Commentary: Thailand has a new PM but Pheu Thai will have a political price to pay for it

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THAKSIN’S FUTURE

A crucial portfolio to watch is the justice ministry which oversees the criminal justice system, the powerful Department of Special Investigation and the Department of Corrections, which is responsible for keeping prisoners in custody.

Pheu Thai will want to ensure that Thaksin is kept safe and gets the necessary medical treatment while serving his sentence, and to deter political rivals from opening new cases that could end up extending his eight-year jail term.

On the other hand, the conservatives likely suspect that Pheu Thai could be tempted to meddle in the justice system to shorten Thaksin’s sentence and pave a way for his political rehabilitation.

All things considered, this is unlikely – at least in the next few months.

Pheu Thai will want to focus on consolidating power amid considerable public disenchantment. Mr Srettha will almost certainly come under pressure to do something to help Thaksin, but he may seek to dissuade and placate them through other means to preserve his job.

Deal or no deal, nobody should rule out Thaksin reasserting himself as a nexus of political power akin to the days of old. He has shown his enduring influence in Pheu Thai and the strength of his family’s personal brand.

Once the present economic travails subside, Pheu Thai might conceivably explore options to revive Thaksin’s clout. Pheu Thai will likely need it to combat public support for the MFP as a genuinely democratic force ahead of the 2028 election and Thaksin will be motivated to secure a bright political future for his daughter Paetongtarn.

Any misstep could still give the conservatives and the military a convenient pretext to call an abrupt end to this strange and unprecedented partnership.

Harrison Cheng is a Director in risk consultancy firm Control Risks.

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Commentary: The curious tales of defectors to North Korea

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UNHAPPY NEW LIVES

In reality, many North Korean defectors face countless challenges ranging from integrating into a fast-paced, modern society to difficulty finding stable jobs and making ends meet. According to a 2022 survey published by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), North Korean defectors earn about 74.4 per cent of the average income of salaried South Korean employees.

In addition, defectors often experience discrimination. A 2017 poll showed that nearly half of all defectors living in the South felt discriminated against due to their economic status (16 per cent), level of education (14.4 per cent), or region of origin (12.2 per cent).

Many South Koreans see their North Korean counterparts as “a cultural other”, reluctantly tolerating their presence while never fully accepting them as a “normal” member of society. Despite sharing a common history, language, ethnicity and traditions, North Koreans often feel like “strangers in a strange land” once they enter South Korea.

In fact, some would rather return to North Korea altogether. According to the 2022 NKDB report, 18.8 per cent of surveyed defectors said they had thought about going back to the North. Another survey published the same year by the Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies showed that 18.5 per cent of North Korean defectors expressed that they “regret” moving to South Korea.

The reasons for this are several, including wanting to see family and friends, difficulty integrating into South Korean society, unfair treatment, and the need for greater emotional support. The lack of community in the South is a particular reason why some defectors consider returning to their homeland.

However, there are also cases where defectors have been tricked by brokers who paint South Korea as a land of opportunity and wealth. These North Koreans have demanded to be repatriated to the North once they have realised the realities of living in the South.

The cases of Kim Ryon-hui, 48, and Kwon Cheol-nam, 44, fall under this category and made headlines in 2017. Moreover, although official statistics only identify 29 re-defectors, this figure is likely to be much higher as the whereabouts of around 900 defectors were reportedly unknown as of 2017.

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Commentary: Japan’s Fukushima wastewater release plan is about nuclear diplomacy as much as science

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HUMAN FEARS AND ANXIETIES ABOUT ALL THINGS NUCLEAR

Despite the scientific endorsement, very little is known in the public regarding the effects of radiation. Fears and anxieties persist – it is only human.

The concerns are largely on the environmental impact and degradation of marine ecology, as well as the risks to human health.

Tritium emits beta radiation, but this cannot penetrate human skin. The concern lies with the ingestion of affected seafood, which is why outcry within Japan has stemmed mainly from its fishery industry.

As a precaution, Japan has stepped up monitoring of radiation levels in nearby affected waters and will test fishery products before they are released to the consumer market. However, such precautionary measures are not foolproof and people worry that contaminated fish and seafood could arrive on the dining table.

Another contributing factor is TEPCO’s lack of transparency regarding the management of the Fukushima wastewater. 

