Commentary: The Myanmar military is losing control

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Changes in military expenditure in the post-2011 transition also created an imbalance among the infantry, naval and air forces. Since 2006, Myanmar’s military equipment expenditures have favoured the navy and air force, though the military’s main challenge is counterinsurgency (that is, handled by the army).

The military’s share of the 2011 budget (at 23.6 per cent) – approved by the State Peace and Development Council before the transfer of power – was US$2 billion. This coincided with plans to expand the air force by purchasing MiG-29s while the navy was buying submarines from Russia, India and China.

These big-ticket acquirements came at the expense of the army: Soldiers deployed to the frontlines now are reportedly using bamboo baskets as backpacks. What’s more, the army’s reported 522 ground-troop battalions are understaffed.

TARNISHED CREDIBILITY

These past policy decisions are now coming home to roost. The Myanmar army keenly feels the loss of strongholds such as Mongko and Kunlong, which previous cohorts of soldiers had wrested from the CPB in 1967-68 and 1989. Recent Facebook updates by Operation 1027 forces show ethnic armed organisation soldiers marching into a Myanmar army base at Kunlong, where abandoned tanks, truck-mounted rocket launchers, and even Howitzers are visible.

Even if the SAC and Myanmar army recognise the root causes for the current turn of events after Operation 1027, it may be a case of too little, too late. The Myanmar army’s credibility has likely been tarnished, in the eyes of its supporters and detractors.

Wai Moe is a former Burmese political prisoner turned journalist. He was also a Visiting Fellow with the Myanmar Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s blog, Fulcrum.

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Commentary: Taiwan opposition parties’ joint election bid is an opportunity for China

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OPPOSITION LEADERS FAR MORE PALATABLE FOR CHINA

The two opposition party candidates could change the tone of the relationship. KMT’s Hou has campaigned on the fact that he is the one who will improve cross-strait relations, and open up dialogue between the two sides. He’s been clear about supporting the 1992 consensus, a vague understanding between the Communist Party of China and the KMT, where both sides agree they belong to the same country, even if they disagree on what that means. 

Meanwhile, TPP’s Ko says he will use “deterrence and communication” as his China policy, and simultaneously increase defence spending, while engaging in with Beijing. 

Both would be far more palatable for China to deal with than DPP’s Lai.

There is no guarantee of course that they will win, nor is it clear which of the two will lead the alliance. An announcement is expected Saturday.

Even if a KMT/TPP government might ease cross-straits tensions temporarily, it will “eventually have to fend off pressures from Beijing to venture into more difficult political discussions, which will be a hard-sell domestically,” Ivy Kwek, China Fellow with the International Crisis Group, says. 

Those difficult discussions will no doubt focus on how much control China has over what goes on in Taiwan, although neither of the opposition parties have suggested in any way the island’s sovereignty is up for grabs – it would be politically foolish to do that.  

But if avoiding a Chinese invasion and reducing tensions in the Taiwan Strait is the objective, then the island’s opposition parties may present the best possible shot at that yet – as long as they keep the electorate’s distinct identity in mind.  

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Commentary: The G20’s approach to debt has failed

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CHINA HAS A DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING OF COMMON FRAMEWORK

It is by now clear however that China either had a very different understanding of the Common Framework’s terms or wasn’t serious when signing up to them.

Common rules, especially around comparability of treatment, are essential to being able to move forward complex debt restructuring negotiations involving a multitude of official and private sector creditors. And the longer the process takes, the more economic damage tends to befall the defaulting country (and the lower its likely ability to repay its creditors anyway).

Real discussion of how this is expected to work in practice is only occurring now, through a working group steered by the IMF, World Bank and India, the current G20 president.

It remains to be seen how the recommendations, including on comparability of treatment, will be implemented. Even then, they are non-binding, leaving country negotiations to continue on a case-by-case basis – defying the whole point of having a unified framework in the first place.

When it comes to China’s role, two key issues of consistency stand out.

First, China seems to want to pick and choose when its policy banks – which have led its Belt and Road lending – are considered official or commercial lenders. For example, in Sri Lanka, China has accepted that the China Development Bank be treated as an official lender whereas in Zambia, it has argued that the bank is a commercial creditor (and thereby likely subject to smaller losses).

A second problem is that China is highly reluctant to take a haircut on its loans, preferring to defer debt repayments instead. In doing so, China is effectively trying to treat the various debt crises it is caught up in as mere problems of illiquidity, rather than the insolvency problems that they really are.

For instance, China has deferred Laos’ scheduled debt repayments four consecutive times between 2020 and 2023 but has yet to recognise that the country is virtually insolvent. Meanwhile, the Lao government’s most recent revenue strategy has consisted of selling off state assets.

