Commentary: Titanic sub – why is extreme ‘frontier travel’ booming despite the risks?

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In many instances that danger remains, but the commercial transaction strips away the perceived risks involved. Marketing materials aim to sell “safe” adventures, with the risks often listed in the fine print. A polar plunge in Antarctica, for instance, is often marketed as safe because participants are attached to a tether and the swim time is limited to prevent hypothermia.

Two decades ago, in forecasting the growth of space tourism, anthropologist Valene Smith said what tourists want, the industry will provide. This has become a truism, as the Titan voyages demonstrate.

The massive growth of frontier tourism could lead to even greater problems if the industry doesn’t respond in the right way. If travellers are going to expose themselves to extreme risks, whose responsibility is it, then, to ensure their safety and recovery should accidents occur?

Many tourism businesses and travel insurance companies make risks known to their guests. But regulations on disclosing risks differ between countries. This means travellers may have to evaluate the risks themselves, and this is fraught with danger if company standards are low.

One solution is frontier tourism might be best experienced in controlled and safe environments through digital storytelling or augmented and mixed reality. However, this may not be enough to satisfy the adrenaline junkies out there.

As the Titan incident illustrates, the unpredictable nature and unintended consequences of frontier tourism are very real things. While money can allow us to travel almost anywhere, it’s worth considering whether some places should just remain untouched, sacred and off-limits completely.

Anne Hardy, Can Seng Ooi and Hanne E F Nielsen are academics at University of Tasmania. Joseph M Cheer is Professor of Sustainable Tourism and Heritage, Western Sydney University. This commentary first appeared on The Conversation.

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Commentary: What to make of Biden’s bewildering remark equating Xi to “dictators”?

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Mr Biden’s words may rankle, but so did the Wall Street Journal report immediately following Mr Blinken’s visit that China plans to open a military training facility in Cuba, about 145km from the Florida coast. Nothing about Blinken-Xi meeting should suggest that US and China will neglect to pursue their own interests. 

WHEN IS A GAFFE NOT A GAFFE?

Mr Biden’s “dictator” remark is against protocol, and to the extent that it makes some of his goals vis-a-vis relations with China more difficult to achieve, a mistake. However, it is very much in keeping with his more general view about China and US interests. 

For Mr Biden, a central tenet of his foreign policy is that the competition between democracies and autocracies is a primary global struggle that will define the future, and that both America and the world are better off and more secure with a strong US capable of rallying democratic allies to meet contemporary challenges. 

Thus, while Mr Biden’s choice of language is ill-advised, it highlights the divide he sees between the US and China.

There is no question that words can stoke tensions. Mr Biden’s statement that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid if China were to launch an unprovoked attack annoys Beijing and sends US diplomats and aides into a frenzy of clarification that US policy on “One China” has not changed. 

Yet, having repeated the same “misstatement” on several occasions, Mr Biden is sending a message of a more assertive US foreign policy.

BIDEN’S REMARKS PLAY WELL DOMESTICALLY

While such messages are potentially destabilising for foreign policy, it is important to remember that they usually play well to a domestic audience. Mr Biden’s remark are unlikely to give him problems at home.

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Snap Insight: What progress did US Secretary of State Blinken make in China visit?

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Topics such as Taiwan, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, setting guardrails (especially for the US) and de-risking (instead of “decoupling”, since eschewed by US and G7 leaders) would all be on the agenda.

A breakthrough is unlikely, given the current lack of trust, but being able to “sense-make” the other in understanding how these issues are being spoken about might provide clues as to what policy steps may be possible moving forward.

In other words, a meeting – even in the absence of any clear policy outcomes – between both sides is better than refusing to meet, at the risk of further misunderstandings or suspicions towards one another. As Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said when he met Mr Blinken in Washington DC on Saturday, the trip was “essential, but not sufficient”.

We are likely to witness more cycles of ups and downs. Both sides will have their own political calculations to make. So, anxious as the rest of the world may be when it comes to US-China relations, we should not be overly excited about the prospect of change nor be exasperated if things do not move the way we expect.

The hope now is that Mr Blinken’s visit will pave the way for more conversation between Mr Xi and Mr Biden after the two leaders last met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in November 2022. Ultimately, staying in the conversation is still better than not.

Benjamin Ho is an assistant professor and coordinator of the China Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

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Commentary: Why investigating China for COVID-19 biowarfare allegations pose challenges

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The interesting thing about the new report is not just that it says it has new evidence, but that it claims its data shows Chinese scientists were researching coronaviruses in relation to biowarfare. Biowarfare is the deliberate use of disease and biological agents to cause harm.

