Commentary: Does China have the chops to play peacemaker in the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

By:
On:
In: Asia

China has maintained an active presence in wider diplomatic endeavours in an effort to legitimise its role as a mediator.

Encouraging endorsements from international figures, such as the leaders of France, Brazil and Spain, aid China’s aspirations to facilitate a ceasefire. China’s special envoy on Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, has been on a diplomatic marathon, engaging with key stakeholders in Ukraine, Poland, France, Germany and Russia.

While these deliberate diplomatic interventions have not yet yielded substantive outcomes, they highlight China’s commitment to resolving the conflict.

But playing a mediator role could be a high-stakes gamble for China. Both Russia and Ukraine hold entrenched positions and the requisite conditions for dialogue – a genuine commitment to negotiation and a ceasefire – are missing. While there’s a certain plausibility to Xi’s assertion that “dialogue and negotiations are the only viable way forward”, it contrasts with the United States’ decision to back its allies in training Ukrainian forces to operate F-16 fighter jets.

The US move to enable the supply of Western jets to Ukraine could intensify the conflict and render Beijing’s mediation efforts futile, casting a shadow over China’s image as a peace broker.

While the culmination of China’s mediation efforts remains uncertain, the success of China’s role in resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict depends on its diplomatic capabilities and the dynamics of global politics. The international community is keenly observing China’s careful diplomatic manoeuvring amid the escalating tensions.

The tangible impact and effectiveness of China’s mediation will ultimately be evaluated on the basis of its ability to bring about a swift and peaceful resolution to the conflict – a metric that underscores the urgency of solving this international crisis.

Xiaoli Guo is Visiting Fellow at the Australian Centre on China at the World at The Australian National University. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

Continue Reading

Commentary: Tokyo could win ‘not China’ global hub status – but it must want it

By:
On:
In: Asia

It does not matter, in this theory, whether you call what is happening “decoupling”, or sand its edges and call it “de-risking”. Business is reshaping, finance will follow and in historic realignment, runs the logic of avarice, there is always historic opportunity.

This type of conversation plays as sweet music to the promoters of Tokyo’s ambitions as a global financial centre: A strangely skeletal and necessarily patient lobby whose zeal has traditionally risen in inverse proportion to any serious signals of success. 

Critically, this lobby has never been anywhere near the core of what Japan wants or how it sees itself. Plenty of asset owners and managers come to Tokyo; but when the assets tend not to come with them, Japan as a whole just shrugs.

THE TIME IS NOW

For the Tokyo boosters, now may be the yearned-for breakthrough: Their cause might be winnable through an unexpected twist or two of geopolitics.

There are three genuine grounds for optimism. The first works around the idea that the global realignment of the chip industry, in parallel with the broader “de-risking” strategies of both Japanese and foreign companies, could draw businesses and even regional hubs away from China (and Hong Kong) and towards Tokyo. 

The revelation in May that South Korea’s Samsung was looking to establish a US$200 million research and development centre in Japan provided striking optics for the sense that old rules are crumbling quickly.

Continue Reading

Commentary: Is a national health insurance like South Korea or Singapore the way to go for Malaysia?

By:
On:
In: Asia

In 2012, Mr Liow Tiong Lai tried to introduce 1Care national health insurance during former prime minister Najib Razak’s administration. The idea was not well-received by the people: One concern was healthcare cost escalation for Malaysians and contracts financed by public funds being outsourced to corporate interests.

Months before the 2018 general election, Dr Subramaniam Sathasivam announced the Voluntary Health Insurance as an incremental step towards a national health insurance, but the government lost the election. 

The winning coalition’s Dr Dzulkefly Ahmad also considered the idea but the Pakatan Harapan administration was short-lived. 

Mr Khairy Jamaluddin, who started the Health White Paper, said in 2022 that national health insurance is one of the forms of healthcare funding to be considered – something his successor has continued. 

Current Health Minister Dr Zaliha Mustafa announced in March that the White Paper will look into diversifying funding sources, with focus on a national health insurance scheme.