In 2011, prior to the ALPS treatment process introduced in 2013, TEPCO discharged tonnes of untreated, highly radioactive wastewater into the Pacific Ocean, drawing huge criticisms about their irresponsible behaviour. TEPCO had also denied claims of repeated leakages to the groundwater, which led to the flow of radioactive nuclides into the ocean.   

Given TEPCO’s disrepute, several experts remained sceptical that the ALPS-treated water was safe and below the acceptable threshold for discharge. As such, TEPCO should first demonstrate the trustworthiness of its organisation before going all out to convince the international community to accept its “science-based” approach. 

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Commentary: Cybertrooper activity in state elections marks irreversible trend in Malaysia politics

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PN CYBERTROOPERS

PN’s cybertroopers dominated Facebook and built most of their political campaigning around firebrand characters, particularly caretaker Chief Minister of Kedah, Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor.

Prior to the elections, police arrested Sanusi after he allegedly insulted local royalty in a TikTok video. During the campaign, there were several controversies involving Sanusi, most notably with the Minister of Home Affairs on the issue of rare earth element theft and with the caretaker Chief Minister of Selangor, who threatened to sue Sanusi.

In both cases, PN cybertroopers defended Sanusi and presented PH-BN as an abusive government that silenced its critics by curtailing the freedom of speech and abusing lawsuits. 

In the final week of campaigning, two major issues became a focus of cybertroopers: An incident involving Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim at an event with local pre-university students and a televised debate between Minister of Economics Affairs Rafizi Ramli and the PAS MP for Bachok Syahir Sulaiman on economic plans for Malaysia.

In the first, Anwar was accused of being condescending and rude in his response to a student’s question regarding the racial quota system in tertiary education while in the second, Syahir was seen as losing the debate as his presentation was poor, with flawed and under-developed arguments. 

PH-BN and PN cybertroopers were quick to engage in both these episodes to spin the story in their side’s favour. In defence of Anwar, PH-BN cybertroopers focused on highlighting that the original video was intentionally edited to embarrass Anwar and emphasising that the PM was right to chide the student.

On the other hand, PN cybertroopers, in manipulating public opinion, accepted that Syahir performed poorly but sought to minimise the debate by calling it a waste of time and claiming that it would not affect the election. 

Cybertroopers are not meant to flip political viewpoints but to entrench them; they cast doubt on valid political viewpoints and pre-emptively shut down debate or distort it. In all the examples of online fighting between PH-BN and PN cybertroopers, both sides were adamant that their side was faultless and the other could do no right.

The upshot is that their growing presence is causing Malaysian voters to become even more polarised and fragmented in real life, leaving neutral voters disenfranchised, as they are pushed out of online discourse.

Benjamin YH Loh is Visiting Fellow of the Media, Technology and Society Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Senior Lecturer at Taylor’s University, Malaysia. Sarah Ali is a PhD candidate at the Gender Studies Programme at Universiti Malaya. This commentary first appeared on ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s blog, Fulcrum.

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Commentary: The challenges facing Malaysia’s opposition as it works up to GE16

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WHAT NOW FOR BERSATU?

Bersatu’s challenges are more existential. 

The party is a breakaway from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), which had ruled Malaysia for more than six decades before being booted out of power in 2018. It was formed in September 2016 after Mr Muhyiddin and former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad abandoned UMNO following a political fallout with Malaysia’s now-jailed former prime minister and UMNO president, Najib Razak.

Without a powerbase, the party now faces an uphill task to remain politically relevant until the next general election. 

The party’s leadership is grappling with legal troubles over charges of corruption that are bound to be a serious distraction to performing as a credible opposition and staying cohesive. Apart from Mr Muhyiddin, opposition leader Hamzah Zainuddin and Azmin Ali, a former senior politician in Mr Anwar’s Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) party, Bersatu does not have a second echelon leadership line-up. 

Separately, a new dynamic is taking shape in Malaysian politics. 

The last two general elections in Malaysia featured contests between three broad political forces. In the 2018 general election, the fight was between the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, PH and PAS, while the polls in November 2022, saw fights between PH, BN and PN. 

Last weekend’s state assembly elections featured straight fights between Mr Anwar’s unity government that now includes UMMO and BN against the PN. 