For the Common Framework to remain relevant, it must be explicit on how and what a country and its creditors need to do when it is insolvent.

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Commentary: Conviction is but one hurdle in Malaysian MP Syed Saddiq’s political journey

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DIVIDED PUBLIC REACTION

When the news of Syed Saddiq’s conviction hit early last week, the public reaction was bifurcated.

In the eyes of his ardent supporters, Syed Saddiq can do no wrong. They might see his conviction as politically motivated, as he previously refused to join the Sheraton Move and has become a fierce critic of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s unity government.

In September, MUDA left Mr Anwar’s coalition, as it was concerned the government was “normalising the culture of corruption” by dropping graft charges against Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi.

To his detractors, however, Syed Saddiq is an embarrassment to the reformist cause not only due to his recent conviction, but because MUDA is viewed as a vote spoiler in elections. 

Syed Saddiq duly resigned from MUDA presidency after his conviction, but the party has for some time been in political limbo. Prior to the Aug 12 state elections, MUDA’s efforts to form a coalition with PH were futile, and it ran for the elections solo. It lost in all 19 seats it contested, and most candidates did not secure enough votes to reclaim their electoral deposits.

Indeed, MUDA touts youthful, progressive freshness as its selling point. But it is preaching to a shrinking well-educated, urban voter audience that has been divvied up by several PH component parties, leaving little room for MUDA.

Ironically, it was precisely Syed Saddiq’s lowering of voting age to 18 that ushered in an expanded cohort of young but conservative, often religiously driven voters who prefer PAS’ theocratic appeal, crowding out their progressive counterparts who are anyway captured by PH and not MUDA.

Syed Saddiq’s immediate political prospects look bleak, as he would be preoccupied with fighting his criminal appeals over the next few years, which could see him in jail if exhausted. 

But Syed Saddiq has youth on his side, and in the context of Malaysia’s fragmented political landscape, a future comeback must not be ruled out.

A few observers have depicted Syed Saddiq’s conviction as a milestone for the government’s anti-corruption drive. But more accurately, it is testament to Malaysia’s emboldened judicial independence. Recent months have seen a number of senior politicians alternately been acquitted or made to answer charges, apparently on the merits of their cases.

Moving forward, Malaysia’s politics is likely to remain unstable, as elite struggles intertwine with demographic shifts.

Oh Ei Sun is a senior fellow with the Singapore Institute of International Affairs.

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Commentary: Fighting cybercrime to win China’s favour has become a common goal in Myanmar’s civil war

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UNIFYING CONCERN IN MYANMAR’S CIVIL WAR

China’s resolute commitment to combat transnational criminal networks sends a clear signal to all stakeholders in Myanmar’s ongoing civil war to address the issue of transnational crimes proactively.

Despite the SAC’s criticism of the movie, the junta has collaborated with China to combat cybercrimes. In September 2023, the SAC extradited thousands of Chinese nationals linked to these unlawful operations back to China.

Despite enduring a series of military setbacks in the wake of the surprise offensive conducted by the MNDAA and its allies in October, the SAC persists in placing transnational crimes at the forefront of its negotiation agenda with their Chinese counterparts. This helps the diplomatically isolated junta to retain the support of China.

The SAC also wants to leverage China’s influence on ethnic armed groups, which is vital to prevent the northern Shan state crisis from escalating. The SAC is also willing to violate Myanmar’s foreign policy by allowing Chinese special police forces to operate within the country in a desperate effort to maintain ties with China.

The SAC is not alone in seeking to curry favour with China. The United Wa State Army, one of the largest ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, has repatriated thousands of offenders to China to maintain its close economic ties with the country.

Similarly, the MNDAA’s expressed goal of seeking to free the Kokang region from the influence of criminal syndicates and cyberscams appears to be an attempt to secure China’s tacit approval for the new offensive. Taken together, it appears that warring factions in Myanmar’s civil war are now engaged in a race to eradicate cybercrimes, vying to garner favour from China.

For China, the successful cross-border actions present a substantial public relations coup, enabling it to burnish its image as a champion of justice and security in the region – a narrative of immense potential that Beijing cannot afford to disregard. This may motivate all parties in Myanmar’s civil war to maintain their efforts against cybercrime. In an unexpected twist, cybercrime has become a unifying concern in Myanmar’s civil war.

Kyi Sin is a Research Officer at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the institute’s blog, Fulcrum.

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Commentary: Foxconn founder Terry Gou’s presidential candidacy may shift Taiwan’s political landscape

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THE FUTURE OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

For a sizeable segment of the Taiwanese electorate, the 2024 election significantly influences the nation’s future stance on cross-strait relations. While the election holds personal significance for Gou, his initial endorsement of the Kuomintang candidate, followed by his independent bid, accentuates the volatile nature of political allegiances and underscores the elevated significance of this presidential contest.

