Commentary: Can China help bring peace to Myanmar?

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With more high-level engagement likely soon, the question of how China can encourage positive outcomes for Myanmar requires a focus on its core interests. While Myanmar’s economic growth until the coup was advantageous, the fact that the coup leaders are almost friendless – and despised even in ASEAN – offers a different upside.

CHINA’S COURSE OF ACTION

For now, China can harness the Myanmar military’s appetite for attack aircraft, heavy weapons and constant resupply of ammunition and technical equipment to bolster its role as the patron-in-chief. Russia has traditionally taken a similar approach. For Beijing and Moscow, Myanmar is part of a convenient global constellation of countries pushed to the outer edge of the international system.

Whatever its short-term strategy, it would help China’s standing in ASEAN, and even in countries like Australia, if it showed a creative instinct to use its wealth and influence to broker better outcomes for the people of Myanmar.

The fear is that China will instead continue to manipulate Myanmar’s impoverished and downtrodden status while fuelling, through its lucrative weapons exports, some of the most atrocious violence seen in Southeast Asia for generations.

When the dust finally settles in Myanmar, its people will rightly ask who sustained the reviled military regime. Right now, the answer is that Beijing offered “friendship” to the coup-makers, an irony for a Communist Party so committed to regime and institutional stability.

Yet with the right attention to China’s role and self-interests, it is still possible to imagine shifting positions, where Chinese institutions eventually work out how to negotiate a more peaceful settlement. At a time when China talks regularly about peace in European, Middle Eastern and African conflict zones, a positive contribution in Myanmar would be welcomed by all.

Nicholas Farrelly is Professor and Head of Social Sciences at the University of Tasmania. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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Commentary: Thailand’s military machinations will define post-election political manoeuvring

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Prawit-loyalist Assistant Army Chief General Suksan Nongbualuang has a chance to beat out Jaroenchai as Army Commander, after which Pana would succeed him. Should Pita or Srettha become prime minister, they would likely prefer the weaker General Ukrit Boontanonda to be army chief.

But a military selection board, dominated by arch-royalist service chiefs, votes on promotions above the level of general and it is doubtful that Ukrit would get the nod. Moreover, though Pita or Srettha could try to cancel Prayut’s reshuffle, Jaroenchai, as Deputy Army Commander, would simply become the acting chief and only he or Suksan could pass the board. 

The leadership of Thailand’s army-dominant military will not be obedient to progressive civilian leaders and look set to oppose any reformist measures by Move Forward or Pheu Thai.

Thailand’s progressive 2023 election winners are confronted by a gauntlet of obstacles. Move Forward and Pheu Thai face cases before the Election Commission and must pass the junta-appointed Senate. 

An alternative coalition comprising only conservative parties or Pheu Thai with conservative parties could easily form, especially if the Election Commission disqualifies Move Forward MPs. 

If a progressive prime minister takes office, Thailand will likely look forward to growing pandemonium. Meanwhile, caretaker Prime Minister Prayut will use the reshuffle to ensure that the military leadership remains firmly independent of elected civilian control for years to come.

Dr Paul Chambers is Lecturer at the Centre of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Thailand. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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Commentary: Titanic sub – why is extreme ‘frontier travel’ booming despite the risks?

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In many instances that danger remains, but the commercial transaction strips away the perceived risks involved. Marketing materials aim to sell “safe” adventures, with the risks often listed in the fine print. A polar plunge in Antarctica, for instance, is often marketed as safe because participants are attached to a tether and the swim time is limited to prevent hypothermia.

Two decades ago, in forecasting the growth of space tourism, anthropologist Valene Smith said what tourists want, the industry will provide. This has become a truism, as the Titan voyages demonstrate.

The massive growth of frontier tourism could lead to even greater problems if the industry doesn’t respond in the right way. If travellers are going to expose themselves to extreme risks, whose responsibility is it, then, to ensure their safety and recovery should accidents occur?

Many tourism businesses and travel insurance companies make risks known to their guests. But regulations on disclosing risks differ between countries. This means travellers may have to evaluate the risks themselves, and this is fraught with danger if company standards are low.

One solution is frontier tourism might be best experienced in controlled and safe environments through digital storytelling or augmented and mixed reality. However, this may not be enough to satisfy the adrenaline junkies out there.

As the Titan incident illustrates, the unpredictable nature and unintended consequences of frontier tourism are very real things. While money can allow us to travel almost anywhere, it’s worth considering whether some places should just remain untouched, sacred and off-limits completely.

Anne Hardy, Can Seng Ooi and Hanne E F Nielsen are academics at University of Tasmania. Joseph M Cheer is Professor of Sustainable Tourism and Heritage, Western Sydney University. This commentary first appeared on The Conversation.

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Commentary: What to make of Biden’s bewildering remark equating Xi to “dictators”?

