Commentary: Thai PM’s first 100 days in office follow a populist path

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Economic populism might struggle to address the root causes of Thailand’s economic woes: Issues like falling investor confidence also touch on political stability, the rule of law and transparency – underlying structural issues crucial for sustained growth. Industry leaders have called for more sector-specific strategies for economic recovery, including for long-term vision for a resilient tourism industry.

Thailand’s economy grew less than expected in the third quarter (1.5 per cent), reflecting sluggish exports and reduced post-pandemic government spending.

Still, household consumption grew 8.1 per cent and private sector investment accelerated. The National Economic and Social Development Council forecasts a 2.5 per cent growth in gross domestic product for the year.

Populist strategies may have had some positive impact, but relying on consumption-focused policies for growth isn’t a magic bullet. A resilient economy requires diversity, considering risks like inflation, climate change and pandemics.

PHEU THAI’S FLAGSHIP DIGITAL HANDOUT PLAN

One measure that stands out is the Thai government’s flagship 10,000 baht (US$277) digital cash handout, totalling US$14 billion or about 3 per cent of GDP. Mr Srettha said this marked “the beginning of Thailand’s economic shift”.

Eligibility is set at age 16 and above, which emphasises inclusivity, with a cap on monthly income or bank savings added on after much public criticism. About 50 million Thais, of a population of more than 70 million, are expected to receive the payment.

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Commentary: Malaysia opposition leader Muhyiddin pulls off shrewd political move with ’24-hour resignation’

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More Bersatu MPs may jump ship now that it is clear the anti-hopping does not work in practice. There are rumours that another three or four opposition MPs may switch their support to Mr Anwar before the end of this year, with the incentive simply the ability to access government funding for their constituency.

This would have increased political pressure on Muhyiddin to take political responsibility for losing the MPs. But after the Bersatu Supreme Council’s swift rejection of his decision to step down, Muhyiddin has confirmation that he is safe politically.

ANYTHING CAN HAPPEN BETWEEN NOW AND 2027

Muhyiddin’s “24-hour resignation” was a shrewd political move. He has emerged stronger politically after the annual party congress when it could easily have turned against him.

More importantly, he is now in pole position to retain the presidency in Bersatu internal elections next year. If he wins without a challenger, then all he has to do is to wait for the next general election, due by 2027 at the latest.

If PN wins that election, then he will break Mahathir’s record as a second-time prime minister.

The bad news, of course, is that Malaysian politics is wholly unpredictable. Anything can happen between now and 2027.

But Muhyiddin’s political stunt ensures that no matter what happens over the next four years, he will remain a major player in Malaysian politics.

James Chin is Professor of Asian Studies at the University of Tasmania and Senior Fellow at the Jeffrey Cheah Institute on Southeast Asia.

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Commentary: India is making too many disasters in the Himalayas

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WHAT’S BEHIND NARENDRA MODI’S VISION?

The highway the workers were building was part of a giant new network meant to connect four revered mountain temples more than 3,000m above sea level. These hilltop shrines have long been major destinations for pilgrims – and are prized in part precisely because of their inaccessibility. But Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose populist politics often blends religious symbolism and large-scale development projects, was determined to build a 900km network of motorways so the temples could be reached all year round.

It isn’t just populism at work, though: The fact that India’s giant northern neighbour has built a dense supportive infrastructure alongside its side of the disputed border is another motivation. Indian and Chinese troops have regularly clashed in the Himalayas, and relations have deteriorated sharply since 20 Indian soldiers were killed in one such skirmish in 2020.

When India’s Supreme Court intervened to reduce the width of some new stretches of mountain road, the defense ministry insisted that they needed to be at least 10m wide, presumably so that they could more effectively ferry troops and armor to the border. India is at a disadvantage here: Its side of the border is jagged, rough country. Chinese troops, meanwhile, have a smoother ride up to their side, since it’s relatively easier to built roads and rail on the Tibetan plateau.

Finally, the need to diversify energy sources away from fossil fuels has pushed Indian authorities into building and expanding hydroelectric projects elsewhere in the Himalayas, particularly in the country’s northeast.