A US investigator is quoted in the article as asserting that Chinese scientists were working on a vaccine. The allegation is that the Chinese military wanted a vaccine to inoculate their own population if they ever wanted to use the virus for biowarfare. With a vaccine, says the report, China “might have a weapon to shift the balance of world power”.

Claims that China was developing biological weapons have been made by Dany Shoham, a former Israeli intelligence officer and biowarfare expert. Others staunchly reject this accusation. A US National Intelligence Council report said of COVID-19: “We judge the virus was not developed as a biological weapon.”

NEXT STEPS – MORE DATA?

So, what could the rest of the world do about these new allegations – if anything?

The dispute over whether COVID-19 was created by Chinese scientists is still as hot as ever. States may feel they need more information.

We have already seen something similar happen in Syria in relation to chemical weapons, which are said to have been used during the conflict there. Despite the former US president Barack Obama calling the use of chemical weapons a “red line”, Washington said it did not wish to act until they felt the evidence of chemical warfare was incontrovertible.

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Commentary: Does China have the chops to play peacemaker in the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

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China has maintained an active presence in wider diplomatic endeavours in an effort to legitimise its role as a mediator.

Encouraging endorsements from international figures, such as the leaders of France, Brazil and Spain, aid China’s aspirations to facilitate a ceasefire. China’s special envoy on Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, has been on a diplomatic marathon, engaging with key stakeholders in Ukraine, Poland, France, Germany and Russia.

While these deliberate diplomatic interventions have not yet yielded substantive outcomes, they highlight China’s commitment to resolving the conflict.

But playing a mediator role could be a high-stakes gamble for China. Both Russia and Ukraine hold entrenched positions and the requisite conditions for dialogue – a genuine commitment to negotiation and a ceasefire – are missing. While there’s a certain plausibility to Xi’s assertion that “dialogue and negotiations are the only viable way forward”, it contrasts with the United States’ decision to back its allies in training Ukrainian forces to operate F-16 fighter jets.

The US move to enable the supply of Western jets to Ukraine could intensify the conflict and render Beijing’s mediation efforts futile, casting a shadow over China’s image as a peace broker.

While the culmination of China’s mediation efforts remains uncertain, the success of China’s role in resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict depends on its diplomatic capabilities and the dynamics of global politics. The international community is keenly observing China’s careful diplomatic manoeuvring amid the escalating tensions.

The tangible impact and effectiveness of China’s mediation will ultimately be evaluated on the basis of its ability to bring about a swift and peaceful resolution to the conflict – a metric that underscores the urgency of solving this international crisis.

Xiaoli Guo is Visiting Fellow at the Australian Centre on China at the World at The Australian National University. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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Commentary: Tokyo could win ‘not China’ global hub status – but it must want it

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It does not matter, in this theory, whether you call what is happening “decoupling”, or sand its edges and call it “de-risking”. Business is reshaping, finance will follow and in historic realignment, runs the logic of avarice, there is always historic opportunity.

This type of conversation plays as sweet music to the promoters of Tokyo’s ambitions as a global financial centre: A strangely skeletal and necessarily patient lobby whose zeal has traditionally risen in inverse proportion to any serious signals of success. 

Critically, this lobby has never been anywhere near the core of what Japan wants or how it sees itself. Plenty of asset owners and managers come to Tokyo; but when the assets tend not to come with them, Japan as a whole just shrugs.

THE TIME IS NOW

For the Tokyo boosters, now may be the yearned-for breakthrough: Their cause might be winnable through an unexpected twist or two of geopolitics.

There are three genuine grounds for optimism. The first works around the idea that the global realignment of the chip industry, in parallel with the broader “de-risking” strategies of both Japanese and foreign companies, could draw businesses and even regional hubs away from China (and Hong Kong) and towards Tokyo. 

The revelation in May that South Korea’s Samsung was looking to establish a US$200 million research and development centre in Japan provided striking optics for the sense that old rules are crumbling quickly.

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Commentary: Is a national health insurance like South Korea or Singapore the way to go for Malaysia?

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In 2012, Mr Liow Tiong Lai tried to introduce 1Care national health insurance during former prime minister Najib Razak’s administration. The idea was not well-received by the people: One concern was healthcare cost escalation for Malaysians and contracts financed by public funds being outsourced to corporate interests.

Months before the 2018 general election, Dr Subramaniam Sathasivam announced the Voluntary Health Insurance as an incremental step towards a national health insurance, but the government lost the election. 

The winning coalition’s Dr Dzulkefly Ahmad also considered the idea but the Pakatan Harapan administration was short-lived. 

Mr Khairy Jamaluddin, who started the Health White Paper, said in 2022 that national health insurance is one of the forms of healthcare funding to be considered – something his successor has continued. 