If the paper passes in parliament, the ministry will begin basic work required for the development of a national health insurance scheme, such as calculating contribution rates, developing health benefit packages and determining the payment mechanism for health service providers, she said.

WHY THE INTEREST IN A NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE?

It is given that more funding is needed, given the pressures on Malaysia’s health system, made worse by the pandemic.

Continue Reading

Commentary: Deciphering China’s mixed messages on US engagement after rejecting meeting between defence chiefs in Singapore

By:
On:
In: Asia

But there has been communication through different channels recently. On May 8, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with US ambassador to China Nicholas Burns, suggesting the “pressing task is to stabilise the China-US relationship”.

Burns then met Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao on May 11, who subsequently went on to meet US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo on May 25 for “candid and substantive discussions” on the commercial relationship, according to the US readout.

The Wang-Raimondo meeting was the first Cabinet-level link-up since the balloon incident, but an arguably higher-level meeting was held on May 10 to 11 in Vienna between US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Politburo member Wang Yi, China’s senior-most diplomat. This meeting was a small step down from the Beijing trip US secretary of state Antony Blinken had planned in February and cancelled after the balloon incident, but still represented a willingness to engage at a senior level.

BUTTER, NOT GUNS

The series of meetings seemed to indicate a burgeoning rapprochement between the US and China. With both countries harbouring economic concerns, in the US as the inflationary fallout from the Ukraine war translates into higher interest rates and a possible recession, and in China as its post-COVID recovery sputters, greater communication seemed mutually beneficial.

But with China then rejecting an Austin-Li meeting, and not yet agreeing to a call between President Xi and President Biden despite weeks of Washington’s requests, a limit to re-engagement appears to have been reached.

In truth, there are specific circumstances preventing an Austin-Li meeting. The US has maintained sanctions against Li since 2018 under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act given Li’s role in procuring Russian military equipment. For Beijing, the sanctions on Li are an unacceptable background to any meeting, while Washington has thus far refused to remove them.

Continue Reading

Commentary: Don’t dismiss the fury over Fukushima’s water

By:
On:
In: Asia

Pacific nations have a similar history. Though no country has suffered the death toll that Japan endured from nuclear weapons, the dozens of bombs tested in the Marshall Islands released energy about 5,000 times greater than that of those dropped on Japan. It left a grim legacy of cancers and birth defects.

Most Pacific nations became independent from their former colonial powers in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when both the US and Japan were looking to the region’s vast spaces as a dump for radioactive waste. Fighting against those policies and establishing a nuclear-free zone south of the equator was a foundational event for many young nations, quite as much as pacifism was in post-war Japan.

Some circumspection earlier in the process might have paid off. It took China’s aggressive diplomacy in the region before Japan, the US and Australia started to reverse decades of neglect and began making serious attempts to woo and listen to Pacific island governments. 

As recently as 2015, then-prime minister Shinzo Abe told a delegation of island leaders meeting some 40km from the Fukushima plant “to support Japan’s effort without being misled by rumours”.

That sort of scolding response was thankfully absent in his successor Fumio Kishida’s summit on the sidelines of the Group of Seven meeting earlier this month with Prime Minister Mark Brown of the Cook Islands. Pacific leaders, in turn, appear to have been mollified by the greater transparency and dialogue.

Continue Reading

Commentary: China is increasing its influence in Central Asia as part of global plans to offer an alternative to the West

By:
On:
In: Asia

The countries at the summit recommitted to a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, to highways from China to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and to transport infrastructure for trans-Caspian trade routes using seaports in Kazakhstan and in Turkmenistan.

This focus on transport infrastructure in, and importantly across, central Asia highlights how important the region is for China’s attempts to diversify its trade routes to Europe away from Russia. 

It also means that China, for now, will continue to use infrastructure development and trade to recruit more partners for its alternative international order.

The Russian “northern corridor” is now largely closed as a result of Ukraine war-related sanctions. So the route often referred to as the middle corridor has regained importance not only for China but also, crucially, for the G7 countries.

