Commentary: The missing piece in Malaysia’s muddled Bumiputera governance debate

KUALA LUMPUR: Ethnic Malay interests remain front and centre in Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Malaysia Madani. An uptick in ethnic polarisation and a poor showing by parties from Anwar’s unity government in Malay-majority seats in 2023’s state elections leave the administration under pressure to shore up Malay support.

To that end, the Malaysian government will be wheeling out a Bumiputera economic congress in January 2024 (Bumiputera, meaning “sons of the soil” in Malay, is an official term for Malays and indigenous ethnic communities).

Decades after the inception of the New Economic Policy affirmative action program and its various reincarnations, Anwar has flagged the need to review the use of Malay corporate equity as the yardstick of Bumiputera empowerment and move towards a “participation rate and … control of the Bumiputera economy (that are) more meaningful”.

This is a step in the right direction. Malaysia’s muddled Bumiputera empowerment plans and metrics are in dire need of change.

Championing Malay corporate equity is historically synonymous with Bumiputera empowerment. But the approach fails to empower the Malay majority and sidelines vulnerable communities while enriching the politically connected.

UPROAR OVER BOUSTEAD PLANTATIONS SALE

Yet the recent uproar over the arranged sale of Boustead Plantations (BPlant) – a Bumiputera government-linked company (or GLC, denoting part or whole state ownership) – to the primarily Malaysian Chinese-owned multinational company Kuala Lumpur Kepong suggests two things.

First, securing buy-in for non-equity metrics will be an uphill battle because of political sensitivities. Second, significant issues, such as the principal-agent problem in Bumiputera empowerment agendas, remain unaddressed.

The government extended financial lifelines to the Armed Forces Fund Board (LTAT) in October. LTAT is a government-linked investment company (GLIC) legally mandated to provide retirement earnings to Malaysia’s military personnel through profits generated via the GLCs in which it – or LTAT’s holding company Boustead Holdings – holds stakes.

The roster of GLCs includes BPlant, Boustead Naval Shipyards and Pharmaniaga – all of which have added to LTAT’s financial woes by underperforming, due to mismanagement and corruption.

Successive CEOs have undertaken asset fire-sales and divestments to alleviate LTAT’s debts and improve cash flow, most recently through BPlant’s sale to Kuala Lumpur Kepong. But this acquisition was cancelled at the last minute. While LTAT did not clarify why, several factors suggest that racial optics deterred the acquisition.

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Commentary: ASEAN leadership needed when US is distracted by wars and election

There are few visible efforts from Southeast Asian capitals to invest in updating the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) so that it can more effectively perform its existing mandate in a more contested and uncertain world. Otherwise, committing to at least starting ASEAN reform or the development of related Southeast Asia-based mechanisms would seem like a reasonable approach to evolving conditions.

There is a tendency among regional actors to look at ad hoc bi-lateral or mini-lateral arrangements involving both regional and extra-regional actors to address economic and security needs. Examples include Cambodia and Thailand’s enhanced bilateral military cooperation with China, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework as well as the Malacca Strait and Sulu Sea patrols. Ironically, this could result in more of the global and regional fragmentation many Southeast Asian capitals seek to avoid.

SOUTHEAST ASIA HAS A CHOICE TO MAKE

Both Southeast and Northeast Asia historically gained from a United States committed to supporting economic liberalisation and stability, along with a China that came around to accepting and gaining from this arrangement from the late 1970s.

Not all people benefitted from the liberal order advanced by their actions. The Korean War, the three Indochina Wars, China’s support for the Khmer Rouge, as well as the excesses of anti-communism and the War on Terror underscore the very real human costs that came with the prosperity and partial stability.

Whatever its faults, the liberal, rules-based order is now under challenge. Both the United States and China are now more suspicious of each other’s intentions, with the former looking more inward and toward its allies on economic and security terms, even as the latter focuses on its domestic economy and resisting external pressure.

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Commentary: The first debate unveils the character of Indonesia’s 2024 presidential campaign

THE ROUND ONE WINNER IS …

The inaugural debate focused on six themes: Law, human rights, governance, corruption eradication, bureaucratic reform and the fortification of democracy. Moderated by two hosts, the event featured 11 panelists comprising subject matter experts who had meticulously formulated the debate questions and were responsible for randomly picking questions for the three candidates to address.

The participants could pose selected questions to one another and there were some heated exchanges, mainly between Prabowo and Anies. However, in a display of political finesse, all three seasoned politicians adeptly navigated the harder questions without providing definitive answers.