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Mr Biden’s words may rankle, but so did the Wall Street Journal report immediately following Mr Blinken’s visit that China plans to open a military training facility in Cuba, about 145km from the Florida coast. Nothing about Blinken-Xi meeting should suggest that US and China will neglect to pursue their own interests. 

WHEN IS A GAFFE NOT A GAFFE?

Mr Biden’s “dictator” remark is against protocol, and to the extent that it makes some of his goals vis-a-vis relations with China more difficult to achieve, a mistake. However, it is very much in keeping with his more general view about China and US interests. 

For Mr Biden, a central tenet of his foreign policy is that the competition between democracies and autocracies is a primary global struggle that will define the future, and that both America and the world are better off and more secure with a strong US capable of rallying democratic allies to meet contemporary challenges. 

Thus, while Mr Biden’s choice of language is ill-advised, it highlights the divide he sees between the US and China.

There is no question that words can stoke tensions. Mr Biden’s statement that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid if China were to launch an unprovoked attack annoys Beijing and sends US diplomats and aides into a frenzy of clarification that US policy on “One China” has not changed. 

Yet, having repeated the same “misstatement” on several occasions, Mr Biden is sending a message of a more assertive US foreign policy.

BIDEN’S REMARKS PLAY WELL DOMESTICALLY

While such messages are potentially destabilising for foreign policy, it is important to remember that they usually play well to a domestic audience. Mr Biden’s remark are unlikely to give him problems at home.

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Snap Insight: What progress did US Secretary of State Blinken make in China visit?

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Topics such as Taiwan, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, setting guardrails (especially for the US) and de-risking (instead of “decoupling”, since eschewed by US and G7 leaders) would all be on the agenda.

A breakthrough is unlikely, given the current lack of trust, but being able to “sense-make” the other in understanding how these issues are being spoken about might provide clues as to what policy steps may be possible moving forward.

In other words, a meeting – even in the absence of any clear policy outcomes – between both sides is better than refusing to meet, at the risk of further misunderstandings or suspicions towards one another. As Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said when he met Mr Blinken in Washington DC on Saturday, the trip was “essential, but not sufficient”.

We are likely to witness more cycles of ups and downs. Both sides will have their own political calculations to make. So, anxious as the rest of the world may be when it comes to US-China relations, we should not be overly excited about the prospect of change nor be exasperated if things do not move the way we expect.

The hope now is that Mr Blinken’s visit will pave the way for more conversation between Mr Xi and Mr Biden after the two leaders last met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in November 2022. Ultimately, staying in the conversation is still better than not.

Benjamin Ho is an assistant professor and coordinator of the China Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

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Commentary: Why investigating China for COVID-19 biowarfare allegations pose challenges

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The interesting thing about the new report is not just that it says it has new evidence, but that it claims its data shows Chinese scientists were researching coronaviruses in relation to biowarfare. Biowarfare is the deliberate use of disease and biological agents to cause harm.

A US investigator is quoted in the article as asserting that Chinese scientists were working on a vaccine. The allegation is that the Chinese military wanted a vaccine to inoculate their own population if they ever wanted to use the virus for biowarfare. With a vaccine, says the report, China “might have a weapon to shift the balance of world power”.

Claims that China was developing biological weapons have been made by Dany Shoham, a former Israeli intelligence officer and biowarfare expert. Others staunchly reject this accusation. A US National Intelligence Council report said of COVID-19: “We judge the virus was not developed as a biological weapon.”

NEXT STEPS – MORE DATA?

So, what could the rest of the world do about these new allegations – if anything?

The dispute over whether COVID-19 was created by Chinese scientists is still as hot as ever. States may feel they need more information.

We have already seen something similar happen in Syria in relation to chemical weapons, which are said to have been used during the conflict there. Despite the former US president Barack Obama calling the use of chemical weapons a “red line”, Washington said it did not wish to act until they felt the evidence of chemical warfare was incontrovertible.

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Commentary: Does China have the chops to play peacemaker in the Russia-Ukraine conflict?

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China has maintained an active presence in wider diplomatic endeavours in an effort to legitimise its role as a mediator.

Encouraging endorsements from international figures, such as the leaders of France, Brazil and Spain, aid China’s aspirations to facilitate a ceasefire. China’s special envoy on Eurasian affairs, Li Hui, has been on a diplomatic marathon, engaging with key stakeholders in Ukraine, Poland, France, Germany and Russia.

While these deliberate diplomatic interventions have not yet yielded substantive outcomes, they highlight China’s commitment to resolving the conflict.

But playing a mediator role could be a high-stakes gamble for China. Both Russia and Ukraine hold entrenched positions and the requisite conditions for dialogue – a genuine commitment to negotiation and a ceasefire – are missing. While there’s a certain plausibility to Xi’s assertion that “dialogue and negotiations are the only viable way forward”, it contrasts with the United States’ decision to back its allies in training Ukrainian forces to operate F-16 fighter jets.