To emerge as a serious alternative, the PN coalition must find something other than the disenchantment among the Malay community towards establishing a national political footprint.

Leslie Lopez is a senior correspondent at CNA Digital who reports on political and economic affairs in the region.

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Commentary: Japan and South Korea look to the future, for a change

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RAPPROCHMENT MUST OUTLAST CURRENT LEADERS

Though Yoon deserves the plaudits that will accompany a successful summit (at least in Tokyo and Washington, if not at home), success will, ironically, only be confirmed if this thaw can outlast him. The leaders are all too aware of what tends to happen historically: A change of leadership in Seoul, a return to a focus on prior feuds and more distrust on both sides. 

That’s what happened to the “final and irreversible” 2015 agreement on comfort women, a euphemism for those trafficked to army brothels during Imperial Japan’s occupation, which the government of Yoon’s predecessor, Moon Jae-in, swiftly abandoned. It gummed up the gears of relations for years, with the nations engaging in tit-for-tat trade disputes. 

Biden’s presence has helped provide a backdrop of stability that is a marked difference to his predecessor’s haphazard foreign policy in Asia. But there’s a real chance that Donald Trump might return to the White House, bringing one or both of his “fire and fury” or “love letter” approaches to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Yoon’s presidency runs until 2027, but he’s limited to this one term; and though the Japanese public admires how Kishida has handled the South Korea matter, his domestic support is flagging. While personal ties between leaders are important, this relationship must survive once the three men have departed office. 

BALANCING CHINA AND US

Despite what Beijing’s mouthpieces might say, there’s no talk of forming an Asian North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) just yet.

The steps likely to be announced this weekend are tamer, such as making the summit an annual event and setting up a three-way hotline between Japan, South Korea and the US.

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Commentary: Prabowo gathers momentum in the race to succeed Indonesian PM Jokowi

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CANBERRA: You have to give credit to Indonesian President Joko Widodo for his commitment to the old cliche that Javanese politicians like to communicate their intentions through symbols and hints. With presidential elections six months away, Jokowi has painstakingly avoided an explicit endorsement of any candidate.

Yet it’s become the worst-kept secret in Jakarta that the president increasingly sees advantage in having his defence minister, Prabowo Subianto, succeed him in 2024.

The aura of being Jokowi’s favoured successor matters because he approaches his last year in office with his approval ratings just above 80 per cent, an all-time high.

Benign economic conditions have helped a lot. Indonesia’s GDP grew by 5.2 per cent from July 2022 to July 2023, with inflation at just 3 per cent over the same period. Corruption, informality and inequality still weigh on Indonesia’s economic potential, but for the average voter, the Widodo-era economy has expanded economic opportunities, increased availability of cash transfers and subsidised health care.

Prabowo now polls just ahead of Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo in a three-way race that includes the opposition’s candidate, former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan, who’s failed to gain traction.

Ganjar, a member of the nationalist PDI-P party like Widodo, is burdened by his close association with PDI-P chair and former president Megawati Soekarnoputri, an electorally polarising figure with whom Jokowi has a tense relationship.

Prabowo remains the fallback option for voters who now prefer Anies. Polls predict that he would win if Anies fails to make it onto the ballot and would prevail in a June runoff should Anies be eliminated in the first round of voting in February.

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Commentary: What’s driving record-high youth unemployment in China?

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MISMATCH IN CHINA’S JOB MARKET

The significant surge in colleague graduates contributes towards an imbalance between supply and demand in China’s job market.

Regulatory tightening on segments of the economy since 2021 has had a negative impact on youth employment, such as those on the platform sector, for-profit tutoring, and video-gaming.

There has been growing interest to join the public sector through civil service exams, indicating a changing preference for government jobs and a loosening labour market. Indeed, the number of persons aged 35 and below registered for the civil service exam rose from 1.4 million in 2019 to 2.5 million in 2023.

Beyond the above, social change also plays a role in China’s youth employment.

Facing the weakening economy and contracting job market, some Chinese youth have adopted passive lifestyles. They may choose to lie flat (tang ping), let it rot (bai lan), or become full-time children to live with and take care of their parents. Concurrently, some may make efforts to seek employment, take up part-time jobs, or undergo career training.

