Commentary: Indonesia’s new capital Nusantara can’t afford the tangled wires of Jakarta

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But the practical dangers are more pressing for pedestrians and nearby residents, such as the potential for electrical short circuits and fire hazards. Some outages have also been reported due to animal disturbances, including from birds and monkeys.

Public complaints over years have gone unaddressed, highlighting that the messy cables not only decrease the electricity supply but carry a cost for quality of living and national productivity.

AVOIDING URBAN PAINS IN NUSANTARA

In part to resolve Jakarta’s urban pains, the government has pledged to build a new Indonesian capital city Nusantara, in East Kalimantan. Nusantara will apply the “smart city” concept, using multi-utility tunnels for the installation of a host of public services, including electrical lines, fibre optical cables for telecommunications, and water pipes, taking lessons from cable deployments in developed countries, particularly in Japan and some European nations.

The goal in Nusantara is to no longer have a network of cables above the ground, which will minimise the need for public disruption.

Instead, a technician can easily do maintenance inside the multi-utility tunnels when a network needs to be fixed or replaced. A single control room with digital monitoring will also make it easier to track down leaks or damage within the system.

The concept has been used since 1850 for cable and pipe utilities under Paris. The Chiyoda district of Tokyo adopted a multi-utility tunnels system in 1926, which has survived significant earthquakes that have hit the city above.

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Commentary: Will third time be a charm for Thailand to pick next prime minister?

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Ultimately, Pheu Thai is likely to collaborate with the incumbent coalition parties, hoping that the powers of incumbency and the MFP’s dissolution will give it a clear advantage over alternative pro-democracy parties in the next election, due by 2027.

MINORITY GOVERNMENT

Alternatively, Thailand could end up with a minority government comprising incumbent coalition parties if Pheu Thai doggedly refuses to work with them for the sake of optics for progressive voters.

Senators could do the incumbent coalition a final favour before ending their term in May 2024 by backing caretaker deputy premier and former coup conspirator Prawit Wongsuwan as the new prime minister.

It would be unwise to underestimate the longevity of Mr Prawit’s government. The same institutions that wrecked Mr Pita’s bid in the past two weeks, coupled with defections and other extra-parliamentary measures, could artificially prolong the minority government’s shelf life for years to come.

Foreign investors and businesses will hardly be enthused. With parliament being a veritable minefield due to the risk of no-confidence motions, legislative activity will be sidelined in favour of executive decisions on policymaking.

Businesses should expect slower reforms – often devised opaquely and without meaningful consultation with the private sector – and a dearth of fresh ideas to innovate investment policies and spearhead economic liberalisation of sectors, especially those that are dominated by politically connected conglomerates.

Thai voters may have rejected years of military rule but it may be a political void, rather than change, that awaits.

Harrison Cheng is a Director in risk consultancy firm Control Risks.

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Commentary: With a missing foreign minister, it’s hard for Xi Jinping to project China as country of influence

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If there were to be any wrongdoing on Qin’s part, Xi would be in an extremely politically sensitive position.

If he tries to protect Qin, Xi would lose his credibility as a leader of integrity. If he dismisses Qin, he would lose his credibility as a leader who protects his loyal subordinates.  

It would also be difficult to find a replacement for Qin’s position. The party boss of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is Qi Yu, who while politically reliable, does not have any experience in foreign affairs. 

Executive Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu could be a candidate, but his political credentials are a bit too weak. He is not even an alternate member of the 20th Central Committee. Of course, Xi could transfer Liu Jianchao, head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Finally, Qin’s problems have highlighted a fundamental flaw of Xi’s style of personnel management. Xi takes political loyalty as the most important criterion for selecting top officials but he also wants to project an image of being impartial. 

Loyalists, however, are not necessarily clean officials. Once Xi starts to clean up his loyalists for corruption issues, he loses their absolute loyalty.

Professor Bo Zhiyue is the founder and president of the Bo Zhiyue China Institute, a consulting firm providing services to government leaders and CEOs of multinational corporations, and an author on China’s elite politics.

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Commentary: Has history left Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi behind?

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Indeed, over the past few years, a host of small armed groups have arisen. Many pay lip service to the NUG, or the PDF, but most act independently. They collect their own intelligence, choose their own targets and decide their own tactics. At the end of the day, these groups are unlikely meekly to surrender their arms and do as they are told by members of the so-called political elite, negotiated settlement or not.

Finally, Aung San Suu Kyi used to be the darling of the international community but her moral authority collapsed in 2019 when she defended Myanmar’s armed forces against charges of genocide at the International Court of Justice.

While still important to Western policymakers, she no longer commands the influence she once did. A new generation of leaders has emerged in Myanmar that demand greater attention.

STILL RECOGNISED AS A POTENT SYMBOL BY THE JUNTA

All that said, and as Don’s visit demonstrated, Aung San Suu Kyi is still viewed as a potent symbol by the junta, the opposition movement and ASEAN. If they can, all three are prepared to use her to pursue their own interests.

Locked up in Naypyidaw and kept incommunicado, except for carefully vetted individuals, it is difficult to know what she herself is thinking and saying (Don’s pronouncements notwithstanding). 