In this author’s view, the standout performance of the night belonged to Anies Baswedan, who presented himself as a candidate advocating for change. He appeared assertive and went on the offensive early, clearly positioning himself as a catalyst for transformation.

Leveraging his intellectual background, Anies was exceptionally at ease and energetic in the debate. He skillfully incorporated data to bolster his arguments. By making “change” the central theme and mission of his campaign, Anies strategically drew a sharp contrast between himself and President Jokowi’s administration, establishing himself as a formidable opposition figure.

On the flip side, Prabowo Subianto appeared defensive, particularly when addressing his first question on past human rights violations in Papua and Anies’ challenge to him on the Constitutional Court’s decision allowing Gibran to run as a vice-presidential contender.

Answering the charge that he was behind the kidnappings of pro-democracy activists in 1997-98, Prabowo countered that those problems had already been resolved. He bluntly asserted that even democracy activists who were once victims of kidnappings now supported him. An activist who was imprisoned during the New Order era, Budiman Sudjatmiko, former head of the leftist People’s Democratic Party, visibly endorsed Prabowo by raising his hand from the audience stand at that point.

Ganjar Pranowo assumed a middle ground and appeared somewhat uncertain about his stance, while avoiding drawing sharp contrasts with Jokowi. Ganjar’s positioning, seemingly vying for the role of Jokowi’s successor against Prabowo, might prove risky in the election. Ganjar’s debate performance lacked memorable moments even though he seemed at ease and confident, as it left voters with little to recall.

Prabowo and Anies undeniably commanded the stage. When Anies further probed Prabowo’s human rights record, it revealed Prabowo’s quick temper and tendency to condescend. Near the end of the debate, Prabowo defiantly declared he did not fear losing power. To the audience’s (albeit mainly his supporters) delight, he mocked Anies at least twice by shaking his head when addressing him, and even engaging in a gesture from his “goyang gemoy” dance.

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Commentary: A tale of two (or more) prime ministers in Thailand

Whatever path Srettha chooses, he must tread carefully. Failure to achieve significant accomplishments, such as the implementation of the ambitious digital wallet scheme, could jeopardise his position as prime minister. Yet, if he exceeds expectations, particularly on the domestic front, he may also face the risk of being replaced, as his successful performance could overshadow Paetongtarn and delay her rise to the premiership.

Furthermore, if Srettha aligns himself too closely with Thaksin, he could face significant public backlash, much like Yingluck. Her government’s attempt to pass a controversial amnesty Bill, which would have allowed Thaksin to return home without facing charges, resulted in widespread protests and, eventually, the 2014 coup d’etat.

On the other hand, if Srettha treads too carefully and does little to please the Shinawatras, he may find himself left in the cold, similar to Samak whose bid to return to power in 2008 after being dislodged by the Constitutional Court was thwarted by his party’s decision to nominate Somchai Wongsawat as his replacement.

Ultimately, Srettha’s lifeline, setting him apart from all previous Thaksinite parties’ prime ministers, may be his status as a political outsider and a classic Thai elite background that places him closer to the traditional centres of power in Thai society – a status that not even Thaksin can lay claim to. The rest depends on his political acumen to leverage this trait, which, as of now, he has demonstrated only indirectly.

Napon Jatusripitak is Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the Institute’s blog, Fulcrum.

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Snap Insight: Malaysia PM Anwar’s new Cabinet choices display his strengthened political hand

THE KEY SEATS

The appointment of technocrat Amir Hamzah Azizan, who stepped down as CEO of the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) to take up the position of second finance minister, will provide the operational support at the ministry, while Mr Anwar can ensure that the management of the national cash register does not become open to the rent-seeking practices of the past that led to many financial scandals, such as the fiasco at state-owned 1Malaysia Development Bhd (1MDB).

The breaking up of the Communications and Digital Ministry, with seasoned elected Member of Parliament Gobind Singh Deo heading the newly minted Digital Minister, is a reflection of the government’s determination to become more aggressive in the digitalisation of the national economy. 

Fahmi Fadzil will continue to lead the communications arms, which Mr Anwar recently acknowledged needed more improvement, particularly in communicating national policies to the public.

Mr Anwar also broke up the Ministry of National Resource and Climate Change that was headed by a loyalist, Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, who will now lead the newly formed Ministry of Natural Resource and Sustainability.

Fadhillah Yusof, one of Malaysia’s two deputy prime ministers and a powerful politician from the Sarawak state, has been appointed to the new portfolio of energy transition and public utilities, while remaining in charge of the affairs of Borneo states that include Sabah.