However, the middle corridor, which begins in Turkey and continues via Georgia and through central Asia, would be risky for China as a sole alternative. Its capacity is low (currently only about 5 per cent of the northern corridor) because goods have to cross multiple borders and switch several times between road, rail and sea.

AFGHANISTAN’S ROLE

Another alternative – with similar geopolitical significance – is transporting through Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea via the Pakistani port of Gwadar. In the long term, a trans-Afghan route is in the interest of both China and Central Asia.

It would contribute to (but also depend on) stability and security in Afghanistan. And it would reduce China’s exposure to the risks associated with the existing route along the China-Pakistan economic corridor, especially those arising from the ongoing Taliban insurgency in Pakistan.

Continue Reading

Commentary: Xi Jinping’s Taiwan ambitions threaten China’s rise

By:
On:
In: Asia

Like the Japanese before the second world war, the Chinese complain that the US is trying to strangle their economy. America denies any such intention, arguing that its restrictions on tech exports are narrowly aimed at China’s war-fighting capability.

But even if the US had a broader plan to thwart Chinese economic growth, any such efforts would probably be unsuccessful.

IMPRESSIVE ECONOMIC RISE

Like most countries, China has its share of problems. But the country’s economic rise remains impressive. This year China is projected to become the world’s largest exporter of cars, displacing Japan.

China is doing particularly well with the electronic vehicles that will dominate the future. Bill Gates argues that American tech-export bans are likely to be counter-productive, encouraging China to develop its own capabilities much more rapidly.

The Microsoft founder told me recently: “I don’t think the US will ever be successful at preventing China from having great chips.”

The CEOs of some of the West’s most powerful companies, such as Tim Cook of Apple, have made it very clear that they have no intention of walking away from China.

As a self-proclaimed Marxist, Xi should understand that global political power flows from economic power. China does not need to win a shooting war to expand its international power and influence. Trade, aid and investment will do the job without any of the attendant risk and bloodshed.

Continue Reading

Commentary: Pakistan faces another lost decade as the army takes on Khan

By:
On:
In: Asia

But so was a model Pakistan Air Force jet, army installations in the garrison city of Rawalpindi and even the house of the senior military officer in Lahore once owned by Pakistan’s founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah. There’s no doubt in the protestors’ minds of who is to blame for Khan’s arrest: Pakistan’s military, which has run the country openly and from the shadows for most of its independent history.

We don’t know the truth of the many corruption allegations against Khan. The one he was arrested for involves Pakistan’s largest construction magnate, who was supposed to hand over £190 million (US$238 million) to the treasury, but was allowed to use it to pay down his tax debt instead. The government has accused Khan of receiving “donations” for one of his university projects as a payoff.

FROM BEING THE ARMY’S CHOICE TO ITS BANE

Unfortunately, however, the facts of this or other cases don’t matter. Khan’s supporters will argue that his troubles are all because the military wants him out. And that is undeniably true. It’s equally undeniable, however, that the military wanted him in first. 

Khan’s two decades in the political wilderness only ended when the army put its massive thumb on the electoral scales in 2018, jailing and intimidating Khan’s opponents and ushering him into the prime minister’s office.

That it’s the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) being used against Khan is particularly telling, since it was originally set up by a former military dictator, Pervez Musharraf, to “put the fear of God” into Pakistan’s political elite. And it was, most recently, used to go after the military’s previous public enemy number one, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, as well as his brother, the current PM.

The military succeeded in pushing Nawaz Sharif out of politics to get Khan in; and now they have made peace with his brother, in order to push Khan out. They have used the NAB, the media, and even judges to keep Pakistan’s politicians under control.

Continue Reading

Commentary: How Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida got his groove back

By:
On:
In: Asia

He’s taken a page or two out of Abe’s playbook. The late leader became a master of sticking it out through scandals, relying on internal support – and a lack of alternatives – to wait until the media ran out of material. While Kishida doesn’t have Abe’s control of the party, he’s been aided by the fact that the Abe faction, the LDP’s largest grouping, remains in disarray and has yet to choose a new leader.

DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVOURS

Fortune has favoured him in other ways. Kishida’s strengths lie in international diplomacy, and he took power in a post-COVID world at a time when he could shine.