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Commentary: Malaysia PM Anwar’s first year in power is marked with wins and warnings

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KUALA LUMPUR: From the get-go, there had been questions about how long Mr Anwar Ibrahim would be able to last as Malaysia’s prime minister.

His decades-long quest for the top seat kept getting thwarted, and he spent several stints in prison on charges he has described as politically motivated.

Finally, after several twists and turns in last year’s general election that resulted in a hung parliament, the Malaysian king stepped in and Mr Anwar was sworn in as the country’s 10th prime minister on Nov 24.

After a noisy 12 months of politics, Mr Anwar has consolidated power to command a strong majority in parliament, giving him a clear runway to the remainder of his five-year mandate.

Malaysia under the Anwar administration has been the most stable since the May 2018 general election that led to a revolving door of governments and three prime ministers. The so-called unity government led by Mr Anwar’s multi-racial Pakatan Harapan (PH) alliance currently enjoys a two-thirds majority in the country’s 222-member Parliament, a margin last seen in 2008.

In the past few weeks, a growing number of opposition MPs from Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) have publicly declared their support for Mr Anwar’s unity government.

Now, Mr Anwar’s main challenges are to crank up economic expansion, deliver on job growth and tackle cost of living pressures that together have become a toxic cocktail spreading disillusionment among ordinary Malaysians with his administration.

All of this will require fresh approaches.

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Commentary: The Myanmar military is losing control

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Changes in military expenditure in the post-2011 transition also created an imbalance among the infantry, naval and air forces. Since 2006, Myanmar’s military equipment expenditures have favoured the navy and air force, though the military’s main challenge is counterinsurgency (that is, handled by the army).

The military’s share of the 2011 budget (at 23.6 per cent) – approved by the State Peace and Development Council before the transfer of power – was US$2 billion. This coincided with plans to expand the air force by purchasing MiG-29s while the navy was buying submarines from Russia, India and China.

These big-ticket acquirements came at the expense of the army: Soldiers deployed to the frontlines now are reportedly using bamboo baskets as backpacks. What’s more, the army’s reported 522 ground-troop battalions are understaffed.

TARNISHED CREDIBILITY

These past policy decisions are now coming home to roost. The Myanmar army keenly feels the loss of strongholds such as Mongko and Kunlong, which previous cohorts of soldiers had wrested from the CPB in 1967-68 and 1989. Recent Facebook updates by Operation 1027 forces show ethnic armed organisation soldiers marching into a Myanmar army base at Kunlong, where abandoned tanks, truck-mounted rocket launchers, and even Howitzers are visible.

Even if the SAC and Myanmar army recognise the root causes for the current turn of events after Operation 1027, it may be a case of too little, too late. The Myanmar army’s credibility has likely been tarnished, in the eyes of its supporters and detractors.

Wai Moe is a former Burmese political prisoner turned journalist. He was also a Visiting Fellow with the Myanmar Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s blog, Fulcrum.

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Commentary: Taiwan opposition parties’ joint election bid is an opportunity for China

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OPPOSITION LEADERS FAR MORE PALATABLE FOR CHINA

The two opposition party candidates could change the tone of the relationship. KMT’s Hou has campaigned on the fact that he is the one who will improve cross-strait relations, and open up dialogue between the two sides. He’s been clear about supporting the 1992 consensus, a vague understanding between the Communist Party of China and the KMT, where both sides agree they belong to the same country, even if they disagree on what that means. 

Meanwhile, TPP’s Ko says he will use “deterrence and communication” as his China policy, and simultaneously increase defence spending, while engaging in with Beijing. 

Both would be far more palatable for China to deal with than DPP’s Lai.

There is no guarantee of course that they will win, nor is it clear which of the two will lead the alliance. An announcement is expected Saturday.

Even if a KMT/TPP government might ease cross-straits tensions temporarily, it will “eventually have to fend off pressures from Beijing to venture into more difficult political discussions, which will be a hard-sell domestically,” Ivy Kwek, China Fellow with the International Crisis Group, says. 

Those difficult discussions will no doubt focus on how much control China has over what goes on in Taiwan, although neither of the opposition parties have suggested in any way the island’s sovereignty is up for grabs – it would be politically foolish to do that.  

