Sweden’s Saab is getting up to speed in building the next generation of A26 Blekinge-class conventional submarines (SSK), with a forward-looking design that anticipates capability requirements for future seafloor warfare.
This month, Naval News reported that Saab laid the keel of the first A26 SSK for the Royal Swedish Navy, the soon-to-be RSwN Blekinge, at Karlskrona, southern Sweden in late June.
The report said that Sweden plans to build two Blekinge subs, expected to be delivered in 2027 and 2028, respectively. However, the Swedish Navy is contemplating whether five new boats would be enough for its security needs since its three Gotland SSKs will need to be replaced in the 2030s.
The A26 prominently features a unique Multi-Mission Portal (MMP), or an enlarged torpedo tube in the middle of the submarine. The MMP can accommodate swimmers, diving equipment, and manned and unmanned submersibles for special missions.
Commenting on the A26’s unique feature, Naval News cites naval expert H I Sutton as saying that the recent Nord Stream pipeline and Crimea Bridge incidents show the importance of having seabed warfare capabilities.
That, Sutton says, opens the possibility for the A26 to launch and recover remote-operated vehicles/autonomous underwater vehicles (ROV/AUV) such as Saab’s Sabertooth in defense and offensive missions.
Saab advertises the Sabertooth as a powerful but lightweight inspection, maintenance and repair (IMR) platform. Its small, tether-free operation and maneuverability ensure easy and safe access in and around complex underwater structures.
The source states that Sabertooth can use various tooling packages and be operated via fiber cable or through-water communication. Saab also claims that the Sabertooth can swim autonomously to the docking unit and remain there 24/7 for six months, eliminating the need for surface vessels.
ROV/AUVs such as the Sabertooth and similar models may have been involved in September’s Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline explosion and Crimea Bridge blast. At the same time, China may have taken cues from the incidents in planning a possible attack on Taiwan’s undersea internet cables in a blockade scenario.
Military sabotage is the leading hypothesis behind the Nord Stream 1 blast. Whoever was behind the explosion may have used combat divers, self-propelled mines or underwater drones to plant the explosive charges that gutted the underwater pipeline, The Economic Times reported.
Citing an unnamed military source, The Economic Times states that an attacker can operate an underwater drone from a submarine stationed several nautical miles from the target. The military source said that since the pipeline is a fixed target, it would not be too difficult for a remote attack.
An underwater drone attack is also one of the leading hypotheses for the Crimea Bridge explosion, which no party to date has claimed responsibility. This month‘s Molfar open-source intelligence community report states that a US-supplied underwater drone may have been responsible for the blast.
The source says that camera footage from the bridge shows a white object between two pillars moving with the water. Ukrainian forces retrieved a water drone for special operations at Sevastopol this April.
In both instances, Asia Times reported that the US Seafox ROV/AUV may have been responsible for the explosions. The Seafox carries a 1.4-kilogram-shaped charge capable of punching a hole through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, although for the Nord Stream 1 and Crimea Bridge blasts it might have carried larger or even multiple explosive charges.
Given those incidents, China may have taken elements from Sweden’s A26 submarine, as seen in its latest SSK. Asia Times has previously reported on China’s Type 39 C/D, which has several design similarities with Sweden’s A26, most notably its angled-sail design. However, it is unknown if the Type 39 C/D design is an outright A26 copy or is the result of common design requirements.
As with the A26, China’s Type 39C/D may also operate ROV/AUVs. In China’s case, it may be used to tap or sever Taiwan’s undersea cables should China enforce a blockade of the self-governing island. Such a blockade may not only aim to starve Taiwan of energy supplies but also critical information and communications.
The use of submarines to cut or tap undersea cables is not a new practice, although this highly-specialized capability remains within the purview of leading military powers. For example, submarines such as Russia’s Losharik spy submarine and the USS Jimmy Carter carry specialized equipment for that mission.
It is plausible that China may equip its Type 39 C/D with specialized ROV/AUVs that can sever or tap into Taiwan’s extensive undersea cables to cut the island’s access to outside information, gather sensitive military intelligence and cripple Taiwan’s communications with the US and its allies.
As with leading military powers, China is known to use ROV/AUVs for military purposes. Asia Times has previously reported on China’s use of ROV/AUVs to gather oceanographic data in support of submarine operations in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. They may also be used to cut or tap Taiwan’s undersea internet cables.
This August, the Mercatus Center of George Mason University published a report noting that nearly all internet traffic passes through undersea cables. It also highlights the vulnerability of Taiwan’s undersea internet cables in the event of a Chinese blockade of the self-governing island. As of August 2022, Taiwan was connected to 15 undersea cables, which come ashore at three landing stations at New Taipei, Toucheng in the north and Fangshan in the south.
Those points roughly correspond to the locations of China’s August live-fire naval drills off Taiwan, launched in response to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island. Asia Times has previously noted that such exercises are not just for show but mark the first phase of China’s “reunification” of Taiwan with the mainland through a blockade that it can prolong indefinitely.
While China’s August live-fire drills were intended to signal its displeasure and capability to blockade Taiwan at will, it can choose to escalate by denying air and sea traffic to Taiwan and cutting off its undersea cables.
China may opt to use a squeeze-and-relax approach to Taiwan, a strategy of military exercises that amount to blockades with a tighter military noose increasing the threat level.
As submarines are expected to be China’s workhorses in enforcing a blockade of Taiwan, its Type 39 C/D may be equipped with its version of Saab’s Sabertooth ROV/AUV to cut or tap into Taiwan’s undersea internet cables, which would adversely affect the US and its allies including South Korea and Japan.