However, one thing is clear. Politically weakened, morally compromised and deprived of a public stage she may be, but Aung San Suu Kyi cannot yet be written off as a factor in the power games being played in and around Myanmar.

Andrew Selth is Adjunct Professor at the Griffith Asia Institute, at Griffith University, Australia. This commentary first appeared on Lowy Institute’s blog, The Interpreter.

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Commentary: The lack of democracy in Thailand has been revealed

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VOICE OF THE PEOPLE IGNORED?

Looking towards the medium to long term, the implications of these developments extend far beyond party politics. They have the potential to ignite substantial frustration and discontent, particularly among those who perceive Pita’s failure to secure the necessary support as evidence that the democratic process has been compromised by actors and institutions that prioritise their own interests over the popular will.

This growing disillusionment among the public may intensify calls for political reforms and a thorough re-evaluation of the role and accountability of various power structures within the political system, such as the Senate, the Constitutional Court, and the Election Commission.

However, the absence of a clear and effective pathway for formally addressing these grievances poses a significant challenge. For instance, to revoke the Senate’s authority to jointly select the prime minister, amending Section 272 of the Constitution is necessary. But amending the Constitution requires the backing of at least one-third of senators, as stipulated by Section 256.

The limited avenues for meaningful engagement and redress can further erode public trust in the existing political institutions, leading to widespread mobilisation and street protests with ever-increasing frequency and intensity. That said, however, historical precedents have shown that social unrest and emergencies are often used as a pretext for the military to intervene in the name of maintaining peace and order.

In conclusion, the political future of Thailand hangs in the balance. If the selection process fails to produce a successful candidate for the role of Prime Minister, Section 272 (2) of the 2017 Constitution allows for the possibility of an outsider being considered as a potential candidate for the position. This scenario remains unlikely due to stringent requirements; moreover, there is no guarantee that the candidate would serve as a neutral arbiter or independent third party.

Ultimately, these developments underscore the stark reality that leaders in Thailand are not elected by the will of the people but rather permitted to rise to power with support or at least acquiescence of the conservative establishment. Now that the true nature of democracy, or the lack thereof, in Thailand has been revealed, it remains to be seen what actions and measures will be taken by the Thai people whose voice and choice seem to have been trampled upon.

Napon Jatusripitak is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and PhD Researcher at Northwestern University. This commentary first appeared on the Institute’s blog, Fulcrum.

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Commentary: Can Thai prime ministerial aspirant Pita Limjaroenrat find a way back after a chastening first defeat?

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The second is if the Constitutional Court decides to disqualify Mr Pita from the second round based on alleged violations of electoral laws. This would effectively force the opposition to nominate someone else or risk being out-manoeuvred by an incumbent coalition leader.

Arguably, this outcome would also simplify the intra-opposition bargaining process by taking Mr Pita out of the picture, paving the way for Pheu Thai to lead in forming the government. Pheu Thai will work hard to keep Move Forward on board but once again, the sticking point will be the lese-majeste reform. This will likely result in a Pheu Thai-led coalition with conservative parties, with Move Forward in the opposition.

A RETURN TO MAY 2014 AND MILITARY INTERVENTION?

Of course, it is entirely plausible that none of these developments will transpire, and everyone sticks to their original scripts next week.

Mr Pita may not give way to Pheu Thai; Pheu Thai may fear breaking away from Move Forward at the risk of losing credibility with progressive voters; the Constitutional Court may not want to risk sustained demonstrations and violence in Bangkok by taking the nuclear options of removing Mr Pita or dissolving the Move Forward Party – which happened to the party’s predecessor Future Forward Party in early 2020.

This scenario would not only prolong the political limbo but tip Thailand towards a situation where unrest becomes more disruptive and overt military intervention becomes increasingly likely. A return to May 2014 may be around the corner.

Harrison Cheng is a Director in risk consultancy firm Control Risks.

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Commentary: Upcoming Malaysia state polls set to be a referendum on PM Anwar and his multicultural vision

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KUALA LUMPUR: Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is making the upcoming six state assembly elections personal.

While the polls on Aug 12 have been widely framed as a barometer of the level of support from the Muslim Malay community for the prime minister’s unity government, Mr Anwar is taking a different tact, presenting them as a referendum on his seven-month premiership that is anchored on multiracialism and a civil society, better known as Malaysia Madani.

Mr Anwar, Malaysia’s 10th prime minister since independence in 1957, is asking Malaysians, particularly the Malays who make up more than 60 per cent of the country’s 33.6 million people, to break away from the politics of race and religious rhetoric that he insists have failed Malaysia.

He wants voters to deliver a message that would signal their backing for a new multiracial political compact championed by his fledgling administration, which is led by his Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition.

It is a big ask, particularly at a time when the opposition Malay parties are doubling down on claims that the community is at risk of losing their political clout, which could result in economic marginalisation. What is more, Mr Anwar’s opponents are arguing that multiculturalism is a direct threat to the status of Islam as the country’s official religion.