Mr Anwar added depth to the new line-up with the appointment of Johari Abdul Ghani, a powerful politician from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), to the Plantation and Commodities Ministry that was previously headed by Mr Fadhillah.

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Commentary: Japan’s Kishida needs to learn from ‘jujitsu PM’ to face political scandal

A MAJOR POLITICAL SCANDAL

When compared to the enormous wealth in US politics, Japanese funding scandals can often seem hilariously minor, such as that of Abe-era justice minister Midori Matsushima, who resigned after the sin of handing out paper fans to constituents.

The “kickback” affair, however, is already much bigger: Senior officials are accused of concealing political funds, with Tokyo prosecutors leading the investigation.

James Brady of advisory firm Teneo says it “could become the most wide-ranging scandal since the ‘Recruit’ affair,” referring to the insider trading episode of the late 1980s that cost prime minister Noboru Takeshita and his entire Cabinet their jobs – and later helped hand the LDP its first election loss a few years later. 

In the current affair, the crosshairs have most recently landed on Hirokazu Matsuno, who as chief Cabinet secretary holds the second most important role in government. He’s reported to have not disclosed some ¥10 million (US$69,000) in donations. Matsuno hails from the faction headed by Shinzo Abe before his death; other senior figures from the faction are also believed to be involved. 

True to form, despite his lack of direct involvement, Kishida has already unnecessarily inserted himself in the scandal by stepping down from his party faction – creating an air of impropriety where none seemingly exists.

If the affair continues to run, Kishida’s already disastrous polling numbers could sink to single digits. Reports indicate that he will respond by removing not just Matsuno, but all ministers and senior officials from the Abe faction, including trade minister Yasutoshi Nishimura.

But as leader, the public might saddle Kishida with the blame nonetheless. Time to consider taking some jujitsu lessons. 

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Commentary: North Korea electoral reform prompts speculation of Kim Jong Un grooming his daughter for succession

KIM JONG IL’S ASCENT TO POWER

The first leader in the Kim dynasty, Kim Il Sung, began to groom his son Kim Jong Il for power in the early 1970s when he was in his early 30s. He was named number two in the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in the party in September 1973 and elected to the political bureau of the party’s central committee in February 1974.

Kim Jong Il spent the next few years consolidating his political power and in October 1980, at the 6th Congress of the KWP, he was officially designated as successor to his father.

In September 1991 Kim Jong Il was named as supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, while in 1992, Kim Il Sung publicly stated that his son was in charge of all internal affairs in the Democratic People’s Republic. Kim Jong Il made his first public speech in 1992.

So by 1994, when Kim Il Sung died at the age of 82, his son had been deliberately and carefully groomed with all three arms of the trinity: The army, the party and the people.

NOT AS SMOOTH A SUCCESSION FOR KIM JONG UN

But the succession was not as smooth for Kim Jong Un as his father’s death in 2011 was sudden and unexpected.

Kim Jong Il began to groom his third son for the leadership in 2002, passing over two older sons. Eldest son Kim Jong Nam was disqualified because his mother was originally from South Korea and some of her family members had defected. For a time it seemed as if second son Kim Jong Chol would be named as the successor, but it is thought he was passed over because of a lack of ambition.

There were concerns about Kim Jong Un. Under North Korea’s rigid caste system, the songbun, Ko Yong Hui, mother of Kim Jong Un was from the lowest tier, being born in Japan of Korean stock. It has been reported that Kim Jong Il tried to remove official records to obscure her inappropriate origins.

Having been educated at an international school in Switzerland, Kim Jong Un attended the National War College in Pyongyang from 2002 to 2007. Reports of Kim Jong Un being groomed for the leadership began to emerge in 2008 and in 2010 he was appointed as the equivalent of a four-star general and attended the KWP’s 65th-anniversary celebration with his father.

When Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, his son’s training had not been completed and his position was vulnerable. He moved quickly to take control of both military and party.

Over the next few years, Kim Jong Un consolidated his position with a series of purges, including that of his uncle Jang Song Thaek, who had acted as regent after Kim Jong Il’s death and was reported to have been executed by firing squad as Kim Jong Un “removed the scum” from the KWP.

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Commentary: It’s a pity Malaysia backed down from its bold generational smoking ban

NO BRILLIANT ACTION FOR PUBLIC Heath

For the sake of people health, the new independent tobacco law is required but refrains from being strong. The tobacco final policy, which has been openly discussed for more than a year, is now woefully absent from the approved Bill.

By 2040, Malaysia hopes to be smoke-free, which is typically defined by researchers from around the world as lowering the prevalence of smoking to less than 5 %. How will that get accomplished, though?