Despite the limited prospect of a Gou-led presidency, the potential significance of his political influence cannot be brushed aside. Securing substantial support before the election might not get him the presidency but could position him as a kingmaker. Such a position might prove instrumental in resolving any deadlock within the opposition, ensuring that Gou’s candidate clinches the presidency.

Gou’s recent campaign efforts display a shrewdness in communication strategies. It involves a play on the phonetic qualities of his Chinese name, implying the English expression of “good timing”. This manoeuvre subtly invites support, suggesting that now is the opportune moment to rally to his cause.

If this envisioned change in governance remains unfulfilled, questions arise about whether Gou’s strategic moves serve the greater good of Taiwan. Given the current state of Taiwan’s political climate, this may be the only time Gou can establish a favourable political position.

Should he drop out of the race and join the opposition party, Gou may secure a place in the new government and a strong position to pursue future political ambitions.

Aligning with opposition parties could lead to a broad coalition achieving victory in January 2024, potentially enabling a peaceful transition into a new Taiwanese administration focused on improving cross-strait relations. Amid heightened tensions with China, reopening proper dialogue channels will contribute to securing a safer climate for continued de facto Taiwanese sovereignty.

Big elections are often won on small margins. Even if Gou only commands 5 per cent to 10 per cent of the vote, this could push a coalition partner to victory. It will all come down to whether Gou can settle for being the kingmaker, or if he truly believes he can become the king.

Dennis LC Weng is Associate Professor of Political Science at Sam Houston State University and Founding Chief Executive Officer of the Asia Pacific Peace Research Institute. Jared Jeter is a master’s student at National Chengchi University and Research Associate at the Asia Pacific Peace Research Institute. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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Commentary: For a digital detox, Japan seeks ‘The Way of the Sauna’

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Online guides dictate how much time one needs to spend in a sauna of what temperature (between 80 and 100 degrees Celsius, or 176 to 212 Fahrenheit), how long to endure the heat before subjecting oneself to a cold plunge, as well as the correct number of times to repeat the cycle to achieve totonou.

A bewildering array of terms transmogrified into Japanese from various European languages, from aufguss to loyly, create the impression of a sophisticated hobby, like wine collecting, that rewards dedication and study.

In the English-speaking West, sauna culture seems the province of meatheaded podcast bros and overbearing tech entrepreneurs. Not so in Japan, where polls indicate it’s equally as popular with women as men. Friends recommended it not for its physical health benefits, but for the mental, with one acquaintance going so far as to liken totonou to getting high.

In search of psychological clarity, if nothing else, I visited one of the trendy new facilities in Tokyo’s Shibuya district. I followed the rituals as written: Ten minutes or so in the sauna; a minute in the cold plunge pool; another quarter of an hour taking in fresh air and awaiting inspiration.

Nothing happened. I felt as likely to catch a cold as find inner peace. Was the sauna not hot enough? Had I chickened out of the frigid bath too early? I needed to go further.

NEED FOR RELAXATION

I reached out to the man most directly responsible for the recent craze, manga artist Katsuki Tanaka. He began writing about saunas in 2009, having become hooked on the experience after joining his local gym, and copying what he saw others do. His columns eventually became a collection of essays entitled Sado, a play on the word for tea ceremony, but using a different character to mean “The Way of the Sauna”.

That became a hit comic book and in 2019 was turned into a TV show, all of which helped inspire the current trend. In the process, he popularised the sauna rituals and coined the word totonou. Then came COVID-19, which turbocharged the need for facilities where people could get away from life’s cares.

“Spending so much time at home, surrounded by information on computers and smartphones, unable to go abroad, makes people want an experience that will satisfy your five senses,” Tanaka says. “Our lifestyles have hugely changed in the last few years.”

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Commentary: Malaysia opposition party PAS has a long-term plan to go its own way

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PAS did not defend Bersatu when its renegade members chose to support the Unity Government. In the mind of PAS leaders, this was not unexpected; after all, Bersatu is a party built by defectors. The marginalisation of Bersatu in the SG4 executive councils is a signal of PAS’ intent of building internal strength instead of relying on partners to deliver their part.

AN UPHILL BATTLE

Apart from these focus areas, PAS will likely continue to deepen its community roots like it has always done in the northeast of West Malaysia. The only difference is that it would focus on projecting an urban and modern image, such as setting up a “super app” with functions such as an e-wallet.

It remains an uphill battle for PAS. The SG4 are among the poorest states in Malaysia, with the lowest household income and highest poverty incidence.

Kelantan and its water woes for the past few years were a clear standout. At the party congress, the Kelantan chief minister, Mohd Nassuruddin Daud, struggled to cite good examples of PAS’ governing success, besides providing interest-free loans for cheap housing.