A visit to Kyiv in March contrasted well with Xi Jinping meeting Vladimir Putin at the same time. This month, he courted the Global South with a multi-stage visit to Africa, the first for a Japanese leader in nearly a decade.

Thanks largely to the Biden administration’s increasingly tough stance on China, Tokyo is gaining global relevance as Washington seeks allies to contain Beijing’s rise – a multi-pronged strategy espoused by Abe. US pressure was also a likely factor in the outreach from South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, who has sought to repair ties strained for years.

That has enabled Kishida to get good press for hosting his counterpart in Tokyo and, in a quick turnaround, reciprocating that visit this week in Seoul. After Yoon’s trip to Washington last month, President Joe Biden can paint a picture of an alliance on China’s doorstep, one in which Japan features front and centre. That Kishida, in effect, let Seoul blink first in seeking to mend relations also helps at home, where the public is weary of demands for wartime apologies.

REFRESHED MANDATE

Domestically, things are going Kishida’s way, too. On Monday (May 8), the country drew a line under the pandemic by downgrading coronavirus to the same status as seasonal influenza, ending most COVID-era measures. The return of throngs of foreign tourists will help boost parts of the economy and stabilize the yen, contributing to a sense of an economic pickup even if its actual impact is limited.

The premier’s quick return to the campaign trail last month following a failed assassination attempt made him look like leadership material. The left-field choice of governor for the Bank of Japan – one that, if mishandled, had the potential to roil the economy – has so far paid off, with Kazuo Ueda toeing the line on easy money.

Continue Reading

Commentary: There’s no missing the political signal behind the sunken warship drill by US, Philippines

By:
On:
In: Asia

MILITARY MIGHT

In 2016, Duterte scaled back on his original plan to impose a blanket moratorium on military exercises with the Americans, instead approving the continuation of Balikatan and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).

He mandated that joint military training exercises with the US had to focus on civic action and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as “less assault exercises”. Some key exercises were dropped in accordance with Duterte’s desire to do away with “showy war games”. Duterte also ordered the transfer of Philippine-US exercises customarily conducted in regions facing the South China Sea to be relocated to Mindanao in order to “not offend our neighbours”.

As a result, the annual exercise in 2017 was scaled down to just 5,400 troops from both sides, a sharp drop from about 11,000 the previous year, and the war game component was dropped. True to Duterte’s directives, there were no activities held in Palawan facing the South China Sea, and no live-firing in Zambales which is close to Scarborough Shoal, which Beijing maintained de facto control over.

The exercises in the following year saw a rebound in participation at 8,000 troops, including also amphibious landing drills in Zambales – at a time when China reportedly deployed missile systems to the Spratly Islands.

In 2019, more than 7,500 troops participated in exercises in Luzon, again facing the South China Sea, at a time when a Chinese boat swarm loitered off Philippine-held Thitu Island in the Spratlys.

Despite Duterte’s 2016 directives de-emphasising a “showy wargame” approach, the nature and scale of the 2019 exercises were anything but. It featured the US Navy’s amphibious assault ship Wasp which embarked the US Marine Corps F-35B joint strike fighters – the first time these jets were deployed for Balikatan.

Again, an amphibious assault landing exercise was conducted in Zambales and despite being couched under the official “counterterrorism” cover, those forces and manoeuvres involved made the drills appear closer to simulating a warfighting scenario instead. An airfield assault drill was also arranged at the Philippine military’s request – which is interesting given Manila’s sole airfield in the Spratlys is located on Thitu Island.

Balikatan was not held in 2020 due to COVID-19, whereas the 2021 iteration was a heavily down-scaled one with fewer than 700 troops participating not due to geopolitical considerations – given the Philippine-Chinese flareup over Whitsun Reef in the South China Sea early that year – but pandemic restrictions.

In 2022, however, the exercise rebounded in scale, involving 8,900 troops. The US deployed for the first time an amphibious insertion of a Patriot anti-missile system, while the Philippines showcased its newly acquired weapon systems and platforms.

Continue Reading