautious in the past, and would likely seize on any window of opportunity to put Pheu Thai back in the driving seat, even if doing so risked political conflict.

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Commentary: Malaysia’s political tug-of-war over Najib’s pardon

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The pardons process in Malaysia is far from straightforward. 

While Malaysia’s king has the sole discretion to grant a pardon to a convicted Malaysian citizen, the entire process is lengthy. A convicted person is only eligible to go before the Pardons Board after serving out what is considered to be a reasonable period of time commensurate to his jail sentence, and in Najib’s case several lawyers have privately suggested that it could mean between two to three years.

Najib, the first Malaysian prime minister to be imprisoned, began serving his jail term in August last year.

Lawyers also noted that the optics of granting a pardon so quickly to Najib, who is facing other corruption charges in separate cases linked to 1MDB, would hurt investor confidence in Malaysia’s judicial system.

Senior UMNO leaders privately acknowledge that any pardon for Najib is premature. But they note that the pressures from the pro-Najib faction in UMNO reflect the party’s unsettled and restive internal dynamics. 

While UMNO president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, who is also deputy premier in Anwar’s Cabinet, has consolidated his position following the party’s recent congress in March, Najib’s influence among the party’s rank-and-file and its political warlords cannot be underestimated. 

Several senior UMNO officials suggest that the pro-Najib forces make up at least 40 per cent of the party’s supreme council and these factions argue that Najib’s release would help the party renew its appeal among voters, particularly the dominant ethnic Malay community that make up more than 60 per cent of the population.

It is a weak argument, but it spotlights how Najib remains a divisive figure in Malaysian politics.

Leslie Lopez is a senior correspondent at CNA Digital who reports on political and economic affairs in the region.

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Commentary: Pheu Thai wants a landslide win in the northeast. It faces a tough fight

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Transparent- Uncertain Reduce Triumph

It is obvious that Pheu Thai’s prediction of a landslide victory in this stronghold in the northeast is quickly turning into self-fulfilling revelation. A crucial element of this successful strategy is the group’s commitments to enacting a 10, 000 ringgit digital wallet policy, despite receiving harsh criticism. However, a resounding defeat for Pheu Thai is not yet guaranteed.

Pheu Thai won eight out of ten seats in Khon Kaen in the previous election, defeating the Future Forward Party and the Palang Pracharath Party( PPRP ) by one seat. Since then, the two MPs who were elected to those positions have left their respective parties and joined the ruling coalition’s Bhumjaithai Party ( BJT ). Due to the presence of the BJT in the race, it’s likely that Pheu Thai will once more compete to win every desk within the county, which currently has 11 tickets.

In city 4, Ekarat Changlao, who recently switched from the PPRP to the BJT, is vying with Mookda Pongsombat, a candidate for Pheu Thai. In the previous election, Ekarat is said to have had control over the income of the northern PPRP candidates.

Ekarat, which is currently facing accusations of peculation from Khon Kaen Teachers’ Savings Cooperative, has a history of using cash to engage in political conflict. Ekarat and his brother Wattana, an MP who already left the PPRP to go for the BJT in area 2, are anticipated to put up a valiant fight against Pheu Thai.

Because citizens in Khon Kaen are historically inclined to support Pheu Thai on the basis of its event company, the leader of one of the party’s strategy team asserts that the applicants of that party have the upper hand over the BJT candidates.

However, Pheu Thai’s applicants do not receive the same level of monetary assistance or proper assistance as BJT candidates. Only the BJT is willing to go above and beyond when domestic surveys are conducted by both parties to decide how much support each participant should receive on a rolling foundation. Pheu Thai runs the risk of losing ground, at least on the district poll, if the BJT injects cash into its networks of local leaders and village-based health volunteers in the last stretch of the strategy.

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Commentary: Thailand’s upcoming election is haunted by the ghosts of politics past

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Many parties have more than one candidate for prime minister at this point in the campaigning. While Paethongtarn Shinawatra, the daughter of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, is a Pheu Thai candidate with dynastic charisma, she is flanked by two older and more experienced candidates, so she is no sure thing.

There are other known unknowns, such as the role of palace and the possibility of last minute big surprises, such as the announcement and subsequent cancellation of King Vajiralongkorn’s elder sister Princess Ubol Ratana as a prime ministerial candidate in 2019.

If Pheu Thai returns, then the seeds for the next coup, either military or judicial, may have already been sown. Pheu Thai’s populist promises – such as a 10,000 baht cash bonus (US$300) into a digital wallet for all adults – may offer the pretext for intervention, just like in 2014, when former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s poorly-designed scheme to buy rice from farmers well above market prices was framed as reckless economic irresponsibility. The possibility of Thaksin returning to Thailand could again inflame conservatives and provoke a return to the streets.

Deep social and regional cleavages remain in the Thai body politic, making Thai politics as uncertain as ever.

Greg Raymond is a Senior Lecturer at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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Commentary: What price will Laos need to pay to be saved, and will China pay it?

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For Laos, its rhetoric that a debt default is not likely stands at odds with its actions. As early as 2021, Laos began to unbundle its liabilities – most notably, state-owned energy company Electricite du Laos which makes up around 37 per cent of Laos’ external debt.

Electricite du Laos and the China Southern Power Grid company signed a 25-year concession agreement establishing EDL-T, effectively giving the latter a majority stake and the rights to export Laos’ electricity overseas, potentially depriving Laos of revenue.

SUBSTANTIAL COST OF ADDRESSING LAOS’ LIQUIDITY CRISIS

The cost of addressing Laos’ liquidity crisis is substantial. The World Bank estimates that servicing the deferred Chinese debt is about four times that of concessional loans, with the deferrals having been resettled at market interest rates.

Unlike the situations in Sri Lanka and Zambia, China has moved uncharacteristically fast in providing substantial loan deferrals. But as with Sri Lanka and Zambia, China has also so far been unwilling to take a haircut on its debt, despite obvious signs that this will ultimately be necessary and to everyone’s benefit.

China needs to do more for Laos, and do it quickly. The human cost of this debt crisis on top of the pandemic will be felt for decades.

Indications suggest that since protests last year sparked by the economic travails, many Laotians have headed west to Thailand for work opportunities. The rising cost of food and fuel has detrimental health consequences, too. The World Bank has warned last year that a third of Laotian children under five were stunted largely due to malnutrition and that this was getting worse.

Laos offers up a chance for China to do the right thing with minimal hassle as its single largest creditor and for what Laos deems as its last resort.

Mariza Cooraya is a research fellow and senior economist at the Lowy Institute’s Indo-Pacific Development Centre. This commentary first appeared on Lowy Institute’s blog, The Interpreter.

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