But if avoiding a Chinese invasion and reducing tensions in the Taiwan Strait is the objective, then the island’s opposition parties may present the best possible shot at that yet – as long as they keep the electorate’s distinct identity in mind.  

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Commentary: The G20’s approach to debt has failed

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CHINA HAS A DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING OF COMMON FRAMEWORK

It is by now clear however that China either had a very different understanding of the Common Framework’s terms or wasn’t serious when signing up to them.

Common rules, especially around comparability of treatment, are essential to being able to move forward complex debt restructuring negotiations involving a multitude of official and private sector creditors. And the longer the process takes, the more economic damage tends to befall the defaulting country (and the lower its likely ability to repay its creditors anyway).

Real discussion of how this is expected to work in practice is only occurring now, through a working group steered by the IMF, World Bank and India, the current G20 president.

It remains to be seen how the recommendations, including on comparability of treatment, will be implemented. Even then, they are non-binding, leaving country negotiations to continue on a case-by-case basis – defying the whole point of having a unified framework in the first place.

When it comes to China’s role, two key issues of consistency stand out.

First, China seems to want to pick and choose when its policy banks – which have led its Belt and Road lending – are considered official or commercial lenders. For example, in Sri Lanka, China has accepted that the China Development Bank be treated as an official lender whereas in Zambia, it has argued that the bank is a commercial creditor (and thereby likely subject to smaller losses).

A second problem is that China is highly reluctant to take a haircut on its loans, preferring to defer debt repayments instead. In doing so, China is effectively trying to treat the various debt crises it is caught up in as mere problems of illiquidity, rather than the insolvency problems that they really are.

For instance, China has deferred Laos’ scheduled debt repayments four consecutive times between 2020 and 2023 but has yet to recognise that the country is virtually insolvent. Meanwhile, the Lao government’s most recent revenue strategy has consisted of selling off state assets.

For the Common Framework to remain relevant, it must be explicit on how and what a country and its creditors need to do when it is insolvent.

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Commentary: Conviction is but one hurdle in Malaysian MP Syed Saddiq’s political journey

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DIVIDED PUBLIC REACTION

When the news of Syed Saddiq’s conviction hit early last week, the public reaction was bifurcated.

In the eyes of his ardent supporters, Syed Saddiq can do no wrong. They might see his conviction as politically motivated, as he previously refused to join the Sheraton Move and has become a fierce critic of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s unity government.

In September, MUDA left Mr Anwar’s coalition, as it was concerned the government was “normalising the culture of corruption” by dropping graft charges against Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi.

To his detractors, however, Syed Saddiq is an embarrassment to the reformist cause not only due to his recent conviction, but because MUDA is viewed as a vote spoiler in elections. 

Syed Saddiq duly resigned from MUDA presidency after his conviction, but the party has for some time been in political limbo. Prior to the Aug 12 state elections, MUDA’s efforts to form a coalition with PH were futile, and it ran for the elections solo. It lost in all 19 seats it contested, and most candidates did not secure enough votes to reclaim their electoral deposits.

Indeed, MUDA touts youthful, progressive freshness as its selling point. But it is preaching to a shrinking well-educated, urban voter audience that has been divvied up by several PH component parties, leaving little room for MUDA.

Ironically, it was precisely Syed Saddiq’s lowering of voting age to 18 that ushered in an expanded cohort of young but conservative, often religiously driven voters who prefer PAS’ theocratic appeal, crowding out their progressive counterparts who are anyway captured by PH and not MUDA.

Syed Saddiq’s immediate political prospects look bleak, as he would be preoccupied with fighting his criminal appeals over the next few years, which could see him in jail if exhausted. 

But Syed Saddiq has youth on his side, and in the context of Malaysia’s fragmented political landscape, a future comeback must not be ruled out.

A few observers have depicted Syed Saddiq’s conviction as a milestone for the government’s anti-corruption drive. But more accurately, it is testament to Malaysia’s emboldened judicial independence. Recent months have seen a number of senior politicians alternately been acquitted or made to answer charges, apparently on the merits of their cases.

Moving forward, Malaysia’s politics is likely to remain unstable, as elite struggles intertwine with demographic shifts.