Current Health Minister Dr Zaliha Mustafa announced in March that the White Paper will look into diversifying funding sources, with focus on a national health insurance scheme.

If the paper passes in parliament, the ministry will begin basic work required for the development of a national health insurance scheme, such as calculating contribution rates, developing health benefit packages and determining the payment mechanism for health service providers, she said.

WHY THE INTEREST IN A NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE?

It is given that more funding is needed, given the pressures on Malaysia’s health system, made worse by the pandemic.

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Commentary: Deciphering China’s mixed messages on US engagement after rejecting meeting between defence chiefs in Singapore

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But there has been communication through different channels recently. On May 8, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with US ambassador to China Nicholas Burns, suggesting the “pressing task is to stabilise the China-US relationship”.

Burns then met Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao on May 11, who subsequently went on to meet US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo on May 25 for “candid and substantive discussions” on the commercial relationship, according to the US readout.

The Wang-Raimondo meeting was the first Cabinet-level link-up since the balloon incident, but an arguably higher-level meeting was held on May 10 to 11 in Vienna between US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Politburo member Wang Yi, China’s senior-most diplomat. This meeting was a small step down from the Beijing trip US secretary of state Antony Blinken had planned in February and cancelled after the balloon incident, but still represented a willingness to engage at a senior level.

BUTTER, NOT GUNS

The series of meetings seemed to indicate a burgeoning rapprochement between the US and China. With both countries harbouring economic concerns, in the US as the inflationary fallout from the Ukraine war translates into higher interest rates and a possible recession, and in China as its post-COVID recovery sputters, greater communication seemed mutually beneficial.

But with China then rejecting an Austin-Li meeting, and not yet agreeing to a call between President Xi and President Biden despite weeks of Washington’s requests, a limit to re-engagement appears to have been reached.

In truth, there are specific circumstances preventing an Austin-Li meeting. The US has maintained sanctions against Li since 2018 under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act given Li’s role in procuring Russian military equipment. For Beijing, the sanctions on Li are an unacceptable background to any meeting, while Washington has thus far refused to remove them.

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Commentary: Don’t dismiss the fury over Fukushima’s water

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Pacific nations have a similar history. Though no country has suffered the death toll that Japan endured from nuclear weapons, the dozens of bombs tested in the Marshall Islands released energy about 5,000 times greater than that of those dropped on Japan. It left a grim legacy of cancers and birth defects.

Most Pacific nations became independent from their former colonial powers in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when both the US and Japan were looking to the region’s vast spaces as a dump for radioactive waste. Fighting against those policies and establishing a nuclear-free zone south of the equator was a foundational event for many young nations, quite as much as pacifism was in post-war Japan.

Some circumspection earlier in the process might have paid off. It took China’s aggressive diplomacy in the region before Japan, the US and Australia started to reverse decades of neglect and began making serious attempts to woo and listen to Pacific island governments. 

As recently as 2015, then-prime minister Shinzo Abe told a delegation of island leaders meeting some 40km from the Fukushima plant “to support Japan’s effort without being misled by rumours”.

That sort of scolding response was thankfully absent in his successor Fumio Kishida’s summit on the sidelines of the Group of Seven meeting earlier this month with Prime Minister Mark Brown of the Cook Islands. Pacific leaders, in turn, appear to have been mollified by the greater transparency and dialogue.

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Commentary: China is increasing its influence in Central Asia as part of global plans to offer an alternative to the West

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The countries at the summit recommitted to a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, to highways from China to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and to transport infrastructure for trans-Caspian trade routes using seaports in Kazakhstan and in Turkmenistan.

This focus on transport infrastructure in, and importantly across, central Asia highlights how important the region is for China’s attempts to diversify its trade routes to Europe away from Russia. 

It also means that China, for now, will continue to use infrastructure development and trade to recruit more partners for its alternative international order.

The Russian “northern corridor” is now largely closed as a result of Ukraine war-related sanctions. So the route often referred to as the middle corridor has regained importance not only for China but also, crucially, for the G7 countries.

However, the middle corridor, which begins in Turkey and continues via Georgia and through central Asia, would be risky for China as a sole alternative. Its capacity is low (currently only about 5 per cent of the northern corridor) because goods have to cross multiple borders and switch several times between road, rail and sea.

AFGHANISTAN’S ROLE

Another alternative – with similar geopolitical significance – is transporting through Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea via the Pakistani port of Gwadar. In the long term, a trans-Afghan route is in the interest of both China and Central Asia.

It would contribute to (but also depend on) stability and security in Afghanistan. And it would reduce China’s exposure to the risks associated with the existing route along the China-Pakistan economic corridor, especially those arising from the ongoing Taliban insurgency in Pakistan.

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