Mr Anwar’s loudest opponent for a new Malaysia is Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who dominated Malaysian politics for decades. Dr Mahathir, who turned 98 this week, was Malaysia’s prime minister from 1981 to 2003, and again from 2018 to 2020.

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Commentary: Inequality fuelling the fire for Thailand’s political change

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The changes in income of different classes from 2015 to 2019 reveal that the income of Thailand’s middle- and upper-middle classes has worsened. During this period, the income of the top 5th quintile declined by nearly 19 per cent, while the 4th quintile experienced a smaller decline of 3 per cent.

A comparison based on geographic areas also yields discouraging results. Barring the Bangkok metropolitan area, the Gini index in all regions of Thailand worsened from 2015 to 2019.

This situation is connected to the issue of poverty, which was 7.2 per cent in 2015, 6.8 per cent in 2019, and projected at 6.6 per cent in 2022, indicating a decline in the country’s ability to effectively reduce poverty. Persistent poverty is linked to the rapidly rising population of elderly individuals who are also poor. Most work in agriculture and have limited educational opportunities.

During the years under military influence, Thailand’s inequality has worsened, with the middle classes struggling and a rising number of elderly poor people getting left behind. While government assistance has softened the short-term impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on poverty, the real damage is likely to occur in the long run.

ONE OF LOWEST GROWTH RATES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Thailand’s level of inequality has long been one of the highest in Southeast Asia. The problem is rooted in policies and institutions that existed before the Prayut government. Yet the recent years have played a big part in fuelling people’s resentment of the military-backed government.

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Commentary: To dispel war talk, US and China must forge a new understanding on Taiwan

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To better understand the situation, a bit of history is in order. From 1979 when China and the US re-established diplomatic ties until the start of the Donald Trump administration in 2017, both countries had largely managed the Taiwan issue well as Washington promised to refrain from official relations and to restrain Taiwan from pursuing independence. Meanwhile, the US continued to sell arms to the island under the Taiwan Relations Act, to which China lodged strong protests but did nothing else.

From China’s view, the relative calm over Taiwan was shattered after Trump launched a trade war against China in 2018 and China hawks in the administration started to play the Taiwan card, sending bilateral ties spiralling.

Joe Biden’s administration continued to play the Taiwan card as senior legislators, including then US Congress speaker Nancy Pelosi and legislators from Europe, visited Taipei and met the Taiwanese president and other leaders.

To Beijing, those visits were a clear breach of bilateral agreements. Biden further muddied the waters by talking at least four times about defending Taiwan while insisting the US does not support its independence.

Moreover, over the past few years, the US has succeeded in internationalising the Taiwan issue, which Beijing considers an internal affair. These developments, in Beijing’s view, have galvanised the pro-independence movement in Taiwan.

Hence, Beijing’s more fevered rhetoric and military exercises are aimed at deterring the pro-independence camp.

If polls are any guide, Taiwanese Vice President William Lai Ching-te, who once called himself a “pragmatic worker for Taiwanese independence”, is the favourite to become president in the election scheduled for next January.

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Commentary: What’s behind MUDA’s move to go it alone in Malaysia state elections?

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PICK OF SEATS

Second, for a party premised on popular participation and innovation, MUDA can ill-afford to wait in the interstices indefinitely. The only way to broaden the party’s image beyond Saddiq is for MUDA to field more candidates and have them accumulate their own track records.

To be fair, the party is associated with consistent stances on issues such as Undi-18, anti-corruption, and term limits for office holders. Last, those accusing MUDA of personality politics can be accused of letting their gaze stray past the mirror.

Third, MUDA’s recent electoral performance is on par with PH component parties. Its subordinate position in seat negotiations meant it was fielded in challenging seats. For example, its seven seats in the Johor election included UMNO bastions such as Parit Raja and Machap.

Indeed, MUDA’s win in the mixed Puteri Wangsa seat was by a handsome 7,000 majority. Syed Saddiq’s narrow victory in Muar in November 2022 was also no mean feat, given the intense competition from a senior Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) cleric on the one hand and a youth-friendly UMNO candidate on the other.

Campaigning for the upcoming elections has yet to begin and MUDA can now pick seats at its leisure. Freed from PH, it may be able to leverage its social media capabilities and craft a compelling campaign narrative.

In line with its “third force” label, it would do well to pick a manageable selection of seats from both PH and PN strongholds. While the party will find a better reception in Selangor and Negri Sembilan, it also needs to venture into seats in states like Kedah and Terengganu. Focusing only on urban and mixed seats would undercut its narrative of seeking to be a national youth-focused party.

While the divorce makes sense for both ex-partners, MUDA and Pakatan Harapan may yet cooperate again after the elections. In Malaysia’s new, more competitive political panorama, parties and coalitions increasingly contest elections independently before forging post-election compromises.

Given their more compatible worldviews, a subsequent reconciliation is possible. And, in an era where narrow majorities in Parliament and state assemblies are increasingly frequent, the upstart party may yet be a kingmaker.

Francis E Hutchinson is Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Malaysia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the Institute’s blog Fulcrum.

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