The US move to enable the supply of Western jets to Ukraine could intensify the conflict and render Beijing’s mediation efforts futile, casting a shadow over China’s image as a peace broker.

While the culmination of China’s mediation efforts remains uncertain, the success of China’s role in resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict depends on its diplomatic capabilities and the dynamics of global politics. The international community is keenly observing China’s careful diplomatic manoeuvring amid the escalating tensions.

The tangible impact and effectiveness of China’s mediation will ultimately be evaluated on the basis of its ability to bring about a swift and peaceful resolution to the conflict – a metric that underscores the urgency of solving this international crisis.

Xiaoli Guo is Visiting Fellow at the Australian Centre on China at the World at The Australian National University. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.

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Commentary: Tokyo could win ‘not China’ global hub status – but it must want it

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It does not matter, in this theory, whether you call what is happening “decoupling”, or sand its edges and call it “de-risking”. Business is reshaping, finance will follow and in historic realignment, runs the logic of avarice, there is always historic opportunity.

This type of conversation plays as sweet music to the promoters of Tokyo’s ambitions as a global financial centre: A strangely skeletal and necessarily patient lobby whose zeal has traditionally risen in inverse proportion to any serious signals of success. 

Critically, this lobby has never been anywhere near the core of what Japan wants or how it sees itself. Plenty of asset owners and managers come to Tokyo; but when the assets tend not to come with them, Japan as a whole just shrugs.

THE TIME IS NOW

For the Tokyo boosters, now may be the yearned-for breakthrough: Their cause might be winnable through an unexpected twist or two of geopolitics.

There are three genuine grounds for optimism. The first works around the idea that the global realignment of the chip industry, in parallel with the broader “de-risking” strategies of both Japanese and foreign companies, could draw businesses and even regional hubs away from China (and Hong Kong) and towards Tokyo. 

The revelation in May that South Korea’s Samsung was looking to establish a US$200 million research and development centre in Japan provided striking optics for the sense that old rules are crumbling quickly.

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Commentary: Is a national health insurance like South Korea or Singapore the way to go for Malaysia?

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In 2012, Mr Liow Tiong Lai tried to introduce 1Care national health insurance during former prime minister Najib Razak’s administration. The idea was not well-received by the people: One concern was healthcare cost escalation for Malaysians and contracts financed by public funds being outsourced to corporate interests.

Months before the 2018 general election, Dr Subramaniam Sathasivam announced the Voluntary Health Insurance as an incremental step towards a national health insurance, but the government lost the election. 

The winning coalition’s Dr Dzulkefly Ahmad also considered the idea but the Pakatan Harapan administration was short-lived. 

Mr Khairy Jamaluddin, who started the Health White Paper, said in 2022 that national health insurance is one of the forms of healthcare funding to be considered – something his successor has continued. 

Current Health Minister Dr Zaliha Mustafa announced in March that the White Paper will look into diversifying funding sources, with focus on a national health insurance scheme.

If the paper passes in parliament, the ministry will begin basic work required for the development of a national health insurance scheme, such as calculating contribution rates, developing health benefit packages and determining the payment mechanism for health service providers, she said.

WHY THE INTEREST IN A NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE?

It is given that more funding is needed, given the pressures on Malaysia’s health system, made worse by the pandemic.

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Commentary: Deciphering China’s mixed messages on US engagement after rejecting meeting between defence chiefs in Singapore

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But there has been communication through different channels recently. On May 8, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with US ambassador to China Nicholas Burns, suggesting the “pressing task is to stabilise the China-US relationship”.

Burns then met Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao on May 11, who subsequently went on to meet US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo on May 25 for “candid and substantive discussions” on the commercial relationship, according to the US readout.

The Wang-Raimondo meeting was the first Cabinet-level link-up since the balloon incident, but an arguably higher-level meeting was held on May 10 to 11 in Vienna between US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Politburo member Wang Yi, China’s senior-most diplomat. This meeting was a small step down from the Beijing trip US secretary of state Antony Blinken had planned in February and cancelled after the balloon incident, but still represented a willingness to engage at a senior level.

BUTTER, NOT GUNS

The series of meetings seemed to indicate a burgeoning rapprochement between the US and China. With both countries harbouring economic concerns, in the US as the inflationary fallout from the Ukraine war translates into higher interest rates and a possible recession, and in China as its post-COVID recovery sputters, greater communication seemed mutually beneficial.

But with China then rejecting an Austin-Li meeting, and not yet agreeing to a call between President Xi and President Biden despite weeks of Washington’s requests, a limit to re-engagement appears to have been reached.

In truth, there are specific circumstances preventing an Austin-Li meeting. The US has maintained sanctions against Li since 2018 under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act given Li’s role in procuring Russian military equipment. For Beijing, the sanctions on Li are an unacceptable background to any meeting, while Washington has thus far refused to remove them.

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