According to Malaysia’s federal health survey in 2019, more than 20 % of Malaysian people, or nearly 5 million people, smoke. The old cigarette controls have not been effective. According to research, other actions, such as lowering the nicotine content of marijuana to non-addictive levels, may contribute to the creation of a smoke-free environment.

Prior Indonesian governments should include outlawed vaping when it first appeared in the early 2010s while focusing on reducing cigarette smoking. After his authorities refused to outlaw smoking, former health minister Khairy Jamaluddin is credited with thinking outside the box and suggesting the intergenerational finale determine as a compromise.

According to Dr. Zaliha, the government did not rule out the possibility of re-introducing the intergenerational endgame provision in the future if necessary. However, putting it off right nowadays is a missed chance.

Malaysia’s goal should be achieving tobacco endgame targets, no just controlling smoking products, given that the government has called for healthcare reforms. Without a desire to stop smoking, many wellness accomplishments may simply result in smoke.

Older freelance health journalist Loh Foon Fong resides in Malaysia.

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Commentary: Myanmar’s military stares at defeat as rebel forces go on the offensive

A LITTLE LOVE FOR THE MILITARY Commanders OF MYANMAR

The dictatorship has imprisoned close to 20,000 people and forced almost 1 million people to live in internal displacement since the coup in February 2021. The dictator’s four-cut plan to crush opposition terrorizes the general populace. There is n’t much affection for the generals because the junta has used its air force to attack civilian targets in order to keep power.

Additionally, the rebels ‘ quick success in taking control of a number of Tatmadaw bases has allowed them to obtain more weapons and ammunition. According to the most recent images and videos on social media, rebel forces have even taken weaponry and armored vehicles. In upcoming bombardments, these could be used against the Tatmadaw.

On the field, the rebel troops are in charge. The Tatmadaw are compelled to abandon various positions and retreat on numerous fronts. Military theory contends that freedom of action forces the opponent to adhere to one’s target and rate, making taking the initiative crucial.

But when faced with reality, theory you whither. Does the Tatmadaw regain the effort to plan a successful defense, then launch counterattacks to retake territory? This process appears to be impractical at the moment.

It appears that the Tatmadaw is stretched too far. In addition to fighting the rebels, the coup also faces oppositional troops in areas under its control, as evidenced by the death of one of its allies in Yangon.

According to a new study, the Tatmadaw have about 150 000 soldiers, with 70 000 of them serving in battle units. To put the numbers into perspective, during the height of the Vietnam War, the United States sent roughly 500,000 soldiers to Vietnam.

Even though the two problems are not ideal historic comparisons, it aids in demonstrating the scope of the regime’s difficulty. Given that Myanmar is spatially larger than Vietnam and is dotted with dense jungles and mountains, the Tatmadaw is engaged in a continuous conflict with rebel forces all over the nation.

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Commentary: How Qatar became mediator in the Gaza war

ALL-ROUND INTEGRATION

First, it has no history as a colonial power, so it comes with none of the baggage that inevitably accompanies peacemaking efforts by, say, Britain, France or the US. And, as a small Gulf state that doesn’t publicly align itself intimately with Washington, Moscow or Beijing, its mediation efforts are less likely to draw “great power” suspicion or criticism.

But – perhaps more importantly – Qatar’s position as regional mediator is a byproduct of its wealth management, investment capacity and its extensive and complex business connections, including personal connections in the Middle East, North Africa and particularly to the US.

The US is Qatar’s largest foreign direct investor. US exports to Qatar increased by more than 42 per cent between 2021 and 2022, totalling US$3.7 billion in 2019.

Neoliberal globalisation advocated for open markets, global distribution of production and deregulated financial markets. Qatar has wholeheartedly embraced this in its transition to a multi-faceted economy, no longer wholly dependent on revenue from hydrocarbon production.

It has been a success story. In per capita income, Qatar is now one of the top ten richest countries in the world and the wealthiest in the Arab world, with a per capita gross domestic product of US$88,046 compared to the US at US$75,269 and the United Kingdom at US$45,485.

Significantly, given the conflict in Ukraine which has highlighted the need for European countries to diversify their energy supplies, Qatar is the second largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the world, with some 85 per cent of its export earnings coming from hydrocarbons. Investing the resulting trade surplus in America government debt has led to mutual interdependency between its economy and that of the US.

The more the Qatari economy is intertwined with global supply chains, the more alert its diplomacy has become in providing solutions to thorny – especially regional – conflicts.

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