Oh Ei Sun is a senior fellow with the Singapore Institute of International Affairs.

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Commentary: Fighting cybercrime to win China’s favour has become a common goal in Myanmar’s civil war

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UNIFYING CONCERN IN MYANMAR’S CIVIL WAR

China’s resolute commitment to combat transnational criminal networks sends a clear signal to all stakeholders in Myanmar’s ongoing civil war to address the issue of transnational crimes proactively.

Despite the SAC’s criticism of the movie, the junta has collaborated with China to combat cybercrimes. In September 2023, the SAC extradited thousands of Chinese nationals linked to these unlawful operations back to China.

Despite enduring a series of military setbacks in the wake of the surprise offensive conducted by the MNDAA and its allies in October, the SAC persists in placing transnational crimes at the forefront of its negotiation agenda with their Chinese counterparts. This helps the diplomatically isolated junta to retain the support of China.

The SAC also wants to leverage China’s influence on ethnic armed groups, which is vital to prevent the northern Shan state crisis from escalating. The SAC is also willing to violate Myanmar’s foreign policy by allowing Chinese special police forces to operate within the country in a desperate effort to maintain ties with China.

The SAC is not alone in seeking to curry favour with China. The United Wa State Army, one of the largest ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, has repatriated thousands of offenders to China to maintain its close economic ties with the country.

Similarly, the MNDAA’s expressed goal of seeking to free the Kokang region from the influence of criminal syndicates and cyberscams appears to be an attempt to secure China’s tacit approval for the new offensive. Taken together, it appears that warring factions in Myanmar’s civil war are now engaged in a race to eradicate cybercrimes, vying to garner favour from China.

For China, the successful cross-border actions present a substantial public relations coup, enabling it to burnish its image as a champion of justice and security in the region – a narrative of immense potential that Beijing cannot afford to disregard. This may motivate all parties in Myanmar’s civil war to maintain their efforts against cybercrime. In an unexpected twist, cybercrime has become a unifying concern in Myanmar’s civil war.

Kyi Sin is a Research Officer at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the institute’s blog, Fulcrum.

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Commentary: Foxconn founder Terry Gou’s presidential candidacy may shift Taiwan’s political landscape

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THE FUTURE OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

For a sizeable segment of the Taiwanese electorate, the 2024 election significantly influences the nation’s future stance on cross-strait relations. While the election holds personal significance for Gou, his initial endorsement of the Kuomintang candidate, followed by his independent bid, accentuates the volatile nature of political allegiances and underscores the elevated significance of this presidential contest.

Despite the limited prospect of a Gou-led presidency, the potential significance of his political influence cannot be brushed aside. Securing substantial support before the election might not get him the presidency but could position him as a kingmaker. Such a position might prove instrumental in resolving any deadlock within the opposition, ensuring that Gou’s candidate clinches the presidency.

Gou’s recent campaign efforts display a shrewdness in communication strategies. It involves a play on the phonetic qualities of his Chinese name, implying the English expression of “good timing”. This manoeuvre subtly invites support, suggesting that now is the opportune moment to rally to his cause.

If this envisioned change in governance remains unfulfilled, questions arise about whether Gou’s strategic moves serve the greater good of Taiwan. Given the current state of Taiwan’s political climate, this may be the only time Gou can establish a favourable political position.

Should he drop out of the race and join the opposition party, Gou may secure a place in the new government and a strong position to pursue future political ambitions.

Aligning with opposition parties could lead to a broad coalition achieving victory in January 2024, potentially enabling a peaceful transition into a new Taiwanese administration focused on improving cross-strait relations. Amid heightened tensions with China, reopening proper dialogue channels will contribute to securing a safer climate for continued de facto Taiwanese sovereignty.

Big elections are often won on small margins. Even if Gou only commands 5 per cent to 10 per cent of the vote, this could push a coalition partner to victory. It will all come down to whether Gou can settle for being the kingmaker, or if he truly believes he can become the king.

Dennis LC Weng is Associate Professor of Political Science at Sam Houston State University and Founding Chief Executive Officer of the Asia Pacific Peace Research Institute. Jared Jeter is a master’s student at National Chengchi University and Research Associate at the Asia Pacific Peace Research Institute. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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