At the same time, PAS’ insular thinking about non-Malays would likely yield little returns. The Nik Aziz slogan of “PAS For All” still rings hollow under Abdul Hadi’s leadership, which is defined by the dangerous amplification of racial rhetoric.

It would be a mistake to assume that PAS’ strategy could work in the short term, but it would be a bigger mistake to assume that PAS is not placing bets on the long term. After all, without long-term thinking, it would not have survived a half-century in opposition and ended up where it is today.

James Chai is a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and a columnist for MalaysiaKini and Sin Chew Daily. This commentary first appeared on the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s blog, Fulcrum. Continue Reading

Commentary: Russia’s memory diplomacy is paying dividends in Southeast Asia

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MANUFACTURED REMEMORIES

Even if World War II thoughts are created, it is difficult but not impossible. When their defense ministers unveiled an Allies Of Myanmar Warriors monument in Moscow’s Patriot Park in August to commemorate the Battle of Mandalay in early 1945, Myanmar and Russia did exactly that.

Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Defense Minister, stated at the opening ceremony that it was crucial to” preserve and protect the reality of true history” and that Burma and the Soviet Union had worked together to put an end to fascism( a term that is already popular in the Kremlin because it has accused the Russian leadership of being Nazis ). One of the men in the statue is shown holding a rifle from the Soviet Union.

In actuality, Moscow did not offer Burma any defense support during the conflict.

The Cold War is a more fertile ground for Moscow’s memory delicacy in Southeast Asia because it was during the time of superpower conflict that the Soviet Union supported republican movements in the area.

The Kremlin’s enormous military and financial contributions to Vietnam and Laos during the Cold War continue to be the cornerstone of both nations’ relations with Russia.

Senior Asian leaders always mention Moscow’s” heartfelt help” for Vietnam in its” fight for national independence and reconciliation ,” as Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh just did.

A statue honoring Russian aircraft who killed Burmese pilot training in the 1970s was unveiled in Vientiane in 2022. The storage of the heroic deed performed by the Russian pilots will be in the minds of both peoples, according to the Russian ambassador to Laos.

Earlier in the 1960s, weapons payments from the Soviet Union to Indonesia helped the Sukarno government defeat the Dutch and annex Papua.

The construction of the Khmer-Soviet Friendship Hospital in Phnom Penh is one example of how Russia frequently uses the meager support it currently provides to Southeast Asia to preserve the memory of Communist support.

Moscow’s remembrance of politics in the case of Thailand, which sided with America during the Cold War, dates back to the late 19th centuries, when the royal households of Imperial Russia and the Kingdom of Siam developed near personal relationships. Tsar Nicholas II is credited with preventing Siam from being colonized by Britain and France in both Russian and Vietnamese tales. The Russians are often eager to embellish this historical fact.

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Commentary: Israel-Hamas war puts China’s strategy of ‘balanced diplomacy’ in the Middle East at risk

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The Israel-Hamas war, which has so far been centered around the idea of” balanced diplomacy ,” is, in my opinion, the sternest test however of President Xi Jinping’s Middle East strategy, as a professor who teaches courses on Chinese foreign policy.

Growing pro-Palestinian opinion in China and the nation’s long-standing ties to the area imply that, should Xi be forced off the path of fairness, he will support the Palestinians rather than the Israelis.

Beijing, however, may prefer not to make that decision for smart economical and foreign policy considerations. Making such a decision, in my opinion, would effectively put an end to China’s ten-year effort to establish itself as an influential” helpful plumber” in the area— an outside force that aims to mediate peace agreements and establish an incredibly diverse regional economic and security purchase.

BEIJING’S Techniques AND Goals

China was not the country that invested in the Middle East, contrary to what was widely believed in political circles ages ago. This hasn’t been the case since around 2012. Since then, China has invested a lot of political effort in expanding its influence in the area.

China’s strategic vision for the Middle East is considerably enhanced while the US influence is greatly reduced in Beijing.

On the one hand, this is merely a geographical expression of the world vision, as outlined in dozens of Chinese foreign policy initiatives, including the Community of Common Destiny, Global Development Initiative, and Global Security Initiative. All of these initiatives are intended, at least in part, to appeal to nations in the Global South that feel extremely cut off from the US-led rules-based global order.

It is a perspective based on worries that China’s entry to the Middle East oil and gas exports would be threatened if the United States maintained its control there.

That does not imply that Beijing wants to overthrow the United States as the region’s dominant force. Given the strength of the money and the US’s long-standing ties to some major economies in the region, that is impossible.

Instead, China’s stated strategy is to encourage regional multi-alignment, which encourags unique nations to cooperate with China in areas like infrastructure and industry. By doing this, China and other players in the area are strengthened, and any incentives to add unique US-led blocs are also undermined.Continue Reading