As these trends become the norm in Chinese cities, there may be more social tolerance for young people who opt out of the competitive job market or the ladder towards professional success. At present, however, the precise impact of such gradual societal changes on youth unemployment is hard to estimate.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

Responding to rising youth unemployment, the Chinese government has taken new measures such as providing job opening information online and on-site, training programmes for job-hunting and one-time subsidies to companies that employ new graduates.

Authorities are also promoting self-employment by easing regulations. Some cities, such as Shenzhen, Lanzhou and Hangzhou, have permitted street vendors and hawkers, once banned because they were considered unsightly, to operate in certain areas.

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Commentary: Malaysia’s state elections – when referendum takes precedence over reformasi

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PN’S MALAY REFERENDUM NARRATIVE

PN further entrenched the image that it has replaced the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) as the Malays’ spokesperson. Avoiding the “3-3” or “status quo” description of the election results, PN supporters prefer to compare the total number of seats it won vis-a-vis PH and BN and the inroads it made in the Malay majority seats. This is in line with its Malay referendum narrative.

PN’s performance was far superior: Of the 245 seats on offer in the six states, PN won 146 against PH’s 80 and BN’s 19. PN remains ahead even with PH and BN combined.

And to add insult to injury, PN did way better than BN, which only won 19 out of the 108 seats it contested. In this election, only UMNO contested on behalf of BN; its Chinese and Indian partners, the Malaysian Chinese Association and Malaysian Indian Congress respectively, sat it out.  

Solid victories in Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah have strengthened PN’s Malay referendum narrative. The signs of PN’s progress were already seen in GE15 when PN swept all Kelantan and Terengganu parliament seats, and won 14 out of 15 seats in Kedah.

Traditionally, the contest in these Malay-dominant states was between UMNO and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), and the former could still win some seats, or form the government in Terengganu and Kedah.

In this series of state elections, PH lost all 32 seats it contested in Terengganu, won only two of 45 seats in Kelantan, and three out of 36 in Kedah. UMNO’s big guns were defeated in the process.

The Malay unity message PN played during the campaign brought together former rivals and Malay-Muslim nationalist leaders Mahathir Mohamad, Hadi Awang, and Muhyiddin Yassin. This consolidated PN’s hold in the Malay belt.

The Malay referendum narrative also gained traction in PH-BN’s strongholds in Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Penang. PN increased its seats in Selangor from five to 22, and the increase came from Malay-majority constituencies. It also denied PH-BN the two-thirds majority in the state. PN also made significant inroads in Penang, a PH (DAP) stronghold, by securing 11 seats.

This is quite a coup, considering that PAS (now in PN) only managed to secure one seat in 2018. BN could only win two seats in Penang. Rubbing salt into Anwar’s wounds, Muhyiddin stressed that PN won all three seats in the Permatang Pauh parliament constituency, traditionally the prime minister’s and his family’s seat until the last general election.

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Commentary: The heirs and spares of Thailand’s monarchy

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King Vajiralongkorn’s only royally titled son – 18-year-old Prince Dipangkorn Rasmijoti – is, according to unofficial reports, autistic and “mentally challenged”. Even if true, this might not impede his ability to perform regal functions when the time comes. However, there could be a role for a trusted, relatively young, family member to help him.

In any event, given the issues facing his two half-sisters, one of the prince’s four half-brothers as a ”spare” may be a wise bet.

HOPE OF A FAMILY RAPPROCHEMENT

For their part, the four estranged sons have long stated their desire to return to Thailand. In 2016, after the death of their grandfather King Bhumibol Adulyadej, they expressed their respect for, and loyalty to, their father as the new king on a now-restricted Facebook page.

The visit’s prominent coverage in the Thai media raises hopes of a family rapprochement. Previously, the press airbrushed the four out of reporting on the king’s family. That said, limits remain. Even now, the Thai press does not mention the other two brothers by name. And it is coy on why they have remained abroad for so long.

More importantly, were the royal connections of the four to be restored, it would give greater certainty to the reigning Chakri dynasty. The 71-year-old monarch has no acknowledged grandchildren. And there are no signs that either of his unmarried daughters will be having any in the foreseeable future, certainly not in the next few years.

Absent his four US-based sons, this puts the onus on 18-year-old Prince Dipangkorn to maintain the family line.

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